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ABSTRACT

Moving Forward: Railways in Puerto Rico
by
Gricel M. Surillo Luna

Advisor: Laird W. Bergad

In the second half of the nineteenth century the establishment of railways was essential for
the progress and modernization of the Puerto Rican economy. Railroads were fundamental and
slowly appeared along the coast reaching their highest level of development in the first decade of the
twentieth century. After the First World War, however, the railroads faced economic challenges, and
competition with trucks and automobiles became a serious matter. During the depression of the
1930s, the state started to show unwillingness to aid railroads. The exclusion of the railroads from
the new industrial model developed during the 1940s when a new conception of progress and
modernity transformed the railroads into an obsolete means of transportation.
This study is about the transformation of the railroads in the efforts to build a modern Puerto
Rican economy. Railroads signified progress and modernity during the nineteenth century to become
symbols of inefficiency and tradition tied to the sugar business in the mid-twentieth century.
Automobiles, buses, and trucks became new symbols of modernity and progress for a country
struggling to overcome economic backwardness.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation was possible thanks to the support of various friends and colleagues. The
cartography was a contribution of geographer Héctor Sánchez Graterole to whom I will always be
grateful. I appreciate the suggestions of Professors Jalil Sued, José Molineli, and José Luis Pons.
Another important support came from John Caro for proof reading the manuscript.
I received important support from the staff at the Archivo General de Puerto Rico, the
Colección Puertorriqueña in the library of the Universidad de Puerto Rico, Río Piedras, and
especially to Professor Josué Caamaño Dones for the digitalization of documents in the Centro de
Investigaciones Históricas also in the Universidad de Puerto Rico, Río Piedras Campus. In New
York I receive the help from the staff in the Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños at Hunter College,
the Graduate Center Library, and the New York Public Library.
Finally, I am eternally in debt to the all the support received from my family in all the
process of fulfilling the doctoral degree. For them, all my love and gratitude.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction: State of the research .................................................................................................. 1
Chapter I. On the road to progress ................................................................................................ 17
Chapter II. A beltway railroad ...................................................................................................... 68
Chapter III. Railroad boom ......................................................................................................... 119
Chapter IV: Time of challenges .................................................................................................. 200
Chapter V: Railways under attack .............................................................................................. 253
Chapter VI: The collapse ............................................................................................................ 286
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 314
Appendix 1 .................................................................................................................................. 321
Appendix 2 .................................................................................................................................. 324
Appendix 3 .................................................................................................................................. 325
Appendix 4 .................................................................................................................................. 326
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 327

vi

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1. Daily departures of the Río Piedras Tramway ..................................................58
Table 2.1. Budget for the development of public works in Puerto Rico, 1885 .................69
Table 2.2. Length of rail lines and its sections with its rates to calculate state subvention.79
Table 2.3. Quarterly Gross Income for operating sections in Line A, B and C, Fiscal Year 18921893....................................................................................................................................92
Table 2.4. Selected general tariffs for high and low speed railroads, 1890 .....................100
Table 2.5. Fares for passengers in different accommodations, 1893. ..............................103
Table 2.6. Tobacco Fares in the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto-Rico, 1895..104
Table 2.7. Schedule for section A, 1896. ........................................................................107
Table 2.8. Wages of railroad employees, 1897 ................................................................114
Table 3.1. Timetable of the American Railroad Company of Porto Rico, 1901 .............146
Table 3.2. Timetable of the Porto Rico Transportation Company, 1914 .........................195
Table 4.1. Timetable of the ARRC ..................................................................................211
Table 4.2. Sugar exports, 1919-29. ..................................................................................216
Table 4.3. Passenger Rates of the CFC, 1933. .................................................................229
Table 4.4. Passengers carried and average revenue for the CFC, 1921-1941. ................230
Table 4.5. Comparison of Freight Rates for sugar cane, CFC 1923-1933. .....................231
Table 4.6. Roads Construction and Maintenance (in Kilometers). ..................................233
Table 4.7. Incomes and Expenses of the PRRC and the ARRC (1935-1938). ................245
Table 5.1. Comparison of Freight Rates for sugar cane, ARRC. ....................................257
Table 5.2. Railroads operated by centrales, 1942-1943. .................................................268
Table 6.1. Purchased local transportation: Gross Income (in thousands of dollars), 1944-46. 300

vii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1. Accidents reported by Ubarri’s Tramway, 1880-1885 ....................................61
Figure 2.1. Hacienda La Fortuna .......................................................................................84
Figure 2.2. Hacienda Buena Vista .....................................................................................85
Figure 2.3. Quarterly Gross Income for Line A-1st, 2nd and 3rd sections, 1892-1893........90
Figure 3.1. ARRC Freight Receipts, 1898-1901..............................................................145
Figure 3.2. Earnings of the PRRC, 1907-1911. ...............................................................158
Figure 3.3. The cost of road maintenance, 1903-1913. ...................................................173
Figure 3.4. Construction of new roads, 1900-1914. ........................................................174
Figure 3.5. Number of carts drawn by animals, automobiles, and coaches, 1914-1919. 197
Figure 4.1. Value of Exports, 1921-1928. ......................................................................217
Figure 4.2. Revenues from freight and passenger transportation (CFC), 1928-1938. ....242
Figure 4.3. Railway and highway miles in selected Caribbean countries, 1936 .............248
Figure 4.4. Registered trucks, buses and cars in selected Caribbean countries, 1934. ....249
Figure 5.1. Intra-island freight transportation, 1942-1943. .............................................266
Figure 5.2. Assessed Value Property. ..............................................................................267
Figure 6.1. Automobiles registered for 1940 and 1950. ..................................................305
Figure 6.2. Trucks registered for 1940 and 1950. ............................................................306

viii

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1.1. Road System, 1880s. ..........................................................................................50
Map 1.2. The First Tramways. ...........................................................................................56
Map 2.1. Sections of the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico, 1897. .............109
Map 3.1. Centrales and railroads. ....................................................................................166
Map 4.1. Western segment of the ARRC, 1919. .............................................................210
Map 5.1. Military Bases and Railroads. ...........................................................................255

ix

SELECTED LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAA

Agricultural Adjustment Administration

AID

Aid to Industrial Development

ARRC

American Railroad Company of Porto Rico

ATC

American Tobacco Company

BI

Bureau of Investigations

CCF

Compagnie des Chemins de Fer

CFC

Compañía Ferroviaria de Circunvalación

CFPR

Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico

FDA

Food Distribution Administration

FLT

Federación Libre de Trabajadores

NWLB

National War Labor Board

ODT

Office of Defense Transportation

PRATCO

Porto Rican American Tobacco Company

PRTA

Puerto Rico Transportation Agency

PRRC

Porto Rico Railways and Power Company

PWA

Public Works Administration

UWR

Utilization of the Water Resources

x

INTRODUCTION: STATE OF THE RESEARCH

The study of the railroads in Latin America and the Caribbean has been used to address
broader economic, social and political issues. In the 1970s most scholars adopted a structural
perspective proposing that railroads were essential to export economies. Under this approach, an
increase in exports did not translate into economic progress for Latin American nations. This was
because cheap raw materials returned as expensive manufactured goods producing unbalanced
trade, which perpetuated the economic backwardness of the region. In short, the development of
railroads was interpreted as part of a new development in economic dependency. Winthrop R.
Wright published a work about Argentina using this perspective.1 This author argued that railroads
in Argentina did not produce the same outcomes they had in Great Britain or the United States.
Although Argentinean railroads shortened the distances between distant production areas like the
case of Britain and the U.S., in Argentina the capital of investment came from abroad, and this was
an essential difference. For Wright, Great Britain enjoyed the real gains of the railroads in
Argentina:
British-owned railways did not foster Argentine industrialization. Rather, the
British-owned railroads opened up commercial opportunities to Britons far more
valuable than the dividends they paid. Supplying coal, locomotives, rolling stocks,
rails, and standard equipment for the daily operation of the lines meant steady

1

Winthrop R. Wright, British-owned railways in Argentina: their effect on the growth of economic nationalism,
1845-1948 (Texas: University of Texas Press, 1974.)

1

employment for numerous British workers and profits for British firms. In turn,
the working class of England consumed a relatively inexpensive diet that
contained large quantities of Argentinean beef, lamb and cereals. In this situation
Argentina could not develop a well-rounded national economy. Railways did not
spawn large steel complexes, as they had in Britain and the United States. The
majority of the industries that the railways helped to create concentrated upon
processing raw materials for export and producing consumer goods and
foodstuffs.2
Wright argues that in the twentieth century nationalism provided the basis to reject British
interests in Argentina.
From a Marxist perspective, the railroads were an instrument of the dominant classes to
maintain their economic privileges, and consolidate their political control through a discourse of
modernization. Samuel Hurtado Salazar argued in his study of Venezuela that railroads held up the
process of nation building.3 Local entrepreneurs without sufficient capital for costly ventures such
as the development of railroads relied on foreign investors to pay for rail lines to the ports and this
promoted economic fragmentation. In words of Hurtado Salazar: “Desde la construcción de las
vias férreas hasta las torres de los pozos petroleros, el proyecto social venezolano se fue desviando
(desnacionalizando) hacia centros de decisiones gerenciales extranacionales.”4 Both scholars from

2

Wright, British-owned railways in Argentina, 82.
Samuel Hurtado Salazar, Ferrocarriles y proyecto nacional en Venezuela, 1870-1925 (Caracas, Venezuela:
Universidad Central de Venezuela, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Sociales, 1990.)
4
Translation: “From the construction of railways to the towers of oil wells, Venezuela's social project was diverting
(denationalized) to extra-national managerial decisions.”
3

2

the structural and Marxist perspectives focused on power dynamics between metropolitan centers
and peripheries.
Another approach to the study of railroads moved the attention from the role in export
economies to domestic markets. Richard Salvucci claimed that “the advent of the railroad in Latin
America, once understood primarily as a means of facilitating the production of exportable goods,
is now known to have had a powerful impact on the domestic market in some places, such as
Argentina, and was less associated with international trade in others, such as Mexico, than
commonly supposed.”5 Furthermore, historian Sandra Kuntz Ficker proposed to revisit the data on
internal freight transportation during the Porfiriato in Mexico. Her findings clashed with the
traditional perspective of the railroads as fundamental for integration into the world markets, and
demonstrated the impact of the railroads in the strengthening of internal economic activities. Kuntz
Ficker’s methodology centered in the scrutiny of freight statistics from eleven railroads companies
to measure long-term economic growth. Her conclusions debunked John H. Coatsworth earlier
study of railroads in Mexico.6 Coatsworth measured the “social savings” produced by railroads in
Mexico following the example of Robert William Fogel’s study for railroads in the United States.7
Fogel defined social savings in railroads as the difference between the actual cost of shipping
goods in a given year and the alternative cost of shipping exactly the same bundle of goods

Hurtado Salazar, Ferrocarriles y proyecto nacional en Venezuela, 170.
5
Richard Salvucci, "Export-Led Industrialization," in The Long Twentieth Century, edited by Victor BulmerThomas, John H. Coatsworth, and Roberto Cortés Conde (Massachusets, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2006),
249.
6
Sandra Kuntz Ficker “Economic Backwardness and Firm Strategy: An American Railroad Corporation in
Nineteenth-Century Mexico,” Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 80, no. 2 (2000): 267-298.
7
Robert William Fogel, “A Quantitative Approach to the Study of Railroads in American Economic Growth: A
Report of Some Preliminary Findings,” The Journal of Economic History, vol. 22, no. 2 (1962): 163-197.
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between exactly the same points without the railroad.8 Kuntz Ficker concluded for Mexico that
freight transportation had a high “social savings,” but paradoxically it “contributed little to the
industrial growth of Mexico during the Porfirian era.”9
Scholar A. Kim Clark moved away from the economic issues to focus on the political
project of liberal politicians in Ecuador to unite Quito and Guayaquil in a project of national
unification.10 The country had two sectors committed to the establishment of railroads: the coastal
agro-export elite wanted labor from highland regions, while landowners in the highland areas of
the country wanted coastal markets for their food products. Clark argues that conservative highland
elites made a truce with liberal coastal elites because they had confidence in the economic benefits
of the railroad although their political perspectives in other aspects such as secularization or labor
policies were in conflict. Clark also discusses the experiences of the common people who
benefited, or were excluded, from railroad operations. Railroads would ease the movement of
goods and laborers but also indigenous leaders would journey to town centers to submit complains
and denounce abuses of landowners. Clark’s study looked at the culture of dominant social groups
and their discourse from an anthropological perspective in dialogue with alternate views from
subordinate groups.
The New Economic History offered another view of the railroads by incorporating

Robert William Fogel. “Notes on the Social Saving Controversy,” The Journal of Economic History, vol. 39, no. 1
(1979): 2-3.
9
John H. Coatsworth, Growth Against Development: The Economic Impact of Railroads in Profirian Mexico
(Illinois, USA: Nothern Illinois University Press, 1981), 180.
10
A. Kim Clark, The redemptive work: railway and nation in Ecuador, 1895-1930 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly
Resources Books, 1998.)
8
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quantitative techniques and economic theory to historical analysis. William Summerhill conducted
a study to calculate the economic impact of the railroads in Brazil. He formulated a new set of
questions reconsidering the traditional view that railroads promoted a dependency on foreign
capital and export markets.11 Summerhill did for Brazil what John H. Coatsworth had done for
Mexico twenty years before. He concluded that railroads strengthened the internal economy of the
country by providing cheaper transportation. Summerhill analyzed the finances of railroad
companies and the impact of governmental regulation policies.12 He relied on econometrics to
attest to the inaccuracies found in previous historic narratives. Summerhill avoided cultural
questions or political struggles, to focus on the economic outcomes of the railroads.
The most recent paradigm to approach the history of railroads is the New Cultural History.
Michael Matthews studied the “cultural dimensions” of the railroads in Mexico during the
porfiriato.13 Matthews’ study shared some of the questions raised previously by A. Kim Clark’s
study of Ecuador. Both shared an interest in the discourses about railroads and modernity.
Matthews proposed a detailed scrutiny of the symbolic representations of the railroads for a better
understanding of the porfirian regime. He moved away from the economic questions about the role
of railroad in the advancement of the national economy to questions about power and how it was
maintained and challenged.

11

John Coatsworth, Alan Taylor, eds. Latin America and the World Economy since 1800 (Massachusets, USA:
Harvard University Press, 1999.)
12
William Summerhill, Order Against Progress: Government, Foreign Investment, and Railroads in Brazil, 18541913 (California, USA: Stanford University Press, 2003.)
13
Michael Matthews, The civilizing machine: A cultural history of Mexican railroads, 1786-1910 (Nebraska, USA:
University of Nebraska Press, 2013), 5.
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This concise historiographical review showed different approaches to the topic of railroads
in Latin America. I recognize the value of the traditional perspective as the foundation for
subsequent nuanced narratives. In my study, I discuss the groundwork for railroads in Puerto Rico,
and also address cultural and ideological issues. The following section offers a review of studies
about railroads in the Spanish Caribbean to narrow the focus to the region under study.
Railroads in the Caribbean
There are few studies about railroads in the Caribbean. The best is that of Oscar Zanetti
Lecuona and Alejandro García titled Sugar and Railroads. In this book the authors provide an
economic history of the development of the railroads in Cuba from their inception as a Spanish
colony to the Cuban Revolution of 1959.14 As the title suggests, railroads in Cuba were directly
tied to sugar production; if sugar production increased then freight income also increased and the
railroad business prospered. The entrance of U.S. capital sugar monopolies in the first decades of
the twentieth century generated a problem for the railroad companies because the internal
railroad system of these factories transported raw cane to the mills but also transported refined
sugar to the ports to be exported, marginalizing the railroad companies for public service. In the
1920s the crisis in the sugar industry affected the railroad industry and competition during the
Gerardo Machado regime (1924-1933) was stimulated thanks to an aggressive plan of highway
construction. In the 1940s the principal railroad companies were in serious fiscal problems but
the state assumed an active role to prevent their closure and acquire two of the companies.

14

Oscar Zanetti Lecuona and Alejandro García Álvarez, Sugar and railroads: a Cuban history, 1837-1959 (North
Carolina, USA: University of North Carolina Press 1998.)
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Railroad workers unionized and were leaders of the Cuban labor movement which in the 1950s
opposed the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista. Zanetti and García concluded that the railroad
economic downfall was part of the Cuban neocolonial political system crisis.
For the Dominican Republic, the Michiel Baud’ study provides a social perspective of the
impact of the railroads in the Cibao region. Baud stresses the role of local elites in the promotion
of the new infrastructure, and recounts the people’s reaction to the project of economic
modernization. Railroads were important for the transportation of tobacco and cacao, not only
sugar, as was the case in Cuba. The construction of the railroad Samaná-Santiago was a challenge
because the population in the area was scarce. The company relied in migrant workers from
British and Danish islands (known as cocolos), but a resentment in the local population pushed the
company to hire more local workers. Ten years later the Ferrocarril Central hired local workers
because the area had a much more dense population, however these workers had the inconvenience
of being seasonal. At this moment (1891) the Cibao region entered in the sugar business and the
population mostly worked in the cane harvest, after that, during the idle or dead season these
laborers worked in the railroad construction. Peasant laborers from vicinity lands were also
problematic because during the dry season they worked in their subsistence plots, but for the
railroad company this was the best moment to build the tracks. The beginning of the railroad
service also provided a source of income to peasants living near the railroad route by working in
the maintenance of the area. Although the construction of railroads confronted multiple problems
and delays, it was important in the development of capitalist relations in the region. Baud also
discusses the role of foreign investment in the country. He concluded that investors from Europe
7

limited their interests to business, but investors from the United States also influenced political
decisions in the Dominican Republic for their economic benefit. The author considered that U.S.
investments in railroads produced the first signs of loss of sovereignty of the Dominican
Republic.15
Puerto Rico had only a handful of studies about railroads, but none of which could compare
with those about Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Jesús Martín Ramos in his published doctoral
dissertation, Las comunicaciones en la isla de Puerto Rico, 1850-1898,16 identified 1850 as the
beginning of serious efforts to establish railroads. Martín Ramos discussed every private initiative
to establish railways, even unsuccessful ones, and mentioned the debates related with the line
gauge. The Spanish government imposed in Puerto Rico one-meter line gauge for all railroads
offering public service but the promoters of railroads on the island opposed the decision. Narrow
gauge railroads were less expensive to construct than wider gauge railroads but the government
preferred a uniform wider-gauge for the transportation of heavier loads and for an easier transfer of
wagons between railroad companies. Martín Ramos argued that private initiatives did not pursue a
rational scheme because investors only proposed coastal short lines until the engineers from the
Bureau of Public Works outlined a national plan for a railroad system. The proposal was simply a
coastal trajectory to expedite the transportation of goods to the ports. Martín Ramos concluded by
describing the effort of private companies to connect branch lines from sugar mills to the coastal

15

Michiel Baud, Historia de un sueño: los ferrocarriles públicos en la República Dominicana, 1880-1930 (Santo
Domingo, DR: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 1993.)
16
Jesús Martín Ramos, Las comunicaciones en la isla de Puerto Rico: 1850-1898 (San Juan, PR: Academia
Puertorriqueña de la Historia, 2005.)
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railroad. Las comunicaciones en la isla de Puerto Rico is based on Spanish manuscripts which
provided a clear and detailed description of the emergence of railroad companies during the last
decades of Spanish control in Puerto Rico. However, the focus of the book was not the railroads as
they were part of a communication infrastructure comprised by roads, maritime trade, telegraphs
and ports.
In a study about maritime trade, Emma A. Dávila Cox discussed how the railroads
established in the nineteenth century were a failure in the economic advancement of the island.17
Dávila Cox argued:
El ferrocarril de Puerto Rico fue un verdadero fracaso. No se ajustó al patrón de
“embudo” que suele caracterizar a las economías de exportación de manera que
fluyan los productos desde el interior hasta los puertos. Ni mucho menos llegó a
parecerse al patrón de “estrella” que caracteriza a las naciones desarrolladas de
Europa, en el cual todas las líneas del interior desembocan en la capital, verdadero
epicentro económico del país. La línea de ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico terminó
siendo un anillo partido en cuatro pedazos. La falta de sentido económico en su
construcción no es sino un reflejo de la poca falta que en realidad hacía, y al igual
que el estado de abandono en las carreteras, era reflejo del poco interés que tenían
los puertorriqueños en las comunicaciones intermunicipales. Da haberse intentado
la más difícil tarea de comunicar los centros cafetaleros de la montaña por

17

Emma A. Dávila Cox, Este inmenso comercio; las relaciones mercantiles entre Puerto Rico y Gran Bretaña, 18441898 (San Juan, PR: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1996).

9

ferrocarril con la costa, siguiendo el convencional patrón de “embudo”, la
empresa sin duda habría resultado mucho más exitosa. Pero, como apuntaba
Churchward, el ferrocarril sólo recorría la costa, y por lo tanto no podía competir
con el servicio más eficiente y barato que ofrecía la navegación costera.18
Dávila concluded that railroads were not really necessarily at this moment, and that Puerto
Ricans were not distressed with the limited internal communications due to the fact that goods
moved efficiently via the sea. From my perspective, the people in Puerto Rico did have an interest
in the development of railroads but lack of capital limited their development. Even with this
limitation, there were multiple attempts to develop rail lines, which evidenced the need to
modernize internal communications. The actions of the investors were pragmatic, if it was cheaper
to develop narrow gauge railroads on flat soil then those were the railroads they would establish.
Dávila Cox recognized the necessity of connecting coffee plantations of the interior with the ports
on the coast, but Spain eluded any serious commitment to invest in the development of
infrastructure. Finally, Dávila Cox also argued that railroads could not compete with the “cheap
and efficient” service of maritime shipping. But, it was the other way around: I claim, maritime

Translation: “The railroad in Puerto Rico was a real failure. It did not follow the "funnel" pattern that often
characterizes the export economies so products could flow from the interior to the ports. Much less did resemble the
"Star" pattern that characterizes developed nations of Europe, in which all rail lines of the interior lead into the
capital, the real economic epicenter of the country. The railroad in Puerto Rico ended up being a ring torn apart into
four pieces. Lack of economic sense in its construction only reflected how needless they were, just like the state of
abandonment on roads was a reflection of the lack of interest the Puerto Ricans had on internal communications. If
the company had attempted to communicate the highland coffee centers and the coast by rail following the
conventional "funnel" pattern certainly would have been much more successful. But, as Churchward pointed out, the
railroad only toured the coast, therefore could not compete with the more efficient and cheap service offered by
coastal navigation.”
Dávila Cox, Este inmenso comercio, 292.
18

10

shipping could not compete with the cheap, efficient and rapid transportation of the railroads. Here
the key element is time. Railroads could decrease time in the transportation of goods and
consequently decrease costs and prices. In the nineteenth century, Puerto Rico had an efficient
maritime service, but the island needed railroads for expeditious shipping of goods, and Dávila
Cox avoided the discussion of this key element.
There are two unpublished theses on the railroads during the Spanish era. The first thesis
focuses on the study of the beltway railroad. Edwin Borrero González claimed in his study El
ferrocarril de circunvalación: Estudio de una subcultura puertorriqueña y la tecnología auxiliar
that from 1888 to 1898 Spain promoted the most important infrastructure development in four
centuries of colonial occupation.19 He claimed that the beltway railroad unified the country by
connecting coastal towns. Even those living in the mountains participated in this process of
national unification, which made the colony more valuable to Spain. From my perspective
Borrero González overstated the preeminence of the beltway railroad in the island because in the
last decade of the nineteenth-century the economy relied mainly in the exports of coffee and the
railroads provided service mainly to sugar mills.
The second work was Leandro Fanjul González’s thesis titled Don Pablo Ubarri y Puerto
Rico.20 Fanjul González’s dissertation is a biography of a Spanish merchant, Don Pablo Ubarri,
Conde de Santurce, who first introduced the steam locomotive in 1880. The Tranvía de Ubarri

19

Edwin Borrero González, El ferrocarril de circunvalación : Estudio de una subcultura puertorriqueña y la
tecnologia axiliar (Master’s thesis. Río Piedras: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1978), 227-228.
20
Leandro Fanjul González, Don Pablo Ubarri y Puerto Rico (Master’s thesis. Río Piedras, PR: Universidad de
Puerto Rico, 1980.)
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was the first steam tramway in the urban area of San Juan, Santurce, and Río Piedras. The
tramway increased the reputation of Ubarri to the point that the name “Santurce” was adopted in
honor of Ubarri’s birthplace in Spain.21 The discussion of Ubarri’s trolley was not extensive, but
it was descriptive; and offered important information on one significant developer of urban
tramways.
Juan R. González Mendoza and Héctor E. Sánchez Sánchez also wrote an article about the
Tranvía de Ubarri.22 The authors offered the most insightful research questions of all the
secondary literature under review; however, the article did not address all the issues presented by
them. González Mendoza and Sánchez Sánchez analyzed the origins of the tramway and
identified accidents as one of the principal problems confronted by the company.
Antonio Santamaría García, in the article “Los ferrocarriles de servicio público de Puerto
Rico (1870-1990),” followed the development of the railroads and their eventual collapse.23
Santamaría García’s main contribution was the comparative analysis he made by contrasting the
case of Puerto Rico with other railway systems in Latin America. Finally, historian Aurelio Tió in
“Breve historia de los ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico” provided an overview of the emergence and
downfall of the railroads in Puerto Rico.24 Tió began his essay with a descriptive narrative but
concludes with an assessment of the reasons behind the collapse of the railroad system. He

21

Ibid., 412-13.
Juan R. Gonzalez Mendoza, and Hector E. Sánchez Sánchez, “Los orígenes del tranvía de San Juan a Rio Piedras,
1878-1885,” Anales de Investigación Histórica, vol. 1, no. 2 (1974): 2-33.
23
Antonio Santamaría García, “Los ferrocarriles de servicio público de Puerto Rico (1870-1990),” Revista
Complutense de Historia de América, no. 20 (1994): 207-228.
24
Aurelio Tió, “Breve historia de los ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico,” Boletín de la Academia Puertorriqueña de la
Historia, vol. 3, no. 10 (June 1973): 105-116.
22
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claims that policy makers considered railroads an anachronism, and for this reason denied
subsidies to maintain operations.
There are other short studies in newspapers, popular magazines, and publications about the
sugar economy, in which aspects of the railroads are discussed, but none of them provides a
significant analysis of the socioeconomic impact of the railroads.25 The works about the railroads
in Puerto Rico include articles, a chapter in two books, two master’s theses, but no
comprehensive study has been forthcoming. In this dissertation, I depart from those descriptive
works already developed by other authors, and produce an analysis (from the mid-nineteenth
century to the first half of the twentieth) of the origin, development and collapse of the railroads
in relation to the transformation of the Puerto Rican economy.
This study
The objective of this study is to trace the evolution of railways in Puerto Rico through the
experience of establishing, operating, and then dismantling them. There were multiple successful
as well as unsuccessful attempts to establish tramways and railroads. The franchises under
operation were numerous and I am seeking to understand how those companies contributed to
the insular economy. My focus is the study of “public interest railroads.” In Puerto Rico the state
did not own railroads and all of them were private corporations. However, the government
considered some railroads to be beneficial for the country as a whole. Those railroads were

Articles in journals include Helen V. Toocker “The good old railroad” published in San Juan Review, and Jaime
Bague “Los ferrocarriles de vía estrecha en Puerto Rico, Siglo XIX” published in Boricua. Books about sugar
plantations, which make references to the railroads are Andrés Ramos Mattei, La sociedad del azúcar en Puerto
Rico, and Angel L. Vázquez Medina, La Hacienda Monserrate de Manatí : 131 años de historia del azúcar en la
region norte central de Puerto Rico.
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subject to governmental regulations and provided transportation for passengers and/or freight.
Among these companies, this work closely examines the largest providers of railroad
transportation, which I consider to be soul of the industry. My ideal reader will look for the story
of a Caribbean country struggling to improve its economic reality. The introduction of European
technologies in the nineteenth-century to Puerto Rico offers an opportunity to examine the ideas
of an era and the transformations that occur in the ongoing efforts to reach the level of economic
development of Europe.
I am telling the story of the Puerto Rican effort to modernize the transportation
infrastructure. Like other scholars have done for several Latin American and Caribbean countries
I point out the challenges faced by the island to compete in the international markets with an
inadequate infrastructure. My contribution to the historiography will be the analysis of the
economic need for railroads and their contribution to the economic development and
modernization of the island through analysis of text from politicians, policy makers,
entrepreneurs, unionized workers, legal documents, and the press.
Finally, this work argues that railroads’ role in the economy was transformed from being a
necessity to promote prosperity in the last quarter of the nineteenth century to being a
transportation system that was no appropriate for the industrial development strategy adopted by
the insular and colonial elite in the 1940s.
This dissertation is based on archival material from Puerto Rico, Spain, and the United
States. I primarily rely on official documents such as reports of railroad companies, reports of the
insular governors, legislative hearings, official memos, court cases, and the census. Other sources
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include commercial newspapers and magazines.
Structure
The six chapters of this thesis should be read as a continuous long essay with a
chronological linkage. As a starting point, I analyze the debates of the economic situation in
Puerto Rico during the second half of the nineteenth century and the different proposals for the
development of railroads. These debates were insular, but with ideas common to Latin America
and Europe. Through this analysis, I trace the evolution of the proposals to bring railroads to the
island. This chapter ends with the establishment and outcomes of the first tramways on the
island.
In the second chapter, I focus on the governmental project for a beltway railroad to cover
the entire coastline of the island. The narrative includes the building process of the railroad, and
the interests of the sugar mills to link their own internal railroads to the beltway railroad.
The third chapter deals with the euphoria for railroad construction after the occupation of
the island by the United States. This section also introduces the challenges the railroads faced
during World War I. I give special attention to the emergence of workers unions and the
beginning of the competition between railroads and trucks for the control of the distribution of
goods.
Chapter four provides an account of the railroads during the interwar period. This section
includes the discussion of the New Deal program in Puerto Rico, which provided economic relief
in rural areas, but gave no assistance to sugar mills or railroad companies.
Chapter five is about the role of the railroads in national defense during World War II.
15

Workers gained prominence in that decade and became central in this section as well as in the
last chapter. Another aspect I will analyze is the attitude of policy makers in relation to the
railroads.
In the final chapter, the discussion revolves around three main issues: labor demands,
competition with trucks and automobiles, and the development of a post-war economic plan of
industrialization. In the conclusion, I revisit the trajectory of the railroad industry and offer the
final considerations regarding the changing role of the railroads in the Puerto Rican economy.
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CHAPTER I. ON THE ROAD TO PROGRESS

“In a short time he had increased the production of
ice to such a degree that it was too much for the local
market and Aureliano Triste had to think about the
possibility of expanding the business to other towns
in the swamp. It was then that he thought of the
decisive step, not only for the modernization of his
business but to link the town with the rest of the
world.
-“We have to bring in the railroad,” he said.
Gabriel García Márquez
«One Hundred Years of Solitude»

Eugenio María de Hostos was one of the most prominent thinkers of the nineteenth century
in Puerto Rico. He is well known for his ideas against colonialism and as a promoter of education,
but not necessarily recognized for his ideas about the role of railroads and their impact on the
progress of nations. Adriana Arpini found that Hostos was a strong supporter of the trans-Andean
railroad, which connected Chile and Argentina through the Andean mountains. Arpini argued that
Hostos did not conceive the railroad as a mere bridge between two nations but that it ment LatinAmerican unity as well as a step towards civilization. In Arpini’s words:
Desde la perspectiva hostosiana –forjada a partir de los principios humanistas del
krausianismo y orientada por ideales civilizatorios-, el ferrocarril es no solo un
elemento de unión entre los pueblos, sino también un medio de paz; ya que es un
mediador de intereses económicos complementarios de la producción, del
consumo, de la circulación de las riquezas, de la organización del trabajo, de la
17

locomoción y del desarrollo de culturas embrionarias.26
Hostos was an exceptional figure, and his opinions with respect to the railroads and their
impact in achieving civilization and modernity were shared by many within the Puerto Rican elite.
The idea of establishing “caminos de hierro” (iron roads) to move freight and passengers came
from abroad as a potential solution to the transportation difficulties that many planters and
merchants confronted through the nineteenth-century. Railroads could unite the island and its
interior and with the rest of the world.
The nineteenth-century was a time of change. The island of Puerto Rico finally emerged
from decades of economic isolation. The Spanish monopoly trading system came to an end after
more than two hundred years, and a new chapter of slow economic liberalization improved the
possibilities for economic growth. Sugar plantations on the coast and coffee farms of the interior
became sources of incredible wealth. Agricultural production opened the door for economic
expansion after years of limited commerce, and an unrestrained informal economy.
Sugar exports underwent a phase of expansion in the early nineteenth-century. Sydney
Mintz claimed that “from 1815 until 1876 a full-scale plantation system operated in Puerto Rico.”27
It was in 1815 that the King of Spain, Ferdinand VII, decreed the Real Cédula de Gracias to

“From Hostos’ perspective – shape from Krausian humanist principles and guided by civilizatorian ideals – the
railroads were an element of cohesion and peace for the nations, because fuctioned as mediator between economic
interests of producers, the consumption, the circulation of wealth, the organization of labor, of locomotion, and the
development of embrionary cultures.”
Adriana Arpini, Eugenio María de Hostos y su época: Categorías sociales y fundamentación filosófica (Río
Piedras, PR: La editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 2007), 96-97.
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promote the island as an ideal place to settle and invest. The Cédula de Gracias allowed free
commerce with “friendly nations” and privileged the immigration of white planters with capital
and slaves.28 The decree granted free land for Catholic migrants, their relatives, and slaves; it also
granted tax exemptions for 15 years, and naturalization after five years of residency. The Spanish
Crown allowed the entrance of slaves and agricultural equipment duty free pursuing the transition
fom subsistence agriculture and cattle ranching to embrace the plantation system. Article 32 in the
Cédula de Gracias explicitly welcomed the establishment of sugar mills by locals and foreigners to
produce sugar.
Sugar was a product in high demand with an attractive value in the international markets.
However, Puerto Rico was a late comer to the sugar business and competed against well
established producers like Cuba. Colonel George D. Flinter, an Irishmen serving in the Spanish
army, wrote in 1830: “We cannot expect, of course, to find in Puerto Rico the immense
commercial and agricultural riches which mark Cuba and Jamaica as the richest of the West Indian
islands.”29 Nonetheless, Colonel Flinter believed the island was moving towards improving its
economic situation, among other things, through investments in roads and bridges. In his analysis,
Puerto Rico was gifted with abundant water resources. However, in the rainy season torrents of
water flowed from the mountains to the coast with incredible force, making it impossible for horse
or mule-driven carts to cross the rivers. This situation required the construction of bridges to halt
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economic losses and to prevent the loss of human lives. Colonel Flinter continued to write on how
Spain had ignored Puerto Rico’s needs during the Latin American wars for independence. The
situation changed: “Since the year 1824, the opening and consolidating of roads, and constructing
of bridges, has occupied the attention of government, as the only means of awaking the dormant
spirit of industry.”30 Colonel Flinter praised the quality of the roads and the number of bridges also
captured his interest: “One hundred and thirty wooden bridges, over rivers and brooks, have been
constructed within the last six years, some of which would be an ornament even in Europe.”31 This
commendation of the government’s commitment to the enhancement of the infrastructure was
sealed with this conclusion:
On the whole it may be asserted that the roads of Puerto Rico are generally good,
and some of them excellent. The inhabitants of every part of the island begin to
feel the beneficial effects arising from them, without the expense pressing hard on
any part of the community…In the course of three or four years, I am persuaded
that one will be able to travel round the island, and through the interior of it, in a
carriage, with the greatest facility; for the inhabitants, convinced that their
prosperity in a great measure depends on good roads, zealously second the wise
views of Government.32
Flinter’s prediction, however, was far from accurate. The progress in infrastructure took
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more time than he had estimated. Probably, Flinter’s calculations responded to Governor Miguel
de la Torre’s initiatives for the construction of new roads. Governor De la Torre visited every
town on the island and directed the construction and repair of roads and bridges on the coast and
on the highlands. In 1827, Pedro Tomás de Córdoba, Secretary of State under Governor De la
Torre, reported the construction and improvement of roads in 26 towns funded with private
capital and public funds.33 However, the efforts to provide a modern infrastructure were
insufficient due to limited capital and human resources.34
Labor scarcity was a serious concern in Puerto Rico; in 1834 the island had an estimated
population of 358,836 inhabitants, and only 41,818 were slaves. The details of the slave trade to
Puerto Rico are vague due to the lack of official records, in all probability because after the
Anglo-Spanish treaty of 1820 the introduction of slaves from Africa was illegal.35 Government
officials like De la Torre did not enforce its prohibition, and illegal slave traffic continued
supplying slaves to sugar planters which relied mainly on slave labor. Planters also hired peasants
to complement slave labor. Oral arrangements between planters and peasants based on the
exchange of land and labor were common. These peasants known as agregados (squatters) lived
on a plot ceded to them by the planter with the authorization to cultivate their own food and tend
animals. In exchange for the land, the agregado peasants worked on the plantation and could
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receive payments in tokens to redeem at the planter’s store. The agregado also had the
alternative to acquire goods in the store on credit to be paid off with labor. These arrangements
would benefit peasants and planters alike, because peasants had access to goods and the planters
maintained the peasants working on the plantation until the debt was cancelled.36 However,
planters commonly complained that peasants had no working discipline, irregularly appeared to
work, and rejected tough tasks. Most sugar planters claimed that undisciplined peasants made the
sugar industry unsustainable without slaves.
The 1840s were tough times for sugar planters with “stagnating production, unusually
low prices and profits, increasing costs because of diminishing returns and expenditures on
irrigation.”37 Labor shortages became more acute when diplomatic pressure from Britain
dramatically affected the entrance of slaves to the island. Jorge Chinea claimed that “The third
Anglo-Spanish treaty banning slave shipments to the Hispanic Caribbean (1845), the establishment
of a British consulate and Spain’s adoption of stringent measures against negreros proved
disastrous for the undercapitalized Puerto Rican sugar estates, many of which could not afford the
inflated prices of fresh bonded labor. In response, colonial officials tried desperately to use antivagrancy regulations to mobilize peasants and urban workers.”38 Most of these peasants subsisted
with their own crops and worked on the plantations when they had specific needs to defray. As a
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result, the texts of the time commonly cast peasants with a negative imagery of laziness and
indolence. The government’s strategy was to alter the “nature” of the natives by imposing a strict
work ethic.
In 1849 Governor Juan de la Pezuela responded to planters’ demands for laborers with the
Bando de Policía y Buen Gobierno, which was a legal code to control the behavior of the
population which did not own land or exercise a profession. 39 The code mandated the people to
register and provide all personal data including their occupation. The intent of code was an attempt
to force the population to work as wage earners instead of living a life of subsistence. 40 The law
exempted land owners, but slaves and landless peasants were closely monitored by local
authorities to avoid “immoral” activities typical of “lazy” people. Interesting enough the spaces of
surveillance were dirt roads and streets. Transgressors could be punished with fines, prison, or
community service, such as working in the “composición de los caminos vecinales.”41 A good
example of this was article 178, which penalized any person making public disorder or dressing
inappropriately because of drunkenness with jail and fifteen days working on road improvements.
The code provided a mechanism to stop undesirable behavior, and was also a retribution to society
through work for the public benefit. In a study of discipline and punishment in France the
experience was similar: “thieves who also obstruct the free circulation of goods could be put to

Gervasio L. García, “Economía y trabajo en el Puerto Rico del siglo XIX,” Historia Mexicana, vol. 38, no. 4
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rebuild the highways.”42 The reason: “Public works meant two things: the collective interest in the
punishment of the condemned man and the visible, verifiable character of the punishment. Thus
the convict pays twice; by the labor he provides and by the signs that he produces.”43 The Bando
de Policía y Buen Gobierno represented the streets as vulnerable spaces. No loitering was allowed
on the street, they were only for transit. Streets had to be in good shape, not necessarily for the
convenience of the peasants, the jornaleros (wage earners) or the slaves, but because goods had to
be moved to the markets or ports. Land owners and merchants were the social groups who had the
economic interests of a better infrastructure for the island, and Governor Juan de la Pezuela wanted
to improve the economy by transforming an indolent population (from his perspective) into wage
workers.
Governor Pezuela enacted another code, also approved in 1849, establishing procedures for
the development and maintenance of roads. The code mandated the creation of town boards to
study, develop, and maintain roads for the public benefit. To finance these projects the town boards
collected excise taxes for rum and cattle meat, and property taxes (two pesos per caballería) every
quarter.44 An engineer, architect, or surveyor would be on charge of the road design. Roads would
have a width of 12 varas (measure equivalent to 3 foot per one vara) including 2 varas for each
sidewalk. On steep slopes the width could come down to 8 varas and the road would form a spiral
to reduce the angle to a ratio of 1:18. After 20 or 25 varas the road would be leveled in a plateau to
ease the turn of carriages in a spacious bend. The gutters had to have an inclination of 45 degrees.
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The material used in roads was limestone. Large rocks would be at the base and small rocks
(with the dimensions of a chicken egg) in the surface until it reached a thickness of 10 to 12 inches.
A manual roller was necessary to compact the limestone. In the absence of limestone an alternative
was cobblestone, although it required a layer of clay on the road surface to seal it.
For maintenance of the roads the town boards would hire road peons (peones camineros).
Each peon had to supervise one legua (equivalent to 4 kilometers) to fill potholes with stones and
solid ground, clean ditches, and oversee the transit of people, horses or carriages on the road. A
peon had the right to a small house near the road assigned to him and tools to perform maintenance
work.45 These workers had to wear an identification bronze shield on the chest with the letters
“P.C.”, had to be able to read and write in order to submit weekly reports to the town board, and
would earn a monthly salary of 15 pesos.46 Pezuela’s code provided the structure for the
enhancement of the island infrastructure in a moment of new economic challenges.
Economic changes
The decline in revenues from sugar exports continued to the mid-ninetenth century. Sugar
planters and merchants on the island called for reforms to improve the economy. When the
acquisition of slaves became more difficult and therefore more costly planters relied on peasants
and slaves born in Puerto Rico. Capital formerly used for the purchase of slaves would be invested
in the acquisition of more land to increase production, but the problem of labor continued.
Advanced technology was one strategy to confront the labor problem. In this case the substitution
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of the traditional oxen-powered mill by the modern and more efficient steam powered mill was
necessary to improve production. However, technological innovation was expensive. Historian
Pedro San Miguel studied sugar production in Vega Baja and found that investment in modern
technology was not a possibility for small planters with limited capital. For instance, a mill
(trapiche) powered by animals in Vega Baja could have a value of 500 pesos (as was the case in
Hacienda Rosario), but a steam mill had a value of 8,000 to 10,000 pesos. A hydraulic mill was
less expensive than a steam mill but it required a source of water with a strong current to move the
water wheels, and that possibility was not real for many planters.47 Another option was the
acquisition of a “Jamaica train” (series of large kettels) for the boiling house where the cane juice
was heated to produce brown sugar (moscabado). This technology did not improve the quality of
the product but it heated the kettles with the bagasse of the cane, thus cutting down fuel costs.48
These technological improvements impacted the phase of sugar manufacturing, but once the sugar
was produced another issue arose: the transportation of the sugar to the ports.
By the mid-nineteenth century Puerto Rico continued with a rudimentary road
infrastructure. Planters could have abundant land, workers, and machinery, but if they could not
transport sugar to the markets their businesses would collapse. The sugar profits depended on the
success in exporting the product, not from local consumption. Local planters competed against
other countries to sell their sugar without any privilege, such as protective tariffs, because the
United States was the main consumer of the Puerto Rican sugar. Historian Francisco A. Scarano
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indicated that Puerto Rico was an atypical case in the Caribbean because “the expansion of the
sugar industry depended on interaction with a foreign nation –the United States– and not with its
metropolis, Spain.” 49 Sugar produced in Spain had primacy over sugar produced overseas, forcing
sugar planters in Puerto Rico to look for other markets. The key was to produce cheap sugar of
good quality to win over the competitors, however the island only produced moscabado variety of
sugar of low quality and the cost of transportation was high. Planters did not have the capital to
access the technology to produce refined sugar in the mid-ninetenth century, but actively pursued
state support for the development of new infrastructure to access the export outlets from their
estates. Cheaper and fast transportation could increase profits and competitiveness. Historian
Guillermo Baralt indicated that landowners and merchants donated money, equipment, and slaves
to support government projects to enhance the condition of the infrastructure, and the towns
(ayuntamientos) approved laws to force peasants to work on these projects.50 The improvement of
infrastructure was slow, although it was easier to solve than labor shortages. The country needed
more capital for investment in infrastructure and a stronger commitment from the state.
The first rail initiatives
In reaction to the slow construction of roads by the state a potential solution would be
private transportation over rails. Puerto Ricans could emulate foreign railroad initiatives. The
official newspaper, La Gaceta del Gobierno de Puerto-Rico, sporadically published articles about
the establishment of railroads in countries like Britain, United States, Cuba, and France. Although,
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a small percentage of the population could read the gazette, the literate few had the opportunity to
learn about the first railway initiatives.51
On August 8, 1837 the newspaper examined monetary difficulties in the United States, and
mentioned the futile use of public funds in the development of 200 miles of railroads in New York.
In a territory with a small population like New York it had been a mistake to build another 340
miles railroad with laborers that could have been used in more necessary projects. The article
stated that it was a disadvantage for commerce and industry to develop railroads in territories with
limited wealth and human resources.52 This assessment was applicable to Puerto Rico, a poor
country with a limited labor supply, but the gazette did not make this analogy. Another article
published at the end of the month celebrated the opening of a steam railroad from Manchester to
Liverpool, two important industrial centers in Britain. Although the British success was an
example to other countries, the gazette explained, the economic benefits of railroads would not be
enjoyed in Spain because the mountainous topography of the country impeded its development.53
This limitation also applied to Puerto Rico because the interior of the island was mountainous, but
once again the gazette did not make the analogy. Two months later, the gazette published an article
about the origin of “iron roads” in Britain. Furrows in roads made by the wheels of carriages had
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been the reason to use stones in roads since ancient times. In the seventeenth-century the British
substituted the stones with wood and later the wood was plated with iron to extend its use, and that
was the origin of the “iron roads.” Initially the British used cast iron until the nineteenth-century
when wrought iron became the norm because it was stronger. Iron lines on the road evolved to iron
rails place over the roads to avoid obstacles such as mud or stones. Iron rails required the use of
specially designed convex iron wheels to run aligned on the rails. Elevations, depressions, and
curves were more dangerous in rails than in common roads and had to be avoided. Indeed, the
leveling of the terrain was the most expensive aspect of railroad building. The article provided an
estimated one million to 1.5 million reales for the cost of developing two rails in one legua de
posta (equivalent to 4 kilometers) and 300,000 reales for the cost of the iron for the rails in one
legua de posta.54
In December of 1837 the gazette announced the construction of a railroad from Havana to
Güines in Cuba. The government of Cuba had problems maintaining its roadways in optimal
conditions and considered the construction of railroads following the example set by England. This
initiative began the process of railroad development in Cuba. As usual, the gazette avoided making
any association between the Cuban experience and the situation in Puerto Rico.
Some months later, in August 1838, the gazette revealed the investment of 157 million
Francs for the construction of four railroads lines in France. This article showed a trend towards the
establishment of railroads in multiple countries with state support. However, Spain was reticent.
In August 1842 the gazette reported that a terrible railroad accident had occurred on the
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5:30 p.m. train from Versailles to Paris. The French calamity was not common the gazette
clarified, and should not be lessen the incredible benefits of the railroads. The gazette included a
list of nine railroad lines that were to be constructed in France by private companies with 4,400
reales of state funding. In a decade France had built 3,600 kilometers of railroads in an effort to
recover its past glory as a modern country, which had been surpassed by the United Kingdom,
Belgium, and Germany. The article questioned the viability of developing railroads in areas
without sufficient economic activity to make them profitable. The French government had to
consider two factors: if the railroad would shorten travel time for passengers and if the railroad
would decrease shipping costs for merchandise. The article concluded that only four railroad lines
were viable due to the commercial development in the area, but the other five rail lines only
viewed it as an imprudent and fashionable impulse of promoting prosperity.55 This closing
commentary demonstrated the cautious outlook adopted by Spain in relation to the railroads. Spain
did not adopt a public policy for railways until the approval of a Royal Decree on December 31,
1844, which established the procedure to acquire the permits for the construction and operation of
railroads by private corporations. The corporations had to submit maps with the route of the
railroad, and a report comprising a justification for the project based on the public benefit of
developing the railroad, a detailed description of the rail alignment including aspects, such as the
slopes and curves, a budget for the phase of construction and operation, and a list of construction
materials. Previous to this Royal Decree some railroad projects were submitted by private
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corporations and approved by the government, but none of them attracted enough investors. This
decree provided a standard procedure to stimulate private capital to invest in modern railway
infrastructure.56
The first railroad established in Spain was the Barcelona-Mataró railroad. The gazette in
Puerto Rico announced the project in July 1844 but it was in 1847 when the newspaper celebrated
the opening of the railroad line in Catalonia.57 The entrepreneurs behind the project were Miquel
Biada Bunyol who had lived for years in Cuba and knew first hand the benefits of the HavanaGüines railroad, and Josep María Roca Cabanes who lived in London and had witnessed the first
rail initiatives in Britain. Roca Cabanes answered Biada Bunyol’s call to establish a railroad from
Barcelona to Mataró, Biada Bunyol’s hometown. After the royal approval of the feasibility studies,
the Catalonian entrepreneurs created the railroad corporation and hired British engineer John Lock
for the technical aspects of the project. The inauguration was on October 28, 1848. The Gaceta del
Gobierno de Puerto-Rico did not review the event, but the gazzete was an official paper to publish
local pronouncements and metropolitan decrees, legislative decisions, and international news
filtered by the authorities. It was in 1850 when the Barcelona-Mataró railroad reappeared in the
pages of the gazette. The gazette published a fragment of the debate in the Spanish Parliament for
the approval of a railroad law. The Minister of Public Works in Spain, Mr. Seijas Lozano claimed
that Spain demonstrated its commitment with the development of railroads as demonstrate the
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opening of the Barcelona-Mataró railroad and the development of new rail lines in Aranjuez and
Langreo-Gijon. A controversy arose in relation to the path to be followed: the French model of
public funding or the British model of private initiative. For Minister Seijas Lozano the solution
was a Spanish model, not French nor British, of private railroads in public lands with state
amortization of 6 percent per capital invested in the construction of railroads. In other words,
Spanish railways would be private, economically encouraged by a state amortization and public
land use permits, but would be regulated by a railroad law. The impact of this notes published by
the gazette about the process of railroad expansion is unmeasurable, however the awareness that
railroads could improve the infrastructure in Puerto Rico is palpable through the railroad proposals
received by the insular government since the 1850.
The first initiatives to build railroads in Puerto Rico came from local entrepreneurs. In 1850
the government received a proposal to develop a railroad between the northern towns of Arecibo
and Cataño, close to the port of San Juan. The official newspaper, La Gaceta Oficial de PuertoRico, published a short article relating the creation of a corporation for the development of a
railroad with the support of the government.58 The Intendant of Puerto Rico, Don Miguel López de
Acevedo, approved a tax exemption on materials imported to be used in the construction of this
railroad. The Intendant expressed the commitment of the Governor General in the amelioration and
development of agriculture and commerce on the island. Among other things, the Intendant was
committed himself to provide a labor force from those men that had been sentenced to public
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works. However, Pezuela’s government was not committed to concede land or directly invest in
railroads. The Intendant found that it was plausible to subsidize the project through a 6 percent tax
break, as approved in Spain. However, the Council of Ministers for Overseas Territories
interpreted the Spanish law differently. They rejected any tax breaks, because the law of February
20, 1850 did not apply to Puerto Rico or any overseas territories.59
Neither Governor General Pezuela nor the Council of Ministers for Overseas territories
supported the initiative of the Intendant. The Council rejected the project with the excuse that it
was lacking information. In essence, the government wanted answers: Did the company submit
plans for the route? Did the company submit a financial program with an estimate of the costs?
Was there any auction proposed for contracts related to railroad construction?
The rail line from Arecibo to Cataño started as an idea. If the idea had supporters, then the
corporation could become a reality, and the government could promote the agricultural and
industrial sectors. Months after Don José Joaquín Solís requested the franchise, the intendant
organized a meeting in his home to create a board composed of a president, vice-president,
secretary and five vocals. The Intendant’s petition was submitted in June, four months after
assuming office on the island, demonstrating his active role in promoting alternatives to improving
the economy, although he could not persuade the Council of Ministers about the maturity of the
project. The Council even suggested consulting an engineer from the United States or England.60
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This short phrase is important, because the ministers recognized the vanguard position of these
countries in the development of railroads. England and the United States were models to follow,
since both countries enjoyed healthy economies, and were furthermore civilized and progressive
countries. It was reasonable to believe that their formula for success had to be replicated in Puerto
Rico. The island needed railroads to become a more progressive and civilized countries:
Si la utilidad de las vías ferradas es reconocida y notoria en todos los países, en
ninguno como en la isla de Puerto Rico, donde los frutos no tienen salida y el
comercio y la industria languidecen por la falta casi absoluta de caminos. El
establecimiento de los ferrocarriles allá, será un gran paso en la senda de la
prosperidad y de la civilización, presentando además garantías para las
eventualidades del porvenir61
The project to develop a railroad between Arecibo and Cataño collapsed. The attention
given to the lack of communications changed with the arrival of the new military governor in 1852,
Don Fernando de Norzagaray y Escudero. Governor Norzagaray recognized the economic problem
of an island without a basic infrastructure for the transportation of goods. He classified the roads in
two types: general roads under the responsibility of the insular government and vicinity roads
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(caminos vecinales) under the responsibility of the towns (ayuntamientos).62 General roads
connected the departments, first-class vicinity roads connected towns with the capital of its
department or with the general road that connected with the capital of its department, and secondclass vicinity roads that connected two towns.63 Governor Norzagaray wanted the participation of
people from the entire island to elucidate the best places to establish low cost roads to promote the
economy. As an incentive, the Junta Superior Directiva (Guiding Superior Board) chaired by
Norzagaray opened a competition among the departments with a price of 25,000 pesos for the
development of new roads. The departments must submit a list of road projects with its benefits for
the island as a whole not for the sole benefit of the locals. On November 2, 1852 the board met and
declared the department of Ponce the winner of the price and surprisingly the department of
Bayamón received another 25,000 pesos after a unanimous vote of the board. The reason was the
construction of a general-road from the Capital to the port of Ponce via Bayamón. The Junta
Superior Directiva had two engineers hired to trace a route in a level terrain avoiding the
construction of bridges to maintain low costs, a genuine defy in a country with abundant rivers and
a dense mountain range.64
In February 1853 a regulation for the construction of local roads included the third-class
vicinity roads defined as local roads or particular roads. These roads connected towns or
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plantations with the municipality or a road in connection with the municipality. The towns had to
finance the construction and maintenance of first-class vicinity roads, municipalities and residents
that used second-class vicinity roads had to finance the construction and maintenance, and the
third-class vicinity roads were under the sole responsibility of the residents that benefited from the
road.65 Governor Norzagaray “attempted to systematize the old system of corvées, by which
residents were obliged to contribute, with money, tools, draft animals, or their personal labor, to
the construction and repair of roads.”66
The road program of Governor Norzagaray was more coherent than previous governmental
initiatives, as historian Fernando Picó claimed: “the system of communications devised during
Norzagaray’s governorship would provide the insular administration with a vision of all the roads
needed on the island for marketing and provisioning.”67
A new effort to bring railroads occurred in 1857 for the town of Ponce under the guidance
of Don Juan Lacot, Don Juan Prat, and Don Guillermo G. Oppenheimer. These men represented a
group of south coastal planters and merchants eager to create a corporation for the development of
a railroad connecting Ponce and Santa Isabel of Coamo. They went to the Commander Colonel of
the region requesting a permit for the creation of a corporation to establish the rail line. If the
project was successful they planned to extend further to the east arriving in Guayama, and add a
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branch line from Juana Diaz.68 The Empresa del Ferrrocarril de Cotoner received a permit to
conduct studies, and provide the government with the blueprints, fares, and other requisites with a
deadline of six months. Shareholders made a commitment to deposit 10 percent of the projected
cost in a commercial house, and decided to reject state subventions. Empresa Cotoner had 18
months to complete the railroad from the date the government approved the project. The projected
cost of the construction was 220,000 pesos. The capital came from the sales of 2,200 shares of 100
pesos each. The call for shareholders not only emphasized the economic possibilities of
investment, it also stressed the pioneering character of the establishment of the first Puerto Rican
railroad: “Las locomotoras de las llanuras de PONCE serán seguramente las precursoras de otras que
humearán dentro de pocos años en diferentes puntos de esta favorecida comarca; pues la
esperiencia (sic) de todas las Naciones nos demuestra que en esta senda el primer paso es difícil.”69
These 4½ leguas (25 kilometers) of railroad was the beginning of a new era. In the
pamphlet published to attract shareholders the city of Ponce followed suit the path pioneered by
London and Manchester, and Brussels and Anvers. In these cities the success of the railroads
surpassed all projections. Passengers became an important source of income, and these countries
had much better roads than Puerto Rico. As with the experience in Europe, the railroad from Ponce
to Santa Isabel of Coamo had to be a success because the costs of freight transportation could drop;
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and, the people could move safely in a timely manner. The Empresa del Ferrrocarril de Cotoner
(probably named after Governor General Lieutenant Fernando Cotoner), did not accomplish its
goals. The railroad never materialized.
Another study for a railroad in Ponce was submitted on May 30, 1864 by the British
engineer Edward Brainerd Webb and Gustavo Sichel. Webb and Sichel received the approval of
the Governor General to generate a feasibility study for a steam railroad between Ponce and
Arroyo in nine months. Jaime Bolland in representation of Webb and Sichel requested an extension
to conclude the study. Although the extension was granted the study was never concluded and the
project did not prospered.70 This was the second set back for Edward Brainerd Webb because he
submitted a previous project for a feasibility study in June 1863. In that occasion Webb associated
with two British partners, Richard Revett and Henry Augustus Cowper, for the construction of a
steam railroad from San Juan to Arecibo with a branchline to Río Piedras. The government
approved the study to be concluded in eighteen months but the final report was not submitted.71
In April of 1864 Don Felix Vidal D’Ors, a French engineer, submitted a proposal for the
study of a tramway connecting the town of Ponce with its port. A tramway differs from a railroad
in the space it covers. Tramways provided services in urban areas in a single town, and the
railroads interconnected multiple towns. Tramways were easier to construct than railroads and the
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Captain and Governor General granted a permit for eight months.72 Time passed and D’Ors failed
to implement his idea of a railroad for Ponce. In 1871 a new study for a tramway in Ponce received
the government’s approval. Don Miguel Lloreda had eight months to complete the study for a
horse-drawn tramway running near the road.73 Lloreda suffered the same fate as D’Ors when his
dreams of progress arrived at the same dead end.
On January 19, 1862 Carlos Raldiris, a merchant from Mayagüez, requested a permit to
make a feasibility study for a railroad departing from Mayagüez to the south with arrivals in San
German and Cabo Rojo. The government granted six months to prepare the study but in June 14,
1862 the governor revoked the permit in absence of the final report or a petition for time
extension.74
This small sample of local efforts to establish rail-based transportation suggests the active
role of the wealthy sector on the island at making economic improvements. However, twenty years
of unsuccessful private attempts to develop iron roads tell us something more. Private initiative
alone was not enough. The government would have to assume an active role for the advancement
of the railroads. The government would have to launch a plan for a national network of roads and
railroads to promote the economic progress of the country. Without planning, domestic elite groups
would make little progress.
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On January 21, 1868 Queen Elizabeth II of Spain decreed a general road plan for Puerto
Rico. The plan reformulated the hierarchy of the road system in four levels: (1) first class roads ,
(2) second class roads, (3) vicinity paths, and (4) particular paths. 75 First and second class roads
were proposed by the Overseas Minister to the Board of Roads, Channels, and Ports in the
metropolis. The General Road Plan included five first class roads and four second class roads:
First-class roads:
No. 1- From San Juan to Ponce by way of Caguas and Coamo.
No. 2- From Cataño to Mayagüez by way of Arecibo and Aguadilla.
No. 3- From Mayagüez to Ponce.
No. 4- From road no. 1 to the port in Arroyo by way of Guayama.
No. 5- From Cáguas to the port of Naguabo by way of Humacao.
Second-class roads:
No. 6- From Arecibo to Guayanilla by way of Utuado and Peñuelas.
No. 7- From Río Piedras to Fajardo.
No. 8- From Lares to Aguadilla.
No. 9- A junction in Guaynabo for roads No. 1 and No. 2.
The construction of the first-class roads had priority over second-class roads. The decree
mandated the design of a plan for local or vicinity paths originated in the towns and structured by
the Bureau of Public Works. On June 9, 1869 the Oversees Minister approved the plan for the
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creation of 40 vicinity paths.76 Particular paths needed the approval of the Bureau of Public Works
and must indicate the public benefit of it. The length of the roads or paths vary in a case by case
basis, but the width for roads was 7 meters, vicinity and particular paths for carriages was 6 meters,
and 3 meters for horse paths.
In 1869 the island did not have any railroad after few unsuccessful efforts but at least the
government had approved a new comprehensible plan for the development of roads. Though, the
execution of the road plan would be determined by the funding assigned for public works. The
general budget for fiscal year 1869-1870 allocated 2,000 escudos for road repairs and maintenance,
which represented 21 percent of the budget assigned for development projects (Fomento), and
allocated 200 escudos for surveys from an extraordinary fund.77 For the fiscal year 1871-1872 the
Parliament in Spain allocated 125,000 pesetas,78 which represented 22 percent of the budget
assigned for development projects.79 This fiscal allocation was insufficient to develop the road plan
approved in 1868. In addition, the conservation of roads entrusted to road peons was unsatisfactory
because most of this personnel engaged in other economic activities to supplement their income of
10 reales vellón per day,80 a low remuneration if compared to agricultural workers earning 15 to 20
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reales vellón.81 Lack of funding once again was the main obstacle for the creation of infrastructure
as previously occurred with the road plan set under the rule of Norzagaray.
Abolition and coffee
On March 22, 1873 the National Assembly in Spain approved the abolition law for Puerto
Rico. In its second article, the law mandated a transitional period by forcing the slaves to establish
a contract with a planter, the state, or even their former owner, for three years. The law also
granted indemnity for slave owners due six months after publishing the law in the Spanish
gazette.82 Initially, planters assumed they would receive reparations from the government during
the transitional period and that money could be invested in new technology, but the government
got idle and hold the payments for years.
At the height of 1880 the administrator of the French consulate in Puerto Rico, Argélian de
Johannis, informed the French minister about the decadent situation of the sugar business after the
abolition of slavery. Johannis indicated in his report that 505 sugar mills were in operation before
the abolition, but in 1880 only 300 were functioning because landowners did not found laborers to
work the fields. The Spanish government committed to pay slaveowners for their loss, however,
political instability in Spain made the bonds worthless and many former slave owners traded them
at only 20 percent of the original value. For Johannis the abolition of slavery in 1873 was a terrible
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setback for the sugar business, but locally there were efforts to revitalize it. 83 Johannis recognized
the work of the governor, the press, industrial and agricultural associations, towards promoting the
establishment of sugar factories as a solution to the crisis. Emile Louhet, a French and agent of
Casa Cail y Cía, established Central San Vicente in Toa Baja and had plans for two more factories,
and in Loiza a corporation from the United States established another factory. The abolition of
slavery in Puerto Rico, like every sugar producing country, “created a crisis in the cane industry;”84
however, Argélian de Johannis encountered the crisis as an opportunity for french investors to
partake in the incipient factory model of sugar production.
The crisis in sugar did not immerse the island in a complete economic collapse because
another product emerged as the main source of wealth for the country: Coffee. The low
temperatures and fertile soil of the mountains were exceptional for the production of premium
quality coffee. From 1850s to 1870s coffee production was the second source of state revenue after
sugar, but in 1875 a boom in coffee exports ensued with capital fueled from merchant houses as a
result of the closing of many sugar haciendas. Access to credit was important because the first
harvest of coffee bushes typically took four to five years, but in those years the farmer needed
capital to pay for operational expenses and salaries for the peasants. Although the family worked in
coffee farms, planters also had access to cheap labor from the highlands and from idle workers that
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migrated from the coast. Most coffee farmers were small or medium landowners, which planted
coffee and other products like tobacco, corn, plantains, rice, tubers and had cattle for the work in
the estate (estancia). The big coffee planter with access to credit, land with water sources to wash
the beans, space to dry the bean in concrete floors, and capital to mechanize the process of taking
out the husk of the coffee bean and to polish the coffee bean, could increase production by the
purchase of raw coffee beans from neighboring small coffee farmers. The final aspect of the coffee
business was the transportation of the product from the plantation to the port to be exported to
Europe, the main market for Puerto Rican coffee. Most farmers did not engage in this phase
because it was too expensive and opted to sell their coffee to merchants or planters with the
resources to pay for the mule trains. Fernando Picó claimed that only big planters with warehouses
in the plantation or in the town had the possibility to decrease the impact of carriage costs if they
could hold the product for a while until the prices were favorable.85 Laird Bergad argued that
during the nineteenth century “transportation costs were a restraint to agricultural development.”86
Without doubt, it was beneficial for coffee growers to establish roads to link farms with the ports
and then export markets; even though “coffee’s high value in relation to weight makes excessive
transportation costs more tolerable than for other marketable agricultural products.”87
Producers of coffee and sugar alike needed new roads to decrease transportation costs, and
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railroads could complement the road infrastructure, although the establishment and operation of
railroads in in the mountainous interior was much more expensive than on the coastal plains.
Coffee was a highland crop and mule trains would be less expensive than the establishment of
railroads. On the other hand, sugar producing flat coastal regions were ideal for railroads and the
industry needed a resurgence because of falling market prices, obsolete technology, and lack of
labor. Railroads could stimulate the growth of the sugar sector by decreasing transportation costs.
The state facilitated the approval of railroad “sociedades anónimas” (corporations) and
granted extensions, when solicited, to conclude feasibility studies for the establishment of railroad
or tramway lines. However, permission to establish businesses did not necessarily translate into the
promotion of economic development. The island had an extant plan for road development since
1868, but little progress had been forthcoming. Only in 1876 did the Overseas Ministry finally
commission a feasibility study to the Engineer-in-chief of the Bureau of Public Works, Leonardo
de Tejada Morales, for the establishment of a national railroad. Tejada Morales was a Spaniard
from Malaga graduated as Civil Engineer in road construction (Ingeniero de Caminos) in 1861. He
studied the railroad plans for Murcia to Granada and Albacete to Jaén in Spain and later was
appointed to the Public Works Ministry in Madrid until December 1872 when he was appointed
Engineer-in-chief for Puerto Rico.88 The Revista de Obras Públicas published the report, in which
Leonardo de Tejada stated that railroads were superior to roads, because shipping would be easier,
faster, and more convenient. The problem was the cost. Railroads were expensive, and private
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initiatives assumed the economic risk only when there was a conviction that there would be a
return in capital high enough to cover the costs for the development of the line. Private companies
would not develop railroads in areas of potentially low profits. But with state-supported railroads
those areas would promote the emergence of new industries, and would increase property values.
In this case, railroads could improve national wealth.
There were two types of internal commerce, terrestrial and coastal trade. Overland
movement of products through roads, mule paths, and rivers was difficult and costly. An
alternative was the transportation of goods via the sea. In 1877, twelve ports were open for
commerce: San Juan, Arecibo, Aguadilla, Mayagüez, Guánica, Guayanilla, Ponce, Arroyo,
Humacao, Naguabo, Fajardo, and Salinas.89 Steamships transported freight between all of the
island’s ports, but with the railroads, the competition would possibly lead to a reduction in
transportation costs. Commonly, freight costs on steamships were more economical than on
railroads, but loading costs were the problem. The necessity of multiple loadings and unloadings
could be reduced once the railroads were developed because overland transportation could
eliminate these multiple and expensive loadings. In 1877, the estimated cost of freight loading
between ports in Puerto Rico was 5 pesos per ton. In that year the authorities reported
approximately 50,000 tons transported between ports. Only two companies provided shipping
services. A Spanish company linked San Juan, Fajardo, Humacao, Arroyo, Ponce, Mayagüez,
Aguadilla and Arecibo, and a British company provided service from St. Thomas and St. Domingo
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to San Juan, Naguabo, Arroyo, Ponce, Mayagüez, and Aguadilla. Of all these ports, San Juan,
Ponce, and Mayagüez were the most active. A final aspect to consider was the transportation of
passengers. The companies reported an estimated income of 500,000 pesetas for 12,000
passengers.90 From a current perspective it would be hard to imagine the sea as a safer and more
reliable place for trade and movement of passengers than ground transportation.
Muddy and impassable roads required constant maintenance and improvement. The
inclination of Spain was to continue with the construction of new roads, and in addition plans to
integrate railroads into the landscape. Those railroads were going to be supervised by the state, but
developed by private corporations thus defraying public investment costs. For Wenceslao Lugo
Viña, Utuado’s elected senator in the Spanish Parliament for the 1871 session, the establishment of
a railroad should be a priority in order to improve the economy of the island. Lugo Viña’s
opportunity to represent the Province of Puerto Rico in the Spanish Parliament (a right ceded after
the victory of the 1868 Glorious Revolution in Spain) allowed him to be an authoritative voice in
Spain. Senator Lugo Viña denounced the harm of measures adopted by Spain to protect sugar
produced in Andalucia, because it reduced the Spanish market for sugar produced in Puerto Rico.
On the island farmers struggle with weather inclemency, proliferation of insects, limited irrigation
systems, labor shortages, high salaries, and limited internal markets. Three different taxes, a direct
tax named the subsidio, export tax, and municipal tax, asphyxiated local planters since 1848 when
the tax law was approved. Wenceslao Lugo Viña wagered that progress could be obtained through
a transformation of state policies. Among other reforms, it was necessary a revision of the tax law
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to aliviate the burden for the planters and the completion of the public interest railroad plan
developed by D. Leonardo de Tejada was necessary. Lugo Viña could not conceive a better
economy without railroads.91 The call for reforms made by the Senator had to be approved in
Spain to enhance the insular economy.
In October 1878, King Alfonso XII finally signed the project for the establishment of
Engineer Tejada’s national railroad.92 This support from the Monarchy appeared to be a serious
commitment, but modernity did not come as fast as the people on the island had expected. The
experience with the expansion of roads was already disappointing. An impression of the
disenchantment in the progress of road maintenance and construction is found in the report of the
Colonial Exposition in Amsterdam of 1883. The Provincial Commission of Puerto Rico provided
an infrastructural map of the island, including the status of public works at that moment. The
insular administration was responsible for the development of general or first-class roads, which
connected the island via five branch lines. The projected development of 476 kilometers of roads
started in 1851 with the construction of Road no. 1 connecting San Juan in the north with Ponce in
the south.93 This road was important, because it crossed the mountains and connected the major
export trade centers in Ponce and San Juan. However, the construction suffered from delays
because the war between Spain and the Dominican Republic strained the finances of Puerto Rico.94
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The Provincial Commission detailed the progress and the expectations for the road network. The
government expected to finish the last 20 kilometers of Road no. 1, between the hilly towns of Cayey
and Aibonito and to connect San Juan to Cayey (61 kilometers) as well as Aibonito and Ponce (50
kilometers) in six or eight months. Road no. 2 would have 162 kilometers when finished. The road
departed from the port of Cataño in the north to the port of Mayagüez in the west, traversing the
cities of Arecibo and Aguadilla along the northern littoral. This road had only three sections
developed, eight kilometers from Cataño to Bayamón, one kilometer over the Catholic Kings’ Bridge
between Toa Baja and Toa Alta, and nine kilometers from Añasco to Mayagüez. Road no. 3, which
was 97 kilometers in extension connected the coastline of Mayagüez and Ponce. Only fourteen
kilometers were developed from Mayagüez to San Germán. Finally, there were two more roads
planned: Road no. 4 would be 35 kilometers from Road no. 1 to the port of Arroyo in the south
passing through Guayama, and Road no. 5 would be 48 kilometers from Caguas to the port of
Naguabo in the east passing through Humacao. These two sections would not be started by the time
the exposition opened in Amsterdam. There were also plans for second and third-class roads, but at
the moment only sixteen kilometers were finished (Map 1.1). To supplement the plan three private
tramways were in operations and a fourth one was under construction. In addition, Spain approved
the development of an integral railroad system consisting of four sections running parallel to the
first-class roads encircling the island.95
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Map 1.1. Road System, 1880s.
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This report of the Provincial Commission recognized the lack of roads as an economic
limitation because the movement of commodities from the mountains to the ports in the coast was
expensive and difficult.96 However, the pamphlet did not center its account in the limitations, but
presented a frank depiction of the country with a blueprint of the future projects of development to
promote foreign investment.
Two years later the “seigniorial” city of Ponce was the site of a fair organized on the island,
and in 1885 José Ramón Abad published a report about the Ponce Exposition Fair. The structure of
the report was similar to the pamphlet published for the Colonial Exposition in Amsterdam, but in
contrast was a detailed volume with exhaustive descriptions. In the first part Abad illustrated the
island’s condition by describing its geography, communications, history, and economy. In Abad’s
description of the geography he described the diversity of the soils for agriculture. The economy of
the island depended on three agricultural crops for export trade: sugar, coffee, and tobacco.
However, the island had the potential to develop other profitable goods such as wood for
construction (candlewood or Tabonuco), cocoa, nutmeg, cinnamon, pepper, cotton, peanuts,
sesame seeds, sunflower, plantains, bananas, corn, rice, beans, pigeon peas, and diverse tubers. In
other countries these crops produced revenues, but in Puerto Rico they were harvested for family
subsistence or merely found in the wild. Abad attributed the commercial failure to the farmers,
because they had no knowledge of modern agricultural technology, they did not fertilize the soil,
and they were not committed to strenuous work. The ignorance of the farmer was the main
obstacle to economic progress according to Abad. The limitation in the production of food for
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internal consumption produced trade imbalance because the national production relied only on the
exports of sugar, coffee, and tobacco, and the cost of food imports were artificially inflated. The
other obstacle for the economic progress was the “lack of communication lines, safe and fast.”97
Commercial exchange was overly expensive for the people living in the mountains because the
cost of transportation to the ports was high and the pace slow. This problem affected people from
all social classes in the mountains.
Abad’s image was one of transportation decadence; for him the infrastructure on the island
could be reduced to one road on the littoral. The road had an extension of 520 kilometers; however,
several sections were in catastrophic shape due to significant rainfall throughout the year. The
development of the Central Road (Road no. 1) through the mountains that would connect San Juan
to Ponce continued under construction. In 1883 the pamphlet of the Colonial Exposition in
Amsterdam assured that in less than eight months the road from Cayey to Aibonito would be
finished. After two years this had still not occurred.
A second-class road was planned to connect the northern city of Arecibo with the southern
city of Ponce, passing through Adjuntas and Utuado. Abad also mentioned the design of other
second-class roads, one in the west connecting Aguadilla with Lares and another in the east
connecting Caguas with Humacao. In the report there was no information about the progress of
these roads. In the pamphlet of the Colonial Exposition in Amsterdam the government was
studying the possibility of halting the construction of Road no. 2, and Road no. 3 due to the fact
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that the projected state-sponsored railroad would cover the same routes. Consequently, roads no. 4
and no. 5 were chosen as priorities to be developed. Abad confirmed this decision in his report.
Roads no. 2 and 3 were cancelled and in its place second-class roads would be constructed,
although the project had not yet begun. That is to say, the central government was responsible for
the Central Road and the development of the railroad, and the provinces were responsible for three
second-class roads connecting mountainous towns with ports in the west, center and eastern areas
of the island.
For Abad, a poor infrastructure was the principal economic problem faced by Puerto Rico.
He claimed that the cost of transportation from one corner of the island to the other was the
equivalent in time and cost to a voyage from Puerto Rico to New York. Abad concluded that
economic backwardness could not be overcome until the state invested in new infrastructure. For
him, state inaction was the main cause of poverty in Puerto Rico. By avoiding public debt the state
circumvented the development of a railroad system and this implied and inefficient economy and
enduring poverty.
Abad recognized that there was a plan being developed to build a railway system parallel to
the coastal road, but while he was working on the report neither the railroad had begun the
construction, nor had the coastal road had been repaired. The plan of the Bureau of Public Works
included four sections of railways: 98
No. 1- From San Juan to Mayagüez by way of Arecibo and Aguadilla.
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No. 2- From Río Piedras to Humacao by way of Fajardo.
No. 3- From Ponce to Mayagüez by way of San German.
No. 4- From Ponce to Humacao by way of Arroyo.
In his assessment, Abad questioned why the Bureau of Public Works proposed the
development of railroads in coastal area in lieu of developing them in the mountains to connect the
center of the island to the coast. The state would have to repair many highland areas that were in
poor condition and the coast already had the use of steam ships to connect the ports. Abad proposal
was logic and coherent, because the economy in Puerto Rico relied mainly on the export of coffee,
which was harvested in the mountains. The coast was producing sugar, but the price of sugar had
plummeted and the competition made sugar revenues a secondary source of income after coffee. If
the mountains were the major centers of production then the state would have to develop an
infrastructure for the mountains. Abad proposed the development of narrow gauge railroads in
place of second-class roads. The first “iron roads” operating in Puerto Rican soil were narrow
gauge tramways. These narrow gauge tramways provided urban transportation from the towns to
the ports. However, Abad’s suggestions to establish railroads in the mountains fell on deaf ears.
Tramways
The Spanish government defined a tramway as a private railroad established on a pubic
road. There were four tramway shuttles operating between the principal ports and town centers in
the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Mayagüez had a 2 kilometers horse-drawn tramway; in
Ponce there was a 4 kilometers tramway moved by steam power; and from San Juan to Río Piedras
the longest tramway on the island of 12 kilometers was also powered by steam. This last tramway
54

was unique because it had 8 kilometers of tracks connecting Bayamón with the port of Cataño.
There was also steamship service to transport passengers and freight from the port of Cataño to San
Juan (Map 1.2).
The first tramway established in Puerto Rico functioned in Mayagüez. In 1872 José
Antonio González y Echeverría received authorization to establish in a period of twelve months a
horse drawn tramway from the town of Mayagüez to the seashore through Méndez Vigo Street.
The tramway would have two rails, one in direction to the beach and the other in return to the town
center.99 The Ferrocarril Urbano Mayagüez imported from Britain two story wagons with wicker
seats for its passengers.100 In January 1873 Amalia Corchado y Ruiz received the rights to operate
the tramway and the next year she transferred her rights of exploitation to Alfredo and Clara Cristy
de Roselló.101 The urban tramway operated for a decade, but in 1887 the government cancelled the
franchise after a cease of operations. The government proceed to seize all the equipment owned by
the company to cover the surety of 302.20 pesos.102
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Map 1.2. The First Tramways.
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The first tramway to use steam power was the Tranvía Ubarri between San Juan and Río
Piedras. On February 18, 1878 Pablo Ubarri y Capetillo was granted the right to build and operate
this one-track tramway. Ubarri had one month to pay 4,424 pesetas to the Department of Revenue,
and also had to present blueprints and all the required documents to the Bureau of Public Works
for the approval of the Engineering Inspector. The government approved the right of operation for
sixty years.103
Don Pablo Ubarri y Capetillo was an important figure in late nineteenth-century Puerto
Rico. He was originally from Santurce in Vizcaya and migrated to Puerto Rico in 1839 at the age
of 16 years to live with relatives. He worked as a salesman in a small store, later he become a
cattleman to supply meat to the walled city of San Juan and to produce leather. From 1850,
Ubarri’s home was Cangrejos, a little town that he later administrated after the Governor General
appointed him the mayor. Historian Jesús Martín Ramos in his biographical study, described
Ubarri as a humble garbage collector with an entrepreneurial vision. He purchased wetlands in
Cangrejos to deposit garbage from the walled city of San Juan that eventually filled and dried the
soil. Wealthy people eventually bought Ubarri’s land to build luxury homes in the outskirts of the
walled city, creating a “Puerto Rican Versailles.” From this income he was a recognized capitalist,
and developed friendships with important and powerful people through his active participation in
politics as a conservative. Ubarri became a distinguished leader of the Conservative Party, a
political group unconditional to Spain, and his political career provided him with enough influence
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to receive the rights over numerous profitable projects, among these a project to develop an
aqueduct to supply water to the capital. However, the project, which gave him most notoriety, was
a tramway which would be developed without any state subvention.104
Ubarri appointed the Puerto Rican engineer Tulio Larrinaga to supervise the construction
of a tramway in San Juan. Ubarris’ tramway started operations on January 28, 1880 and was an
immediate success.105 After three months of operation the neighbors of Cangrejos decided to
change the name of the town to Santurce in honor of the native land of Ubarri. On October 15,
1880 by Royal Decree, Ubarri received the title of First Count of San José de Santurce from King
Alfonso XII.
In 1880 the tramway to Río Piedras had a first class rate of 10 cents from the capital to San
Antonio, and 10 cents from San Antonio to Martín Peña. A trip from the Capital to Martín Peña
was 20 cents. In second class, the fare decreased to 6½ cents per adult.106 Children paid half fare.
The operation schedule published in April 1880 was:
Table 1.1. Daily departures of the Río Piedras Tramway
FROM SAN JUAN
(1) 6:30 am
(2) 9:30 am
(3) 1:30 pm
(4) 5:00 pm

FROM RÍO PIEDRAS
(1) 7:00 am
(2) 10:00 am
(3) 4:00 pm
(4) 6:00 pm
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Ubarri’s tramway provided service to passengers during week days, weekends, and even
offered special trips for religious holidays at a roundtrip fare of 30 cents. During the festivities of
San Mateo, the patron saint of Santurce, the tramway scheduled 13 trips to allow the people
participate in the event. For the festivities of Nuestra Señora del Pilar, the patron virgin of Río
Piedras, the tramway had a special holiday schedule, and even added a final trip after the dance.107
An optimistic estimate in 1885 suggested that from a population of 40,000 inhabitants, 500
passengers used the tramway on a daily basis.108
To promote a judicious use of the tramway the company decided to educate potential
commuters. The company published flyers with schedules on one side and tramway rules on the
reverse:
En los coches de pasajeros está prohibido: viajar borracho, proferir blasfemias, ir
vestido indecorosamente, llevar animales, efectos inflamables, líos de ropa sucia,
bultos de materias fétidas, estorbos en los asientos y todo lo que pueda causar
perjuicios y molestias al viajante y a la Empresa.109
The company also needed to educate the public on how to avoid accidents. Deadly
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accidents had put the company under the watchful eye of the government and commuters. One
incident reported the tramway having hit Don Francisco Casenave at the San Antonio stop at 10:15
in the morning, because he was lying down too close to the rails. Casenave died instantly, and the
tramway derailed. Nearly a month later, at 4:15 in the afternoon, another tramway ran over a
woman. Some passengers testified that they had heard the whistle blow, as required by law. In both
accidents, the victims appeared to have been responsible, but the chief engineer decided to impose
a lower speed limit on the company in response to an order by the governor. From the capital to
Martín Peña the speed limit had to be decreased to 10 kilometers per hour, and from Martín Peña
to Río Piedras to 15 kilometers per hour. The population density accounted for the variation of the
speed limits. With this new speed, the machinists had a better probability of stopping the tramway
in case of an emergency. Due to the new speed limits, on October 8, 1893 Ubarri presented a new
schedule for the tramway. Ubarri requested a revision of the resolution, which eventually was
granted by the governor.110
Juan R. González Mendoza and Héctor Sánchez Sánchez recorded the accidents which
took place on Ubarri’s tramway from 1880 to 1885 (figure 1.1). From their perspective the
reprimand received by the government was lenient, because the company was only fined and no
one was prosecuted for the accidents they had caused. Derailments, fires, and collisions between
wagons resulted from a lack of organization, poor machinery maintenance, and inefficiency. The
company did not followed security codes and operated under the impunity of the colonial
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administration. One common complaint was the overcrowding of passengers in the wagons,
particularly during special celebrations.111

ACCIDENTS REPORTED

Figure 1.1. Accidents reported by Ubarri’s Tramway, 1880-1885
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SOURCE. - Juan R. Gonzalez Mendoza and Hector E. Sánchez Sánchez, “Los orígenes del
tranvía de San Juan a Rio Piedras, 1878-1885,” Anales de Investigación Histórica, vol.1, no. 2
(1974): 27-28.

The data provided by González Mendoza and Sánchez Sánchez for the first half of the
1880s suggested that the authorities did not enforce security codes because a decade later the
accidents continued. These historians suggested that Ubarri’s political influences on the colonial
administration may have influenced the special treatment he had received by the authorities, which
allowed him to continue operating without any major inconveniences despite safety issues.
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These accidents did not tarnish the good standing of the tramway. The tramway provided a
modern alternative of transportation to the city, transported free of charge any uniformed police
officer (Guardia Civil), and promoted religious and state celebrations. Ubarri’s tramway was a
symbol of both change and progress. Ubarri’s tramway provides an interesting contrast between
the ideas of progress and elite attitudes toward the “progress” of the country. Ubarri was the
president of the Unconditional Spanish Party (Partido Incondicional Español), the political niche
of the conservatives on the island. Although he was the man behind the establishment of the first
steam power tramway in Puerto Rico he and his political party opposed the development of public
education on the island. For men like Ubarri “progress” meant economic growth, not programs for
the social development of common people. In 1894 Count Ubarri traveled to Madrid for health
reasons and to attend business concerning his tramway.112 Upon his return to Puerto Rico Count
Ubarri died that same year.
On the third day of March, 1878 the Gaceta de Madrid published an approval in favor of
Juan Nepomuceno Torruella y Andino for the development of a steam tramway from the town of
Ponce to the port of the city. Torruella submitted his proposal on February 30, 1877 requesting the
authorization for a feasibility study. Torruellas would assume all the costs for the development of a
tramway after the final approval of the Bureau of Public Works. The government approved the
franchise for 60 years although Torruellas requested the franchise on perpetuity.113 Torruella
created a corporation named Sociedad Anónima del Tranvía de Ponce for the administration of the
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tramway that began operations in October 1880 departing from Atocha Street near the Plaza del
Mercado and arriving at Comercio Street in the sector of Ponce Playa.114 The average speed was
6.5 kilometer per hour between stops with high flux of public and 11 to 14 kilometers in safe areas.
The tramway was not cheaper than a cart but it was more comfortable.
The tramway almost immediately encountered problems. The corporation had limited
capital needed to spend on machinery repairs. The technicians were not experts in tramway
machinery, and the repairs were short-terms solutions rather than permanent. Mechanical problems
and multiple derailments resulted in fines by the government.115 The inevitable happened on
January 1882 when all four steam engines broke down. This was the beginning of the end. The
corporation resumed operations, but it was not long before operations ceased because of similar
problems. From January 2 the corporation operated intermittently with a total of 93 days with no
service to October 2 when the company finally concluded the service. The mechanical problems
could be solved, but losing the public’s confidence was irreparable. The public desired a
dependable tramway service, but they were disappointed with the erratic service. The government
cancelled the permit of the Ponce tramway in 1883, however, there were three possibilities to
resume operations: (1) The original corporation could make a commitment to complete all the
repairs needed to reinitiate operations, (2) the government could assume the administration of the
tramway, or (3) a new corporation could acquire the equipment and assume the administration of
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the tramway. On March 29, 1885 the line was up for public auction with an appraisal of 13,316.26
pesos.116
A decade later, in November 1895, Vicente and José Usera received the approval to
develop an electric tramway from the Ponce town center to the coast (Playa de Ponce).117 José
Usera migrated from Valencia, Spain and owned Hacienda Las Gabias in the towns of Coamo and
Santa Isabel. Vicente Usera was the son of José Usera and the inheritor of the family lands planted
with cane, cotton, tobacco, corn, beans, pumpkins, coffee, other minor fruits, and pasture for the
cattle.118 The Usera family justified the project by arguing that the people of Ponce needed an
alternative to the horse-driven carriages. The problem with carriages was the time they consumed
to customers. Passengers had to wait until all four seats were occupied or could pay for the empty
seats in order to leave. In addition, passengers had to have the exact fare because the driver would
usually claim to have no change, forcing passengers to pay more for a 25 minute per 3 kilometer
trip.
Electricity was a novelty in Puerto Rico. The municipal assembly in Mayagüez debated in
1888 the substitution of hydrogen carbonate gas used in urban lighting for electric lights.119
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However, two years later the assembly decided to maintain traditional gas lamps.120 It was in a
hilly town that electricity made its first appearance in Puerto Rico. In 1893 Don José Ramón
Figueroa y Rivera, a wealthy coffee planter and founder of Villalba, installed the first electric
lighting system in his town of Villalba. Figueroa y Rivera did not rely on public funding to
generate electric light; instead he used his own capital.121 In San Juan, that same year, the Sociedad
Anónima Luz Eléctrica inaugurated an electric lighting system set forth in a royal decree from
1890. The proposal for an electric tramway in 1895 by Vicente and José Usera required the
construction of an electric power plant because there was no source for electric power in Ponce at
the time. The new tramway would promote the progress of Ponce and would expunge the failure of
the previous steam tramway:
Momento era el año 1880 en que el mundo asombrado por los adelantos que en la
locomoción al vapor se habían hecho en el extranjero, aplicaba este sistema a toda
clase de ferrocarriles, y Ponce, entusiasta y anhelante de progreso empleolo en su
tranvía, para muy pronto convencerse como se convenció todo el resto del mundo,
de que para este objeto no resultaba adecuado el vapor como método de
propulsión.122

“Alcaldía municipal de la ciudad de Mayagüez,” Gaceta del Gobierno de Puerto-Rico, 5 April 1890, 4.
Eugenio Latimer Torres, Historia de la Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica: Implantación de los Sistemas de Luz y
Fuerza en Puerto Rico 1893-1993 (San Juan, PR: First Book Publisher of Puerto Rico, 1997), 44-51.
122
“In was in the year 1880 when the world amazed with the advances in steam locomotion done abroad, this system
applied to all kinds of railways, and Ponce, enthusiastic and eager to progress employed it in his tramway to very
soon be convinced, as the rest of the world was convinced , that for this object it was not appropriate the steam as a
propulsion source.” Pedro Hernandes, “Proyecto de tranvía eléctrico de la ciudad de Ponce al Barrio de la Playa,”
15 March 1895, AGPR, Fondo Obras Públicas, Sub Fondo Ferrocarriles y Tranvías, Serie Expedientes y proyectos
de construcción de tranvías, Box 54.
120
121

65

The possibility of establishing a tramway moved with electric power offered a
transportation alternative for commuters in Ponce after the demise of the steam railroad. However,
the shift from steam to electric power was not the fundamental reason for the success of the
project, as the promoters advocated. The problem was not steam power per se, the challenge of the
former Ponce steam tramway was the bad administration of the company and lack of capital to
invest in repairs and new equipment. Electric power came to Ponce after the Spanish Government
granted the Compañía Anónima de la Luz Eléctrica the permit to generate electric lighting in 1897,
but Usera’s electric tramway did not materialize.
The last successful project for a tramway was granted on February 20, 1881. The crown
granted to Línea Férrea del Oeste the right to build a port in Cataño, and a tramway from the port
to Bayamón for 70 years.123 On August 9, 1881 the Línea Férrea del Oeste requested the general
gobernor extra time to begin the construction, because they expected the arrival of more materials
from overseas, and the Crown granted a four months deferment.124 It was on August 1883 when
the Governor General approved the operation of the tramway.125 The objective of this tramway
was not so much to transport passengers, but cattle and produce from the rural areas near
Bayamón. The society Línea Férrea del Oeste built a 7 kilometers tramway of one-meter gauge.
The tracks ended in a terminal that had two ferries navigating between the ports of San Juan and
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Cataño. In 1888, Ramón Valdés Cobián, a Spaniard, acquired the control of the entire company.126
From the many efforts in bringing iron roads to the island, only four tramways resulted.
Two of them were out of business in a short time. More importantly, nothing suggested that
tramways had had a substantial impact in the insular economy. Iron roads alone were not the
solution to the economy, but this was just the beginning of the story. A state sponsored belt
railroad provided real hope for a population dreaming about an island of economic opportunities.
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CHAPTER II. A BELTWAY RAILROAD

Rafael María de Labra, deputy in the Spanish Parliament representing the municipality of
Sabana Grande, defined the economy in Puerto Rico as deplorable and the condition of public
works shameful in 1885. In his speech to the Cortes (Spanish Parliament) in relation to the budget
for the next fiscal year deputy Labra demanded a revision of the state priorities. He proposed less
salaries for government officials, starting with the governor, and more funds for public works. The
island had only 20 kilometers of railroads and two or three roads for the use of horse or ox carts,
Labra said. This limitation made the export of local products unviable because transportation
expenses increased the prices of the products. Tobacco increased in price twelve or thirteen times
when transportation costs were added, and for the coffee sector the situation was similar. The
coffee produced in Puerto Rico was premium quality but transportation costs inflated prices which
affected the competition with other countries producing lesser quality coffee. From Labra’s
perspective the country had everything to generate wealth but the lack of infrastructure hindered
the island to move forward.127
For a better understanding of the island’s necessities Labra cited the report made by
Enrique Gadea, a Spanish engineer and chief of the Bureau of Public Works in Puerto Rico. Gadea
mentioned in his report the existence of a plan for the development of the following infrastructure:
(1) railroads, (2) first-class roads, (3) lighthouses, and (4) ports. The railroad plan was already
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approved but the ministry needed more technical personnel to start the project. The road plan had
147 kilometers of road constructed, 19 kilometers in the process of construction and 310
kilometers waiting to be constructed. The lighthouse plan included 9 lighthouses, with 4 in
operations (el Morro in San Juan, Cabezas de San Juan in Fajardo, Morrillos in Cabo Rojo and one
in the port of Ponce), 2 under construction (Culebrita Island in the east and Caja de Muertos Island
in the south), and 3 under study to be established in Mona Island in the west, Mala-Pascua in
Maunabo and Punta Borinquen in Aguadilla. The port plan included maintenance works already
done in San Juan and Mayagüez and studies to improve the ports in Ponce and Mayagüez. At the
provincial level the plan included the construction of 154 kilometers of second-class roads
although at the time of the report only 20 kilometers were finished. At the municipal level the road
plan included 991 kilometers, plus multiple buildings like town halls, markets, slaughterhouses,
cemeteries, schools, and aqueducts. The budget needed to develop all these projects was the
following:
Table 2.1. Budget for the development of public works in Puerto Rico, 1885

Railroads
First-class roads
Lighthouses
Ports
Buildings for civil uses
Second-class roads
Third-class roads
Total

BUDGET NEEDED
7,644,000
3,439,000
150,000
4,000,000
518,600
1,872,000
4,331,250
21,954,850

BUDGET PROPOSED
1,500,000
3,439,000
150,000
2,000,000
518,600
1,872,000
4,331,250
13,810,850

SOURCE.- Rafael María de Labra, Puerto Rico en 1885.
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BALANCE
6,144,000
0
0
2,000,000
0
0
0
8,144,000

The proposed budget discussed by the Spanish Parliament did not cover all the costs for the
establishment of railroads and ports, both essential to promote the export economy. Deputy Rafael
María de Labra used Enrique Gadea’s report in his speech because he could legitimize his position
with a report made in Puerto Rico about the need of new infrastructure, instead of just providing a
speech from the view of a politician in the metropolis without touch with the Puerto Rican reality.
Deputy Labra was not Puerto Rican, he never lived in Puerto Rico, but he was the only liberal and
autonomist elected in the insular elections to represent the district of Sabana Grande in the Spanish
parliament.
Autonomy in Puerto Rico evolved from the liberal movement organized in the context of
the Third Constitutional Period (1870-71) and the First Republic (1873-74) in Spain. In its
beginnings the liberal movement included people from different political trends: those in favor of
the complete assimilation to Spain, others in favor of autonomy from the metropolis, and followers
of a monarchical government or followers of republicanism. In the elections of 1884 only three
deputies were liberal and Labra was once again elected. He ardently criticized political and
economic centralization and promoted the autonomy for the islands of Puerto Rico and Cuba. Long
years of royalist censorship eclipsed the short periods of liberal freedoms and political
representation in the Spanish Parliament. Labra’s discourse in the Spanish Parliament showed the
view of one leader of the autonomist movement about the need to allocate more funds to establish
railroads and other infrastructure in Puerto Rico.
The rival political current of the autonomy proposed an unconditional union to Spain in
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times of liberal reforms and in times of monarchical rule. The “unconditionals” to Spain promoted
their conservative ideas in the newspaper El Asimilista. In 1885 El Asimilista published a
compilation of articles about “future projects” for Puerto Rico.128 These projects consisted of roads
and railways to promote commerce, industry, and agriculture. For conservatives the country had to
improve its infrastructure, yet it was not clear how these expensive projects would be financed.
The solution would be a public and private partnership. The government should share the costs of
these expensive projects with local capitalists. A serious impediment, however, was the shortage of
native capital for investment. The first bank in Puerto Rico opened its doors in 1877, but it took
more time until the island had a banking system financially secure enough to fund these
ventures.129 With few local investors, and an incipient banking system, they advocated that the
government of the island should encourage foreign investment for the construction and
administration of railroads.
Since 1880 the Spanish Parliament with the endorsement of the Constitutional King of
Spain, Alfonso XII, established a state commitment to facilitate the construction of railroads in
Puerto Rico. In the absence of a railroad law, they decided to adjust the Spanish railroad law to the
island by extending some articles and modifying others. A decree established a standard track
gauge measure of one meter for any railroad offering public service for passengers or freight. The
railroad franchises would be granted for ninety-nine years but after this period the state would
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assume the ownership of the railroad. To attract investors the government would provide some
incentives, which included a guarantee of 8 percent per year over the investment made in the
development of railways and a waiver for the payment of duties on the importation of railroad
equipment into the island. The government agreed to yield public land without charge and allowed
the expropriation of private estates with indemnity.130
The budget approved for the fiscal year 1880-81 indicated this shift in public policy. The
government approved 12,000 pesetas for feasibility studies and new construction of railroads, and
170,000 pesetas for the construction of new roads, more feasibility studies, and road
maintenance.131 This consignment for railroads showed a significant increase in comparison with
the previous two budgets when the sum was limited to only 4,000 pesetas. The difference between
the money allocated for roads and railroads also confirmed the course of action adopted by the
metropolis based on leaving to private investors the responsibility of railroad projects while the
state centered its efforts in road infrastructure. “Public-service railroads” was the classification
coined by the state in reference to private financed railroad for public use. Under this premise,
most railroad promoters claimed to be motivated by the public benefit of their projects. Although it
is obvious that behind any lucrative business there was the desire for profits and capital
accumulation, the petitioners always stressed how the project would benefit the country more than
themselves. In the proposals, at least nominally, public benefit came before private profits. In this
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framework, the benefits of railroads were not individual but social. That was the case of Miguel
Saralegui from San Juan, who proposed the establishment of a horse-driven tramway for the port in
1882. The plan consisted in one track to transport freight from the port to the customs house and
commerce warehouses. This tramway would not jeopardize the business of Ubarri’s tramway
because the former offered freight service while the later only provided service for passengers. The
requisites to obtain a franchise included public hearings to allow the public to express their
opinions about the project. Don Pedro G. Baró, D. Antonio Llopes, D. Sergio Bacenes, Pedro
Rondon, Gerardo Arana, Carlos Romero, Mateo Castro, and Roman Montañez opposed the
project. All of them owned small haulage companies which used carretones (horse-drawn carts) to
transfer merchandise from the ports to warehouses. They opposed the establishment of the
tramway for various reasons. The first and foremost was the possibility of competition and possible
bankruptcy if the tramway displaced them. They claimed that the tracks would impede the
movement of their carts. Finally, the owners of haulage companies reminded the government that
once the tramway absorbed all freight transportation they would lose revenues from taxes. In
conclusion, to benefit one tramway company over multiple small haulage companies was
“sobreponer el bien particular al general.”132
Miguel Saralegui, the proponent of the tramway, reacted to the attacks. The people
displaced by the tramway should not be frightened for their families and their sustenance because

Translation: “to superimpose private over public benefit.”
Jefatura de Obras Públicas, “Don Miguel Sara Legui solicita autorización para establecer un tranvía en los muelles
de esta capital, 1882,” AGPR, Fondo Obras Públicas, Sub Fondo Ferrocarriles y Tranvías, Serie Expedientes y
proyectos de construcción de tranvías, Caja 65, Legajo 108, Expediente 129.
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the tramway would generate numerous jobs. The tracks would be established adjacent to the road
without impeding the movement of horse-drawn carts. Finally, the country would benefit with the
establishment of the tramway because the goods would not suffer damages as had occurred with
the carretones. Mr. Maese, Chief Engineer of the Bureau of Public Works, approved Saralegui’s
tramway over the protests of the haulage companies. The government was the judge in the dispute
over “public interest.” It is hard to believe that anyone involved in the dispute would conduct his
business for the public good rather than his own profits. Yet, all of them claimed to be the real
promoters of the country’s progress.
Narrow gauge debate
The Crown and the Spanish Parliament agreed in facilitating the construction of private
railroads in the 1880s but also urged the construction of the state-sponsored beltway railroad. This
railroad would benefit the island economy by improving transportation offerings in agricultural
areas of production. In 1882 the town of Yauco requested the Bureau of Public Works to receive
preference in the construction of the future beltway railroad. Yauco was a coffee producer town
and coffee generated great revenues to the state in the 1880s. However, the Chief Engineer of the
Bureau of Public Works, Manuel Maese, did not commit to a preferential treatment for Yauco. An
auction would be conducted to pick the best corporation for the construction of the beltway
railroad and the corporation conferred with the contract would decide the agenda for the
construction of the railroad.133 In the time being an investor appeared with a proposal to develop a
railroad in Yauco.
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In 1883 a banker residing in France submitted paper work for a permit to develop a railroad
in Yauco with a route to the east to Santa Isabel passing through Guayanilla and Ponce. Marquis
José María Rojas submitted his petition from Paris to develop a narrow track gauge railroad of 0.76
meters. Rojas did not request any state subvention but the gauge width became problematic. In
1880 the government had approved one meter as the standard track-gauge width for public-service
railroads. The Yauco project had no future because the government had no intention of consenting
to Rojas’ petition. Marquis Rojas wrote a missive to the government citing article five of the
railroad law: “el ancho de la vía será el aprobado para los ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico (un metro),
pero en casos especiales, y justificados debidamente, podrá ser menor.”134 Marquis Rojas had to
provide solid justification to construct a 0.76 meters gauge railroad in place of the one meter gauge
required by the state. He claimed that the distance was short, only 30 leguas (approximately 165
kilometers), and in a poor country there was no need to invest in an expensive one meter gauge
track railroad if there was a more economical alternative:
Pobre, muy pobre dicha Isla, solo puede construir vías económicas.
Naciones poderosas como los Estados Unidos, tienen millares de kilómetros de
ferrocarriles con un ancho de setenta y seis centímetros y con ellos se realizan
todos los servicios con la celeridad y perfección de todos conocidas.
Inglaterra, Chile, Perú, Venezuela, Sajonia, Bosnia, Francia, Bélgica y otras

Translation: “for railroads in Puerto Rico the approved gauge width had to be one meter, but in special cases with
all due justifications the width could be lesser.”
“José Mª Rojas pide concesión de una línea de ferrocarril,” PARES/ AHN, Ministerio de Ultramar, Unidad 369,
Expediente 18, Img. 34.
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naciones que poseen líneas económicas de setenta y seis centímetros, van
aumentándolas considerablemente.
Periódicos tan respetados como The Times de Londres, califica de despilfarro los
capitales invertidos en Inglaterra en anchos de via, cuando la experiencia
demuestra que con líneas de setenta y seis centímetros puede hacerse
perfectamente los servicios.135
The dispute over the width of the track gauge was crucial for railway developers. Marquis
Rojas considered it an error to mandate a standard track gauge width for the entire island. All the
tramways at that time had 0.76 meters gauge lines because narrow gauge meant lower costs of
development. It was evident that after the approval of the one-meter gauge limitation the progress
of the railways was halted. For Rojas, the imposition of a wider track gauge impeded the
establishment of new railroads because construction costs increased unreasonably.
Another advocate of the narrower track gauge was Don Mateo Lucchetti. This planter from
Corsica, Spain, published a pamphlet defending the advantages of narrow-gauge railroads to
promote agriculture and industry. Lucchetti claimed that railroads were essential for the
improvement of the economic situation and to overcome the “primitive” state of the island. He
proposed 76 centimeters as the ideal gauge measurement for all the railroads on the island. The

Translation: “Poor, very poor is this island that only could built economic railroads. Powerful nations like the
United States had thousands of railroad kilometers built in 76 cm rail gauge and everyone recognized the swiftness and
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England, Chile, Peru, Venezuela, Saxony, Bosnia, France, Belgium and other nations with economic rails of 76 cm
are increasing considerably. Recognized newspapers like The Times of London described the investment of capital in
widen gauges a wastefulness after the experience demonstrated that 76 cm rail gauge could offer a perfect service.”
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idea behind this proposal was to merge different lines. For Lucchetti, iron roads instead of roads
for oxcarts would help avoid the hardships encountered in the transportation of coffee and sugar.
With the railroads the island would duplicate, or even triple the transportation of agricultural
products, and new industries (such as mining) could be promoted. The best example of the
economic possibilities of railroads was Ubarri’s tramway. People were able to travel between San
Juan and Cangrejos, and an economic advantage was that properties near the route increased in
value. Ubarri’s tramway was narrow-gauged and the new law of 1880 jeopardized the construction
of future tramways or railroads narrower than a one-meter gauge.136 Indeed, Ubarri tried to acquire
the right to operate a tramway from Río Piedras to Carolina but the government rejected his
proposal for the gauge width. Marquis Rojas also mentioned the obstacles to Ubarri’s project for a
tramway to Carolina and Caguas, because he wanted to continue operations in 0.76-meter gauge
tramways. Lucchetti and Marquis Rojas shared their frustrations with the government’s ruling on
the one-meter gauge width.
After three years waiting for the approval, Marquis Rojas abandoned this dispute and
changed his request to a one-meter gauge railroad. Marquis Rojas also requested a permit to extend
the length of the route from Mayagüez to Arroyo. To his amazement, the government rejected his
project because his railroad had no need in view of the future projected development of the beltway
railroad with a station in Yauco. A Spaniard named Ivo Bosch won the right to develop the
beltway railroad and Marquis Rojas lost his interest in building a railroad in Puerto Rico.
In 1886 the Oversees Minister finally approved the opening of the auction for the beltway
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railroad. The companies would compete for a franchise to construct and operate a single-track
public-interest-railroad.137 The beltway railroad was ready to become a reality as Don Leonardo de
Tejada had planned a decade earlier. To register in the auction the bidders had to deposit 100,000
pesos and the winner of the auction had to deposit a guarantee of 300,000 pesos to be return by the
state at the end of the project. The government decided to divide the route of 546 kilometers into
five rail lines: (A) San Juan-Mayagüez, (B) Río Piedras-Humacao, (C) Ponce-Mayagüez, (D)
Ponce-Humacao, and (E) Caguas-Humacao.138 The auction called for one company to undertake
the construction of the five lines of railroad in a period of 6 years. The state would pay an 8 percent
annual interest over the capital invested in the construction of the rail lines. The company had the
right to request the subvention payment after the completion of each section of a rail-line up to
9,929,000 pesos. To calculate the interest the state established the following rates:
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Table 2.2. Length of rail lines and its sections with its rates to calculate state subvention.

RAIL-LINE

SECTION

RAIL-LINE LENGTH

SECTION

IN KILOMETERS

NUMBER

LENGTH IN
KILOMETERS

1st
2nd
3rd
1st
2nd
1st
2nd
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
Unique

85
60
40
60
36
55
35
18
12
25
70
50

Line A

185 km

Line B

96 km

Line C

90 km

Line D

125 km

Line E

50 km

RATE PER KM
IN PESOS

18,000
20,000
18,000
18,000
18,000
18,000
18,000
19,000
22,000
19,000
15,000
20,000

SOURCE.- Royal Decree approved on December 17, 1886 published in the Gaceta de Puerto Rico.

On January 1887 Queen Regent of Spain, María Cristina, representing her son Alfonso
XIII, scheduled the beltway railroad auction for April 20, 1888. However, in November the
approval of Royal Decree 636 moved the auction to March 5, 1888 at 11:00 AM in San Juan and
3:00 PM in Madrid.139 The auction did not attract any investors and this meant the scheduling of a
second auction, which also had no bidders.
The nonattendance of investors to the railroad auction occurred because of the Spanish
condition of a wide track gauge, concluded José de Jesús Domínguez, a distinguished autonomist
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from Mayagüez. De Jesús criticized the administrative control of Spain over Puerto Rico, although
the island was a province not a colony. This centralization of power affected the economic progress
of the island. The ills of administrative centralization were evident in the difficulties confronted by
Count Ubarri to undertake from the construction of the beltway railroad. Ubarri was the chief of
the Conservative Party, had wealth and influence in Madrid, yet his efforts to prolong his tramway
were rejected. Ubarri’s 76 centimeters gauge tramway in Río Piedras would not connect to the
proposed beltway railroad because it would be a one-meter gauge railroad. After two unappealing
auctions, the government had to reconsider the reduction of the track gauge to allow Ubarri to
participate in the project. Ubarri demonstrated his commitment to the economic progress of the
island when he built the first steam railroad without state subvention and he continued with the
energy and desire to invest in the progress of Puerto Rico, asking that the state had to be more
flexible. In a final consideration, De Jesús questioned the benefit of an eight percent state subsidy
for the construction of the beltway railroad when that money could be used to promote the
decadent sugar industry.140
In the third auction Don Ivo Bosch y Puig, a Spanish banker, won the rights for the
construction of the one-meter gauge beltway railroad. In a Royal Decree sealed in May 15, 1888
the state officially adjudicated the auction to Bosch and indirectly concluded the debate over the
width of the line-gauge. Narrow gauges railroads had their advantages such as “facilitating sharper
curvatures, enabling railway lines to follow the contours of rugged landscape and reducing the
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need for expensive cuttings, tunnels, embankments, and bridges.”141 However, once the beltway
railroad started operations it was more advantageous for narrow gauge tramways and railroad
companies to adopt the one-meter track gauge to integrate their tracks to a wider network with
more users. In the railroad world, a one-meter track gauge was a narrow-gauge railroad still;
however, for Count Ubarri and Marquis Rojas the standardization of track gauge was an
insurmountable obstacle.
Bosch was a powerful man with other investments in railways constructed in Spain,
Venezuela, Colombia, and France. He transferred his rights for the construction of the railroad to a
French company named Societé d’Entreprises et des Constructions des Colonies Espagnoles. In
1888, the French company decide on Mr. Sauvan as the chief engineer. Mr. Sauvan was former
General Director of the Chemin de fer Ottomans.142 French presence in the railway sector was
evident in a number of countries such as Spain (Compagnie Des Chemins de Fer du Nord de
L’Espagne, Compagnie Des Chemins de Fer Andalous, etc.), Argentina (Chemins de Fer de la
Province de Santa-Fé ), and Brazil (Chemins de Fer Brésiliens). French investors acquired the
right for the construction of the beltway railroad, and local capitalists had the opportunity to
develop branch lines or secondary railroads with connection to the trunk line.
Sugar and railroads
The construction of the beltway railroad was important for the island. The tramways had
been significant initiatives but the country needed railroads to boost the economy. Sugar planters
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were particularly attracted to the establishment of the beltway railroad because it would operate in
coastal towns where the cane was grown and produced. Already sugar planters invested in different
technologies in response to the crisis that started in mid-nineteenth century and became critical
with the abolition of slavery in 1873. Historian Andrés Ramos Mattei argued that the fall of the
sugar plantation system during the last third of the nineteenth century was due to a combination of
factors: “the abolition of slavery; the difficulty of forming a labor force of freed men; the absence
of an adequate monetary system; the difficulty in obtaining capital at reasonable interest rates in
the island; regional droughts; the fall in the price of sugar on the international market; the unstable
relations with Puerto Rico's major sugar markets and the increasing consumption of beet sugar
internationally. The latter was a superior product to the muscovado sugar manufactured by the
plantations. As a result of this combination of factors, the crisis broke out in the 1870s. The spark
which started the fire was, undoubtedly, the abolition of slavery.”143
The response to limited labor was efficiency in production. To increase efficiency was
imperious the complete mechanization of the sugar business. Historian Teresita Martínez Vergne
proposed that “both abolition and the drop in the price of sugar dictated the need for change, some
planters entertained the idea of experimenting with new methods of manufacturing sugar. Those
who envisioned the establishment of efficient enterprises as the basis for a prosperous future took
the bold step of investing capital in modern equipment and rationalizing the production
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process.”144 It was necessary a shift from producing sugar in haciendas to produce sugar in
centrales. The haciendas used a rudimental technology which allowed the planter to produce
brown sugar (moscabada), but the central produced white refined sugar in highly mechanize mills.
Precisely in 1873 the first central, Central San Vicente, started operations in Vega Baja, but the
agricultural-industrial complex initiated in San Vicente was difficult to replicate for most planters
without the capital or credit to import that technology. For some planters the solution was to
partially mechanize their production.145 It was in this juncture that planters started to introduce
portable tracks to transport raw cane from field to mills. Mainly two companies, Aine Decauville
from France and Manlove Alliott from Britain, received the orders for portable tracks from planters
in Puerto Rico.146

Teresita Martínez Vergne, “New Patterns for Puerto Rico's Sugar Workers: Abolition and Centralization at San
Vicente, 1873-92,” The Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 68, no. 1 (1988): 48.
145
Andrés Ramos Mattei, La sociedad del azúcar en Puerto Rico: 1870-1910 (Río Piedras, PR: Universidad de
Puerto Rico, 1988), 32-33.
146
Ramos Mattei, La sociedad del azúcar en Puerto Rico, 48.
144

83

Figure 2.1. Hacienda La Fortuna
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Figure 2.2. Hacienda Buena Vista
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Francisco Oller, a distinguished Puerto Rican artist, depicted in his painting Hacienda la
Fortuna (1885) the portable tracks with ox-drawn carts moving forward in direction to the mill
building (Figure 2.1). Historian Andrés Ramos Mattei explained that sometimes half of the land for
planting was dedicated to food crops and pastures for the oxen: “These animals formed the axis of
transportation of cane from the plantation to the factory. They were also used to transport sugar
from the plantation to the loading dock.”147 Evidently, this practice limited the land for cane
planting and steam power for cane transportation became a better alternative because it was faster
and liberate land previously used for pasture.
In another painting titled Hacienda Buena Vista (n.d.), Francisco Oller depicted a step
forward in the growth of sugar transportation (Figure 2.2). Oller painted a steam railroad crossing
the plantation with seven carts full of cane. In his paintings Oller gave us a pictorial representation
of the changes in the rail transportation in the sugar industry. However, the incorporation of
railroad tracks was expensive and the transition was slow, as was the establishment of centrales.
For instance, Central Mercedita in Ponce “mechanized the transportation system with the purchase
of a locomotive from the English firm Manlove Alilot and Company. Even so, they continued
using portable tracks and oxen carts to take the cane from the cane fields.”148
Planters needed an efficient transportation system in two segments: first to transport raw
cane from the estates to the mill (including neighboring estates), and second to transport refined
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sugar from the mill to the ports. Historian Humberto García Muñíz claimed that “the introduction
of movable tracks in 1869 and the railroad in 1888 extended the reach of the central and
revolutionized the transport system.”149 Planters started to modernize their transportation system
with tracks and were anticipating the completion of the insular railroad system. The possibility of
link their private railroads with the beltway railroad or the establishment of secondary railroads
(defined as railroads for public use but not in response to the public interest) was attractive for
every planter. New competition from beet sugar in the United States and European countries
prompted a drop in the sugar prices due to the saturation of the markets forcing local sugar
producers to look for technological innovation and more efficient transportation.150
Finally the railroad
In 1890 Puerto Rico had a population of 810,394 inhabitants and the island participated
actively in international trade. However, farmers and merchants, continued to rely on expensive
and slow ox carts. Even the tramways in urban centers did not satisfy the demand for
transportation. Adolfo de Hostos wrote: “Hacia 1892 el tránsito entre la ciudad y Santurce había
aumentado a tal extremo que el tranvía de vapor era insuficiente. Establecióse un servicio de
omnibús [sic.] con asiento para diez personas, tirados por caballos.”151 The future of Puerto Rico
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was the beltway railroad, and the ox-carts would remain as symbols of the past.
The construction of the railroad required the expropriation of property. Edwin Borrero
González in his master’s thesis acknowledged the legal efforts of landowners to stop land
expropriations. The Oversees Minister approved a law to carry out the expropriations for fair
economic compensation. However, the corporation decided to pay only 5 cents per square meter an
undervalue payment for most of the estates. As an example of landowner’s dissention, Don
Eudaldo J. Iglesias went to the courts claiming a compensation of 79 cents per square meter for his
five estates in Puerta de Tierra.152 His was the first of a wave of appeals in the courts against the
railroad corporation. In general the values ranged from 5 cents to 1 peso, with the exception of the
lands owned by Don Pablo Ubarri. Borrero González studied multiple court cases and found that
Ubarri received the highest compensation for his lands. It is not surprising because Ubarri was a
powerful leader in the “unconditional” movement. The author mentioned other property owners
with emotional bonds to a family estate owned generation after generation, and the loyalty among
neighbors; however, they accepted the compensation offered by the state because litigation was
expensive and difficult to obtain a victory. The issue of fair compensation was eventually settled in
the courts but it was a long process and added to the delay in the construction of the railroad.
The initial agreement of the government with Don Ivo Bosch established that the railway
network would be fully completed in six years. Three years later the Compañía de los
Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico was ready to begin limited operations. The Compañía de los
Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico was a corporation created in Madrid, Spain, in 1888 with a capital of
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16 million pesetas or francs (both currencies were equivalents in value) divided into 32,000 shares
of 500 pesetas or francs each.153 On March 1891, an article in the Revista de Obras Públicas
publicized the opening of the first section in the north from the Martín Peña station in San Juan to
the station in Arecibo.154 This was a major step forward but the corporation was behind schedule.
Several months later a local newspaper published: “Que progresamos, no hay duda, y es necesario
seguir el movimiento de avance.”155 By 1892 the company had built only 191 kilometers of the
projected 456 kilometers. Moreover the consul of Great Britain reported: “little seems to have been
done during the years 1893 and 1894, only 2 more kiloms. (from Hatillo to Camuy) having been
added since 1892”.156 The company decided to start providing service in the finished segments of
the lines to start generating revenues.
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Estatutos de la Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto-Rico (Madrid, Spain: Imprenta de Fontanet, 1888), 7.
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Figure 2.3. Quarterly Gross Income for Line A-1st, 2nd and 3rd sections, 1892-1893.
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SOURCE.- Income obtained by the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles in the first, second, and third
Section of Line A. AGPR, Fondo Obras Públicas, Sub Fondo Ferrocarriles y Tranvías, Serie
Expedientes y Documentos Relativos a Ferrocarriles, Caja 30, Legajo 44, Expediente 63.
The beltway railroad provided service for passengers and freight transportation at different
fares. Income reports for the fiscal year of 1892-1893 illustrated the changing priorities in different
geographical areas. Line A had three sections the first of which was the longest at 85 kilometers
from San Juan to Arecibo. This first section reported higher income in freight transportation than it
reported for passenger transportation (including baggage fees). However, the second section from
Arecibo to Hatillo and the third section from Aguadilla to Mayagüez reported higher profits from
passenger transportation. Figure 2.3 illustrates the income variances for each section of Line A.157
The first section of Line B (San Juan-Carolina) and the second section of Line C (YaucoPonce) also were in operations during 1892. Those sections did not generate the income of Line A
because the distances were smaller. There was also a relation between the income of the section
and the port it serves. Line A Section 1 offered service to port in San Juan, the most active in the
island, Line C Section 2 offered service to the port in Ponce and Line A section 3 to the port in
Mayagüez. The total income for each section per quarter is shown in the following table:158

Jefatura de Obras Públicas, “Estado que manifiesta los ingresos obtenidos por la compañía de los ferro-carriles en
la 1a, 2a y 3a sección de la línea A durante el primer semestre del año económico de 1892-93,” AGPR, Fondo Obras
Públicas, Sub Fondo Ferrocarriles y Tranvías, Serie Expedientes y Documentos Relativos a Ferrocarriles, Caja 30,
Legajo 44, Expediente 63.
158
Jefatura de Obras Públicas, “Datos pedidos por el ministerio de Ultramar acerca del producto bruto kilométrico y
gastos correspondientes a cada una de las secciones en explotación de los ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico. 1893,”
AGPR, Fondo Obras Públicas, Sub Fondo Ferrocarriles y Tranvías, Serie Expedientes y Documentos Relativos a
Ferrocarriles, Caja 30, Legajo 44, Expediente 63.
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Table 2.3. Quarterly Gross Income for operating sections in Line A, B and C, Fiscal Year
1892-1893.
RAIL-LINE
/SECTION

THIRD QUARTER
1892

A/1
A/2
A/3
B/1
C/2

$20,950.64
433.84
0
703.37
6,058.15

FOURTH
QUARTER
1892
$23,005.93
893.43
106.81
785.68
6,977.78

FIRST QUARTER
1893
$28,814.51
1,130.83
12,234.19
1,441.91
8,834.59

SECOND
QUARTER
1893
$30,677.20
1,685.93
6,596.28
821.92
10,964.01

NOTE.- Line A Section 2 started operation in August and Line A Section 3 started operation in
December.
SOURCE.- Data from the Overseas Ministry about the gross income for each section under
operations of the railroads in Puerto Rico, 1893.

In 1894 the contract expired and the beltway railroad continued under construction. The
railroad company had merged section 1 and section 2 in Line A making possible the service “from
the Capital to Camuy, and from the Capital to Carolina; from Aguadilla to Mayagüez; and from
Yauco to Ponce.” 159 The railroad company started to earn income from these four sections under
operation but also started to experience accidents as was the case with tramways. The law of the
railroads stipulated in its article 173: “Notice shall be given immediately by the Station Masters to
the Inspectors and to the Governor General, of any accident which may place in jeopardy the safety
of the trains or endanger the passengers or employees of the Company or any other persons.”160 In
compliance with the law, the Company reported three derailments in 1892 without injury to the

“Porto Rico Railways,” The Railway Engineer, vol. 16, no. 8 (1895): 247.
War Department, Translation of Police Law of Railroads of Puerto Rico and Regulations for its Application
(Washington, USA: Government Printing Office, 1899), 32.
159
160
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passengers or crew members, but producing delays of an hour or more. In 1893 two derailments
and the impact of hurricane San Roque produced undesired delays but no injuries or casualties
were reported.161 These ongoing mishaps eventually ended in tragedy. In February 13, 1894 a
wagon derailed after a crash with an ox. In the report the company claimed that the machinist used
the whistle to announce its arrival 100 meters before the Hacienda San Vicente Station in Vega
Baja. The sound of the whistle startled the ox and it ran in front of the railroad. At 5:42 p.m. the
telegraph station received the news from the chief station officer in Vega Baja. This accident
caused the deaths of Don Pedro Estañol, two children, Víctor and Altagracia Alonso González, and
a civil guard, Teodoro Cazón Paz. A child named Joaquín Álvarez Soler was critically injured. The
parents of the two dead children, civil guard Francisco Alonso López and his wife Balbina Calvo,
were wounded. The government imposed a fine of 1,000 pesos on the company. The company
appealed, but in April 24, 1897 the government of Puerto Rico informed the company of the final
decision from Spain to maintain the fine of 1,000 pesos. Their rational was that the company had
failed to provide a barrier to avoid people or cattle from accessing the rails.162 That same year the
Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico saw its board of directors split into two opposing
groups each of which claimed to be the legitimate voice of the company.

161

Gobierno General de la Isla de Puerto Rico, AGPR, Fondo Obras Públicas, Sub Fondo Ferrocarriles y Tranvías,
Serie Expedientes y Documentos Relativos a Ferrocarriles, Caja 36, Legajo 59, Expediente 220, 221, 222, 223, 225,
227.
162
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The split
On December 9, shareholders of the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico had
scheduled a general meeting for December 27 and 28, 1892. However, three days earlier the board
called for a special meeting without providing any justification to the shareholders. In the Gaceta
de Madrid of December 25th, Ivo Bosch, president of the Board, and Wenceslao. Martínez,
administrator, announced the cancellation of the general meeting that had been scheduled for
December the 27th. Bosch and Martínez also published the agreements adopted by the Board in the
special meeting on December 24th. The board approved the payment of 50 pesetas per share to be
paid in two disbursements.163 Alejandro Pidal, Joaquín María López Puigcerver, Duque de Sexto,
and Lastres y Guardia, all members of the board, resigned their positions in protest of the
impromptu meeting. Although the board had canceled the general meeting, a group of shareholders
from Spain and France arrived on December 27th, but the office was closed. They moved the
meeting to the office of the notary Francisco Moragas y Tejeras. In the absence of any
administrators the assembly elected Alberto Porlitz to chair the meeting and Loriz as secretary.
Porlitz was proxy to 12,240 shares, which represented 244 votes from the Societé de Credit
Mobilier of Paris, so it was no surprise that he was chosen to direct the assembly. Another
important delegate was Ratisbonne with 4,000 shares from the Societé d’Enterprisses et de
constructions aux colonies Espagnoles.164
Three-fifth of the shareholders assembled and agreed to dismiss the board and proceeded to

“Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico,” Gaceta de Madrid, 25 December 1892, 935.
“Sobre consecuencias de divergencias en la cía. ferrocarril," PARES/ AHN, Ministerio de Ultramar, Unidad 386,
Expediente 12.
163
164
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choose a provisional board to operate the company. On December 30, 1892 the shareholders
represented by the new board published a note in the Gaceta de Madrid announcing the annulment
of the agreements that had been made on December 24th by the former board of the company.165
On January 3, the Gaceta de Madrid and three more newspapers (two of them Parisian) published
a summons to meet again on January 21, 1893 to ratify the decision to revoke the board. They also
elected new administrators for the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico. Of the 32,000
shares, the owners of 18,449 shares participated in the meeting to elect the administrators. The first
action of Juan Bautista de la Torre y Vega, Count of Torrepando, and president of the new board
was a petition for an injunction against Wenceslao Martínez, Pablo Bosch and Ivo Bosch to force
them to surrender the company’s official documents and its offices. The election of a new
administration created a crisis in legitimacy. In 1893 the company should have received from the
Spanish government a dividend of 8 percent for the Line A in operation. On February 19, 1893 by
Royal Decree the ministry declared a suspension of payments until the company overcame internal
controversy, or until the courts clarified the status of the board.166
In the Gaceta de Madrid Raimundo Le Brun published a notice that shareholders of the
Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico separated into two factions. One group followed
Ivo Bosch and his fiscal decisions while the other group opposed Bosch. The main reason of
discontent among the shareholders was because of a loan of 360,000 pesetas made to the Banco
General de Madrid by Bosch without their consent. Ivo Bosch was the president of the bank,

“Noticias Oficiales,” Gaceta de Madrid, 30 December 1892, 991.
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which later closed. The second scandal was the economic relation of the Compañía de los
Ferrocarriles with the Credit Mobilier. Don Ivo Bosch as an administrator of the Credit Mobilier
provided capital for the establishment of the Societé d’Enterprisses, the company in charge of the
construction of the beltway railroad. When the Credit Mobilier pressured the Compañía de los
Ferrocarriles for payments, Bosch quit his position in Credit Mobilier and rejected any settlement
from the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles to pay the millions of francs that had been invested in the
Societé d’Enterprisses.167 Because of the economic decisions that had been made by Don Ivo
Bosch, the presence of Credit Mobilier and the Societé d’Enterprisses at the meeting provided an
opportunity to clarify any questions the shareholders may have had.
On January 29 the Gaceta de Madrid published two identical summons for a general
meeting of shareholders, one signed by Conde Torrepando as “president of the board” and the
other also sign as “president of the board” but by Ivo Bosch. 168 In other words, the call for the
meeting came from two factions calling their people to assemble to elect a new board in consensus.
Behind this initiative was the need to raise funds to complete the railroad. The meeting took place
on February 14, 1894 with representatives of 24,934 shares, which was more than half of the total
shares. Both boards agreed to step down, and proceeded to elect a new board. The assembly
elected Count Torrepando as President, Charles Wallut as Vice-president, Marquis Fressangne,
Fernando Fernandez de Cuellar, José F. Silva, Max Proper, Luciano Dubost, Wenceslao Martínez,
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José Feliu y Codina, and Enrique Ucelay as administrators. On February 20, 1894 the newly
elected board sent a communication to the Oversees Minister informing him that the internal
controversy had been resolved to expedite the payment of the dividend owed to the company by
the state.169
The government established a commission on April 1894 to study the amount of money to
be disbursed to the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto-Rico in response to a Royal Decree
declared on March 1894. The commission decided to pay 153,683.82 pesos after the company
settled a tax debt, and paid the government the costs of line inspections and repairs. However, the
administration of the company demanded a revision of the decision and made a request to the
Overseas Minister for 150,000 pesos in advance until the commission reviewed the decision. The
company wanted the payment of 150,000 pesos expedited to resume the construction of the
beltway railroad. They claimed that the payment would benefit the entire country, not only the
corporation. The rational of the company was that Puerto Rico was caught in an economic crisis
that could be surpassed through an injection of capital, and this subvention could be the breath
needed by the insular economy:
…los 150,000 pesos citados, no han de salir de esta Isla, ni van a entrar en una
caja para no salir de ella, sino que, por el contrario, van a quedar en este país, se
repartirán entre los diversos elementos que cooperan á la construcción de una via
férrea, y contribuirán por manera eficaz y poderosa al gran fenómeno ecco. De la

“Sobre consecuencias de divergencias en la cía. ferrocarril," PARES/ AHN, Ministerio de Ultramar, Unidad 386,
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circulación de la riqueza.= En este orden de ideas resultará además que la clase
más favorecida con tal decisión lo será la clase obrera, en los actuales momentos
en que una crisis económica se ensoñoréa de todos los países, en esos instantes
que acaban de hacerse aquí los últimos embarques de café, y que terminan sus
faenas las fincas azucareras, es cuerdo, es oportuno, es sensato, y es, si bien se
mira, hasta político y patriótico que el obrero no permanezca ocioso por falta de
trabajo; que pueda con un jornal atender al pan cotidiano; obteniendo a una obra
pública de utilidad general el trabajo que no halla en las fincas de cultivo de esta
Isla.170
After reviewing its decision, the commission decided to maintain the initial sum of
153,683.82 pesos. For the state the issue raised by the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de PuertoRico was simply an effort to increase their own profits. Furthermore, if there had been a delay in
the payment it was a result of their internal disputes. This split between shareholders resulted from
the company’s financial problems which could have been overcome with the income generated
from the operation of the first sections.

Translation: “The 150,000 pesos will not leave this Island, nor will enter a vault forever, on the contrary, the
money will stay in this country for its distribution among those who are cooperating with the construction of the
railroad and will efficiently and with power cooperate to the resonance phenomenon of wealth circulation. With
these ideas the working class will be the most favorable social group in moments that economic crisis hit every
country. In this moment of the last coffee embarks and the end of the sugar harvest it is sound, opportune, sane, it is
even politic and patriotic to avoid idleness among agrarian workers with the creation of jobs in public works to
provide the income for the daily bread.”
“Sobre consecuencias de divergencias en la cía. ferrocarril,” PARES/ AHN, Ministerio de Ultramar, Unidad 386,
Expediente 17, Imgs. 94-95.
170
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Income
On August 4, 1890 the governor general approved the tariffs for passengers and freight
transportation submitted by the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto-Rico. The tariffs differed
if the railroad was regular or high speed and the passenger also chose first, second, or third class
seats. In first class an unescorted woman would have at her disposal a seat intended for two, as
well as the choice a non-smoking wagon. Children under seven years paid half price while infants
traveled free of charge. Adults were allowed baggage no heavier than 30 kilograms, and children
were allowed 15 kilograms. Passengers also had the alternative to transport fresh food, domestic
animals, and cattle paying the following tariffs:
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Table 2.4. Selected general tariffs for high and low speed railroads, 1890

Fresh Food
Fish and crustacean
Oysters
Milk
Cheese and Butter
Eggs
Hunting pieces (dead)
Ice
Domestic animals
Dogs
Cats
Gamecocks
Parrots
Birds
Poultry
Chicken
Turkey
Ducks
Livestock
Horses, mules,
donkeys
Ox, cows
Veal, pigs
Lambs, sheeps, goats
Horses, mare, mules
transported in stock car

HIGH SPEED
Price per ton
Minimum
and kilometer
allowed
0.300
0.15
0.270
0.15
0.210
0.15
0.180
0.15
0.090
0.15
0.270
0.15
0.210
0.15
Price per piece
Minimum
and kilometer
allowed
0.018
0.15
0.012
0.15
0.015
0.15
0.012
0.15
0.009
0.15
Price per
Minimum
kilometer and
allowed
dozens of birds
0.018
0.15
0.036
0.15
0.030
0.15
Price per piece
Minimum
and kilometer
allowed

LOW SPEED
Price per ton
Minimum
and kilometer
allowed
0.150
0.15
0.135
0.15
0.105
0.15
0.090
0.15
0.045
0.15
0.135
0.15
0.105
0.15
Price per piece
Minimum
and kilometer
allowed
0.009
0.15
0.006
0.15
0.0075
0.15
0.006
0.15
0.0045
0.15
Price per
Minimum
kilometer and
allowed
dozens of birds
0.009
0.15
0.018
0.15
0.015
0.15
Price per piece
Minimum
and kilometer
allowed

0.102

1.00

0.051

1.00

0.108
0.054
0.030

1.00
0.50
0.50

0.054
0.027
0.015

1.00
0.50
0.30

0.153

1.50

0.0765

1.50

SOURCE.- Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico, Cuaderno de Tarifas Generales;
Grande y Pequeña velocidad (Paris, France: Imprimerie Schiller, 1890), 52, 54-58. In AGPR,
Fondo Obras Públicas, Sub Fondo Ferrocarriles y Tranvías, Serie Expedientes y documentos
relativos a ferrocarriles, Caja 34, Legajo 34, Expediente 270-271.
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All the routes had “mixed trains”: passenger wagons and freight wagons. In 1893 the
commuter had three options of travel: first class, second class, and third class (Table 2.5).171
Theoretically, railroads provided cheaper service than horse or ox carts, making transportation
accessible to “the people” and by consequence benefiting “the nation” through a decrease in
transportation costs. To test this assumption I made a comparison between transportation provided
by an animal-driven cart company and the beltway railroad. A newspaper announced that a cart
service from Arecibo to Utuado had a cost of 4 pesos.172 The distance between these towns was
approximately 31 kilometers. There was no rail line to Utuado, but from Arecibo to Vega Baja the
distance was similar and the cost in third class was 1.64 pesos. Even in first class the tariff was lower
than that of the cart company with a cost of 3.61 pesos. The cost per kilometer was significantly
cheaper on the railway line than on animal-driven cart, nevertheless railroad transportation was only
an alternative for the people on the northern coast. This section was an important step towards the
development of the coastal railroad but until the company completed the project other areas
continued relying on traditional transportation. In the mountains the people had no alternatives since
railways were expensive to establish in the highlands, and even on the eastern coast seagoing vessels
were the best transportation option.
When traveling by railroad there was a significant savings in time compared with ships. Until
railway lines were constructed in eastern Puerto Rico, ship service was the most efficient
transportation alternative for the towns of Fajardo, Vieques, Humacao, Naguabo, and Yabucoa. The
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“Cuadro de aplicación de las tarifas para el transporte de los viajeros,” La Balanza, 20 January 1893, 4.
“Empresa de coches,” La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 13 January 1897, 1.
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company Vapor Ivo Bosch had a ferryboat for passengers and freight with two fares: 6 pesos in the
stern, 4 pesos in the bow. On Mondays it departed from Humacao to Vieques, Fajardo and the
Capital; Tuesdays and Wednesdays the boat loaded in the Capital; Thursdays at 2:00 a.m. it left the
Capital to Fajardo, Vieques, Humacao, Naguabo and Yabucoa. From Friday to Sunday it was
available to merchants for chartered trips.173 To conclude, a round trip from the eastern towns to San
Juan took about one week. If we ask ourselves why the railroad took so long to develop in the eastern
part of the island, it was probably because Don Ivo Bosch already had control of the transportation
through his shipping service. His priority was to establish his presence through railroads in areas
where he did not control shipping.
Table 2.5 illustrates the differences between first, second, and third class fares, in which most
first class tickets was double the price of a third class seat. Throughout the years the company
realized they were losing money from the sale of second and first class tickets. The company had
sold few of these tickets so they decided to drop the prices to attract more passengers. The Law of
Railroads approved in 1888 required that the company notify the changes in fares to the government
in advance. The company also had to announce the fare changes to the public six months before rates
became effective. The company received the approval of the state to lower the prices because
reduced rates would benefit the company and consumers alike.174

“Ruta del mes de febrero,” Boletín Mercantil, 9 February 1893, 3.
Gobierno General de la Isla de Puerto Rico, “Expediente sobre la tarifa especial número 2 para billetes de 1ª y 2ª
clase con reducción de precios, presentada por la Compañía de los ferrocarriles de esta isla. 1895 – 1896.” AGPR,
Fondo Obras Públicas, Subfondo Ferrocarriles y Tranvías, Serie Expedientes y Documentos Relativos a
Ferrocarriles, Caja 34, Legajo 51, Expediente 158
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Martín Peña

Bayamón

Dorado

Vega-Baja

Manatí

Barceloneta

Cambalache

Arecibo

Hatillo

1st:$0.37
2nd:$0.27
3rd:$0.17
1st:$0.56
2nd:$0.39
3rd:$0.26
1st:$1.85
2nd:$1.35
3rd:$0.84
1st:$3.15
2nd:$2.29
3rd:$1.43
1st:$4.16
2nd:$3.03
3rd:$1.89
1st:$4.81
2nd:$3.50
3rd:$2.19
1st:$6.38
2nd:$4.64
3rd:$2.90
1st:$6.75
2nd:$4.91
3rd:$3.07
1st:$7.86
2nd:$5.72
3rd:$3.57

····
····
····
1st:$0.19
2nd:$0.14
3rd:$0.09
1st:$1.48
2nd:$1.08
3rd:$0.68
1st:$2.78
2nd:$2.02
3rd:$1.26
1st:$3.79
2nd:$2.76
3rd:$1.73
1st:$4.44
2nd:$3.23
3rd:$2.02
1st:$6.01
2nd:$4.37
3rd:$2.73
1st:$6.38
2nd:$4.64
3rd:$2.90
1st:$7.49
2nd:$5.45
3rd:$3.41

····
····
····
····
····
····
1st:$1.30
2nd:$0.95
3rd:$0.59
1st:$2.59
2nd:$1.89
3rd:$1.18
1st:$3.61
2nd:$2.63
3rd:$1.64
1st:$4.26
2nd:$3.10
3rd:$1.94
1st:$5.83
2nd:$4.24
3rd:$2.65
1st:$6.20
2nd:$4.51
3rd:$2.82
1st:$7.30
2nd:$5.31
3rd:$3.32

····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
1st:$1.30
2nd:$0.95
3rd:$0.59
1st:$2.31
2nd:$1.68
3rd:$1.05
1st:$2.96
2nd:$2.16
3rd:$1.35
1st:$4.53
2nd:$3.30
3rd:$2.06
1st:$4.90
2nd:$3.57
3rd:$2.23
1st:$6.01
2nd:$4.37
3rd:$2.73

····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
1st:$1.11
2nd:$0.81
3rd:$0.51
1st:$1.76
2nd:$1.28
3rd:$0.80
1st:$3.33
2nd:$2.42
3rd:$1.52
1st:$3.61
2nd:$2.63
3rd:$1.64
1st:$4.81
2nd:$3.50
3rd:$2.19

····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
1st:$0.65
2nd:$0.47
3rd:$0.30
1st:$2.22
2nd:$1.62
3rd:$1.01
1st:$2.59
2nd:$1.89
3rd:$1.18
1st:$3.73
2nd:$2.76
3rd:$1.73

····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
1st:$1.67
2nd:$1.21
3rd:$0.76
1st:$1.95
2nd:$1.42
3rd:$0.89
1st:$3.15
2nd:$2.29
3rd:$1.43

····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
1st:$0.37
2nd:$0.27
3rd:$0.17
1st:$1.58
2nd:$1.15
3rd:$0.72

Arecibo

Cambalache

Barceloneta

Manatí

Vega-Baja

Dorado

Bayamón

Martín
Peña

San Juan

Table 2.5. Fares for passengers in different accommodations, 1893.

····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
····
1st:$1.21
2nd:$0.88
3rd:$0.55

After the scandal with the board it was not secret that the company was confronting
solvency problems. In a report from the British consul’s office, the railroad company built tracks
on a steady pace until 1893 although in 1894 the company only added one more section, from
Hatillo to Camuy.175 The company tried to accumulate more capital from the initial sections under
operation to finance the rest of the construction. Apparently the profits were not enough to keep the
rhythm of construction possibly because the fares were not competitive for passengers or freight.
In 1894 Don Bianchi, Jr. representing the land owners of Añasco sent a letter to the
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Great Britain Foreign Office, Diplomatic and consular reports on trade and finance: Spain (London: Harrison
and Sons, 1895), 9-10.
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Governor General, Don Antonio Dabán, requesting his support for a revision of the rates for sugar
and coffee transportation.176 These planters considered the rates too high. Tobacco planters had a
similar problem but in 1895 the railroad company revised the tariffs approved on February 20,
1893 for tobacco transportation. The government accepted a fare reduction for transporting tobacco
from Hatillo to San Juan:
TABLE 2.6. Tobacco Fares in the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto-Rico, 1895.
STATION
Río Piedras
Bayamón
Carolina
Toa Baja
Dorado
Vega Baja
Manatí
Barceloneta
Arecibo
Hatillo
Camuy

FARE (IN PESOS)
0.84
0.90
1.54
2.10
2.24
3.86
4.06
4.16
4.67
4.95
4.95

NOTE.- Departing from San Juan Station (fares based on 1,000 kilograms of tobacco).
SOURCE.- “Expediente sobre la tarifa número 4 presentada por la Compañía de los ferrocarriles.
1895.” AGPR, Fondo Obras Públicas, Subfondo Ferrocarriles y Tranvías, Serie Expedientes y
Documentos Relativos a Ferrocarriles, Caja 34, Legajo 51, Expediente 157.

Gobierno General de la Isla de Puerto Rico, “Expediente relativo a instancia de varios agricultores y
comerciantes solicitando se modifiquen las tarifas que rigen el transporte del azúcar y café en la 3ª sección de la
línea A de los ferrocarriles. Añasco. 1894.” AGPR, Fondo Obras Públicas, Subfondo Ferrocarriles y Tranvías, Serie
Expedientes y Documentos Relativos a Ferrocarriles, Caja 34, Legajo 51, Expediente 153.
176
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The company changed the rates because they needed to increase revenues. They identified
tobacco transportation as an undeveloped market because high rates discouraged tobacco growers
from using the railroad:
En zonas productivas de tabaco, los transportes de este son muy reducidos y sin
embargo llega en cantidades considerables a San Juan por la vía marítima y por
carros lo que hace suponer que la tarifa en vigor sea la causa de ese alejamiento
del ferro-carril. A encausar por el dicho tráfico y aumentar los productos de
explotación tiende la modificación que se presenta.177
The railroad company gave tobacco growers an additional incentive: they returned 10
percent of the rates paid by any tobacco farmer who transported more than 10 tons in a year. This
tonnage probably was high for small tobacco farmers; however, in 1895 when the incentive was
approved, there were two big tobacco factories with more than one hundred workers located in the
two main urban centers, San Juan and Ponce. These large tobacco companies would benefit from
the incentive. In the late nineteenth century, Puerto Rican tobacco famers exported the leaf to Cuba
to produce the renowned “habanos” (cigars). In small artisans workshops known as “chinchales”

Translation: “In tobacco producing zones transportation offerings are very limited however considerable amounts
of tobacco arrives in San Juan by means of maritime transportation and automobiles which suggests that the tariff is
the cause to keep tobacco away from the railroad. A different tariff must increase the goods transported in the
railroad.”
“Expediente sobre la tarifa número 4 presentada por la Compañía de los ferrocarriles. 1895.” AGPR, Fondo Obras
Públicas, Subfondo Ferrocarriles y Tranvías, Serie Expedientes y Documentos Relativos a Ferrocarriles, Caja 34,
Legajo 51, Expediente 157.
177
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groups from three to fifteen cigar makers prepare cigars for the local and European markets.178 In
1895 the island exported 3,657,370 pounds of tobacco with a value of 698,225 pesos, standing
behind coffee and sugar with exports valued in 9,492,212 pesos and 4,047,399 pesos
respectively.179 The coastal route of the railroad provided service to the sugar plantations but
tobacco workshops in coastal towns would also benefit from the service. The railroad company had
to make itself an attractive alternative for tobacco farmers and cigar makers to became more
profitable.
Each railroad section offered merely one round-trip per day. Upon analyzing the schedule it
is evident that passengers and freight spent only four hours commuting from San Juan to the
farthest station in the northern town of Camuy (Table 2.7):
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TABLE 2.7. Schedule for section A, 1896.
SAN JUAN-CAMUY
Station
San Juan
Martín Peña
Bayamón
Toa Baja
Dorado
San Vicente
Vega Baja
Manatí
Barceloneta
Cambalache
Arecibo
Hatillo
Camuy

Morning
Arrival
--6:19
6:46
7:14
7:17
7:44
7:50
8:15
8:30
9:09
9:18
9:50
9:56

Departure
6:00
6:24
6:48
7:14
7:24
7:44
7:52
8:17
8:35
9:11
9:25
9:52
---

Station
Camuy
Hatillo
Arecibo
Cambalache
Barceloneta
Manatí
Vega Baja
San Vicente
Dorado
Toa Baja
Bayamón
Martín Peña
San Juan

Afternoon
Arrival
--2:42
3:09
3:23
3:59
4:17
4:42
4:50
5:12
5:21
5:46
6:10
6:34

Departure
2:38
2:44
3:16
3:25
4:04
4:19
4:44
4:50
5:17
5:21
5:48
6:15
---

SOURCE.- “Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Pto.-Rico; Trenes regulares y facultativos,” La
Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 14 January 1896, 1.
This timetable shows the connection of ten towns in the north coast in an expedient period
of time making the railroad faster and cheaper than animal-drawn carts. For the general public,
farmers, and merchants of the region the railroad offered a new convenient alternative for
terrestrial transportation. However, from an outsider’s view, the schedule and the service it
provided was inadequate. Harper’s Weekly Magazine special correspondent in Puerto Rico,
William Dinwiddie, wrote in 1899: “It is not essential to discuss the defective methods existing in
railroading in Porto Rico-beyond stating that the service consists of one mixed train of two cars
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each way in 24 hours, and that the average speed is ten miles an hour.”180 This schedule may have
been an alternative for long distances, but not for short ones. An “omnibus” service (horse-drawn
wagon for passenger transport) with a route from Plaza Alfonso XII (today Plaza de Armas in Old
San Juan) to the Church in Santurce had hourly departures from eight o’clock in the morning to six
in the afternoon, and the tramway from San Juan to Río Piedras also provided hourly departures. 181
In other words, railroads were the best means of transportation for long distances. However, for
shorter distances and areas in which railroads were not easily available the traditional means of
transportation were the best alternatives.
The Company had to increase the rhythm of construction because the contract expired in 1895. In
five years the Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de Porto Rico had built 72.5 kilometers (Map 2.1),
much slower than the 46.7 kilometers of railroad constructed in Cuba from Habana to Güines
between 1837 and 1838, over a half century earlier.182 The corporation concentrated its efforts in
obtaining an extension from the government to conclude the project. The Compañía de los
Ferrocarriles was indeed granted extra time to finish the western side of the route from San Juan
to Ponce through Mayagüez by July 15, 1898. For the eastern part of the route (this section
departed from San Juan to Ponce through Humacao) the Company was granted an extension to
July 15, 1900. If the company failed to accomplish these deadlines, the government would annul
the concession. 183

“Business Opportunities in Porto Rico,” Timely Topics, vol. 3, no. 26 (1899): 412.
“Empresa de Ómnibus,” Boletín Mercantil, 1 January 1893, 3.
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1844-1898 (San Juan, PR: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1996), 290-291.
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Map 2.1. Sections of the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico, 1897.
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Although the construction of the railroad was delayed, the economic advantage of the
places with stations were the envy of those without railways. That was the case in Lares, which
sought a railroad to Mayagüez, or the case in Caguas which wanted to connect with Río Piedras via
the Ubarri’s tramway.184 Both towns continued using the slow and costly mule trains to transport
merchandise. It is logical to imagine that sugar, coffee, and tobacco growers were not the only
sectors demanding the use of railroads. Diverse products could be moved via rail lines. A long list
of merchandises, listed in Appendix 1, submitted by the railroad company to the state in
compliance with the railroad law of Puerto Rico suggests that small merchants and farmers also
viewed the railroads as an alternative to transport their products. Imported consumer products and
locally produced foodstuff could equally be moved by railways.185
In 1896 the “French railroad,” as the beltway railroad was popularly known, had 195
kilometers in service. The British Consul in Puerto Rico reported that “137,422 passengers
travelled in these lines during 1896, about 16½ per cent more than in 1895.”186 Freight
transportation also would increase after the addition of new branch-lines to connect internal rail
systems of sugar-producing estates with the beltway railroad. The purpose of merging both rail
systems was to facilitate the transfer of refined sugar to the ports for maritime shipping. As a case
in point, Hacienda Córsica, which was located on the third section of line A (between Añasco and

“De la capital a Caguas,” La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 16 January 1896, 2.
(Article 148): “The Companies are not responsible for the natural wear and tear of the merchandize when its
greater than ordinary, nor can it be for fraud of carelessness.” The records listed multiple merchandise transported
by railroads (Appendix 1). War Department, Translation of Police Law of Railroads of Puerto Rico and Regulations
for its Application (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), 28.
186
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cónsules norteamericanos, franceses e ingleses, 1869-1900 (San Juan, PR: Decanato de Estudios Graduados y
Centro de Investigaciones Históricas, 2005), 222.
184
185

110

Rincón) submitted a proposal to construct a branch-line on May 1897. Hacienda Córsica’s
commitment was to transport a minimum of 1,000 tons of sugar per year. The railroad
administration claimed this branch line would benefit the hacienda, the railroad company, and the
general public. As a result, Córsica had a station on line A of the beltway railroad.
The opening of the sections finished by the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico
was necessary to increase the funding for the conclusion of the construction phase. The railroad
company failed to meet the terms of the contract jeopardizing the continuation of the franchise
granted by the government.
Initial challenges
The law of railroads established mandatory maintenance for the railroads. On April 19,
three Manatí sugar planters filed a complaint with the governor general requesting action against
the railroad company for fires the company had provoked. Don Federico Calaf, owner of Hacienda
Monserrate, Doña Luisa Guayta de Benero owner of Hacienda Luisa, and Don Ángel Villamil,
owner of Hacienda Providencia suffered from seven fires on their estates. They claimed that the
fires resulted from sparks expelled by the train’s chimney. The town was also in jeopardy, because
one the fires occurred very close to the station, the public was afraid of the possibility of future
fires and their consequences. The Bureau of Public Works fined the company 300 pesos because
the company did not maintain the areas in optimal conditions. The sparks were impossible to
control, but the company was responsible for weeding the areas beside the railway lines to
diminish the possibility of sparks causing fires.
In November 1891, the newspaper La Bandera Española published an article about two
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work trains that crashed between the Manatí and Vega Baja stations. As a result of this accident
one stocker died, two suffered serious injuries and five had minor injuries. The newspaper
concluded the article by suggesting that the victims be compensated.187 On July 18, 1894 another
casualty involving a railroad worker occurred in Manatí. The result was the death of Francisca
Morales, a level crossing guard who died at 7:30 in the morning. Some months later, still another
work train crashed with a horse-driven cart in Añasco at 4:45 in the afternoon. The horse died, the
cart was destroyed, and five workers suffered injuries.188 A woman at the level crossing tried to
stop the cart but the driver ignored her. The railway industry did not hire female workers with the
exception of the level crossing guards. The government fined the railroad company 200 pesos.189
The company had to prevent accidents to maintain the confidence of customers, to avoid
fines and reparations, and to offer a safe working environment. Railroad laborers typically worked
ten hours per day, six days a week. Unskilled workers received low salaries as expected, but skilled
workers could earn good wages in comparative perspective (Table 2.8 indicates the salaries for
different occupations in the railway industry).
Historian Jesús Martín Ramos found that during the construction of the beltway railroad
some workers (labors, technicians, and managers) fell victim to yellow fever. Indeed, Martín

“Ferro-carriles,” La Bandera Española, 8 November 1891, 2.
Jefatura Obras Públicas, “Expediente dando cuenta de haber ocurrido en los km. 4, 5, 7, 33 (plano) 35 de la línea
A y 15 punta del Rincón, grandes desprendimientos que impiden el paso de los trenes. 1894 - 1896.” AGPR, Fondo
Obras Públicas, Sub Fondo Ferrocarriles y Tranvías, Serie Expedientes y documentos relativos a ferrocarriles, Caja
37, Legajo 59, Expediente 231.
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Ramos claimed that one reason to explain the slow advancement of the railroad construction was
the disease.190 Since the 1870s artisans in Puerto Rico organized mutual aid societies, cooperatives
and casinos (club houses), but it is unknown if railroad workers in particular benefited from the
health support offered by mutual aid societies. These groups and the emergence of newspapers
published by workers were the first expressions of labor activism. The highest point of the labor
movement in the nineteenth-century was in 1895 with strikes in San Juan and Ponce demanding
for higher wages to help alleviate increasing prices of commodities. Inflation arose after the
adoption of the provincial peso in substitution of the devalued Mexican peso. The provincial peso
was a silver standard currency for local use with an exchange value of 120 Mexican pesos per 100
provincial pesos. Governor General José Gamir in a letter to the Overseas Minister Tomás
Castellano acknowledged the negative impact of the currency exchange for the popular masses.191
Consequently, longshoreman, tailors, masons, carpenters, typographers, tobacco, sugar and
railroad workers participated in strikes. Gervasio L. García argues that political and economic
transformations from 1872 to 1895 accelerated the development of labor organization.192 In sum,
workers in the railroad industry participated from the earliest political activism in the Island’s labor
history.
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Table 2.8. Wages of railroad employees, 1897
OCCUPATION

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES

Agents, station
Blacksmiths
Boilermakers
Carpenters
Clerks
Conductors
Engineers
Firemen
Fitters
Freight handlers
Hostlers, locomotive
Inspectors
Laborers
Machinists
Mechanic’s apprentices
Mechanic’s helpers
Painters
Switchmen
Turners
Watchmen
Water station tenders

22
10
2
14
32
5
10
10
6
9
3
1
23
5
15
5
6
13
3
4
2

WAGES PER HOUR
(PROVINCIAL PESOS)
0.1150
0.2000
0.2500
0.1500
0.0964
0.1534
0.1917
0.1342
0.2500
0.0613
0.1150
0.1457
0.0750
0.2500
0.0150
0.0800
0.1000
0.0575
0.1250
0.0834
0.0613

SOURCE.- Department of Commerce and Labor, Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, No. 61
(Washington: Government Printing Office, November 1905): 820-821.

The island had tramways in the principal urban centers and the beltway railroad had some
sections in operation. Passengers could start their journey on a tramway and transfer to the beltway
railroad or vice versa. In the case of the Línea Férrea del Oeste, the tramway had six round trip
departures between Cataño and Bayamón. The tramway had one morning and one afternoon trip
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that connected in Bayamón with the beltway railroad operated by the Compañía de los
Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico.
A complement to the web of tramways and the beltway railroad was the second-classrailroads. A second-class railroad was defined as a private railroad that offered passenger and
freight service to the general public. In 1897 Ferrocarriles de vía estrecha de Mayagüez
inaugurated a 17 kilometers second-class-railroad between the town of Añasco and Altosano in
San Sebastián. Originally, this railroad was conceived only for freight transportation to promote
agriculture mainly coffee. In order to obtain the incentives provided by law for public-service
railroads the company decided to incorporate passenger service to comply with article 45 of the
railroad law that stated: “Every railroad shall have two distinct uses - for passengers and for
freight.”193 However, the proponents needed to convince the government that they were going to
offer safe transportation for passengers. In Europe it was unusual to find railways with less than
one meter gauge offering passenger service. Though, Ubarri’s tramway was a precedent, because
he provided service for passengers from San Juan to Río Piedras on a 0.76 meters gauge tramway.
The proposed railroad of 0.60 meters would eventually have a route of 42.5 kilometers in a
trajectory with close curves; in contrast, in San Juan the distance was only 11.5 kilometers, with
some wide curves along the route. The government concluded that the transportation of passengers
was unsafe unless the railroad ran at a speed no higher than 15 kilometers per hour. The company
received a provisional permit to begin operations in 1897 under the speed limit of 15 kilometers
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per hour because the zone was prone to landslides, particularly in rainy days.194
The Ferrocarriles de vía estrecha de Mayagüez had plans to prolong the line to the town of
Lares. The project of a railroad to Lares started early in the 1880s. The plan was to establish a
steam railroad to connect Lares, Moca, San Sebastian, and Aguadilla (instead of Añasco) to reduce
transportation costs paid by the farmers. In general, the roundtrip cost of a mule train from Lares to
the port in Aguadilla was 40 pesos, and the cost per quintal of coffee was 2 pesos.195 The
merchandise was in transit for ten to fifteen days and arrived to the ports humid, dirty, and muddy.
The proponents of the railroad, not only stressed the importance of the access to the ports, they also
expressed the importance of transporting agricultural products through the interior of the island.
Rural towns such as Utuado and Adjuntas would also benefit from this railroad. The company
proposed to build the railroad parallel to second-class Road No. 8 to reduce expenses and the
governor approved the project on February 7, 1882.196 In 1885 Don Salvador Mestre y Mora
requested the approval of a new study for a railroad from Mayagüez to Lares. Later in 1889 Don
Francisco Lastres y Ruis proposed the establishment of another railroad from Añasco to Lares. All
these studies received the approval of the government. Don José Pastor, the mayor of Lares, with
the approval of the municipal assembly provided unconditional support for the establishment of
any railroad to promote agriculture and commerce. In essence, lareños considered the railroad to

Jefatura de Obras Públicas y Diputación Provincial, “Expediente referente al ferrocarril en construcción de
Añasco a Lares, año de 1897,” AGPR, Fondo Obras Públicas, Sub Fondo Ferrocarriles y Tranvías, Serie Proyectos
de construcción, Subserie Ferrocarriles secundarios, Caja 26, Legajo 95, Expediente 17.
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be the keystone to progress and civilization: “el día [que] por su jurisdicción corra la locomotora
señalando un paso más en la senda del progreso y de la verdadera civilización.”197 Some people
would pay a higher price to enjoy the progress of the railroad after the expropriation of their lands.
Lastres y Ruis the partner of Don Joaquín Fornabelles claimed that land expropriation was not a
problem because the railroad would pass through land owned by those benefiting from the project.
Coffee producers would lose some land, but they would enjoy the service of a narrow-gauge
railway of 0.60 meters to transport their products to the ports.
It was in 1895 when a new corporation under the name Compañía de Ferrocarriles de vía
estrecha de Mayagüez assumed the project because the previous corporation had run out of funds.
The opening of the first kilometers in 1897 was made public by Don Juan José Potous, former
mayor of Ponce and the General Manager of the company. The station in Añasco provided a
transfer point to the beltway railroad, which connected with the port of Mayagüez, the most active
in the western region. Like the Linea Ferrea del Oeste the Compañía de Ferrocarriles de vía
estrecha de Mayagüez strengthened their services with the transfers to the beltway railroad. The
country could count in more efficient transportation system thanks to this transfer points and the
synchronization of the schedules among different private rail companies; however, the Compañía
de los Ferrocarriles did not meet the terms of the contract and the future of the beltway railroad

Translation: “The day that in this jurisdiction run the railroad it signaling another step forward in the path to
progress and real civilization.”
Jefatura de Obras Públicas y Diputación Provincial, “Expediente promovido por D. Francisco Lastres solicitando se
declaren de utilidad pública las obras del ferrocarril en proyecto de Añasco a Lares por San Sebastián,” AGPR,
Fondo Obras Públicas, Sub Fondo Ferrocarriles y Tranvías, Serie Proyectos de construcción, Subserie Ferrocarriles
secundarios, Caja 26, Legajo 95, Expediente 10.
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was uncertain by the end of the century.
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CHAPTER III. RAILROAD BOOM

Ambiente de estación: espera, conversaciones con
desconocidos, nuevas amistades, ruidos de maletas,
olor a mecanismo engrasado, inquietud, miradas
soñadoras…
La llamarada
Enrique A. Laguerre
In 1897 Spain granted autonomous governments to the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico
attempting to maintain loyalty from Puerto Rico, and as an ultimate effort to halt the
independence war in Cuba. From the Spanish Constitution of 1876, in which Cuba and Puerto
Rico “shall be governed by special laws,” the Puerto Ricans were no closer to obtaining selfgovernment by the late 1890s.198 The hopes for “special laws” never materialized, but on
November 1897 the Crown approved the Autonomous Charter. It was already too late to
convince the Cubans that peaceful autonomy was a better choice than an independent Cuba.
Máximo Gómez, leader of the Cuban insurgent army, regarded autonomy as a strong evidence of
the Spanish military incapacity to win the war.199 If the rebels were winning the war of
independence and the United States declared its support for an independent Cuba, then autonomy
was undesirable.
The Puerto Rican and Cuban independence movements had a clear convergence in 1868
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when the islands declared their independence from Spain in two separate revolutionary actions. In
Puerto Rico the revolution named Grito de Lares was militarily unsuccessful, the leaders were in
exile, and local authorities reinforced the surveillance of political dissenters. In Cuba the outcome
of their Grito de Yara was different because it was the beginning of a ten year war, followed by a
second short war in 1879-1880. After the wars the Cubans created an Autonomous Party in
demand for political reforms and economic liberties under the Spanish sovereignty.
In the 1880s the Puerto Rican independence movement was weak and demobilized but a
new political force evolved from liberals demanding political and economic reforms. Román
Baldorioty de Castro was the founder of the Puerto Rican Autonomous Party in 1887. Historian
Astrid Cubano Iguina argued that in the initial years of the Puerto Rican Autonomous Party a
radical wing of urban workers organized a boycott movement against merchant houses owned by
Spaniards.200 General Governor Romualdo Palacios unleashed an unprecedented persecution of the
militants from the Autonomous movement with massive arrests and torture. Spain removed
Palacios from office, but the radicalism of the Autonomous movement finished after the ruthless
result of the boycott and the death of Baldorioty de Castro two years after the arrests. The
moderation of sugar hacendados became prominent in the 1890s in a party directed by a new
leader: Luis Muñoz Rivera.
Cuba restarted the war against Spain in 1895 and that same year a group of autonomists
from Puerto Rico led by Luis Muñoz Rivera made an agreement with the Spanish politician

Astrid Cubano Iguina, “Política radical y autonomismo en Puerto Rico: conflictos de intereses en la formación del
Partido Autonomista Puertorriqueño (1887).” Anuario de Estudios Americanos, vol. 51, núm. 2 (1994): 155-173.
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Práxedes Mateo Sagasta on the creation of an autonomous home rule government for Puerto
Rico. In 1897 Sagasta was appointed Prime Minister of Spain, after the assassination of Antonio
Cánovas del Castillo, and he complied with his promise.201 In the text of the Autonomous
Charter, the second article of the transitional provisions declared that “In case the insular
government should desire to use for some other kind of public works the 250,000 pesos made
available for subventions to narrow gauge railways by the law of August 24, 1896, the insular
government shall make to the home government whatever proposal is considered opportune.”202
The Autonomous Charter thus provided the backbone for the development of a modern
infrastructure for an autonomous Puerto Rico.
The island was already en route to establishing a beltway railroad but the Compañía de
los Ferrocarriles de Puerto-Rico did not meet the contractual deadlines and the construction was
behind schedule. On May 28, 1897 the company submitted a petition for a new time extension to
the Governor General of the island, plus an amendment to the original concession. The company
proposed to divide the project into two separate concessions for the construction and operation of
the beltway railroad: the western lines (192 kilometers) and the eastern lines (254 kilometers).
The western section would continue under the control of the French/Spanish Compañía de los
Ferrocarriles de Puerto-Rico, and the eastern section would be developed by the English
corporation named East Porto Rico Railway Company. Both corporations had a deadline of four
years to develop their sections. The government would have to continue granting an 8 percent
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interest for the sections in operations.203 Days later the Autonomous Cabinet assumed control of
the country and the decision to extend the concession now rested on the shoulders of the new
cabinet. However, the new autonomous government had more immediate situations to deal with
as a result of the Spanish-American War.
The United States declared the war to Spain in April 1898 in response to the sinking of
the Battleship Maine in Havana harbor on February. From the beginning of the Cuban War for
Independence in 1895 different sectors in the United States exhibited interest in the Cuban
conflict: the press, humanitarians, industrialists, investors, and imperialists. Although the cause
of the war was the Cuban independence struggle, the other Spanish possessions in the Caribbean
and the Pacific would be involved in the fight between the United States and Spain.
María Eugenia Estades Font showed that Puerto Rico’s geographic position was
considered by naval admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, a notable imperialist in the United States.
Admiral Mahan considered the construction of an interoceanic canal a necessary step for the
transformation of the United States into a commercial and military world power. The Caribbean
would be the eastern access to the canal. In the Pacific it was necessary to annex islands like
Hawaii, but in the Caribbean the U.S. should control Cuba, the bay of Samaná in Dominican
Republic, and Puerto Rico for the control of four sea routes to a future canal: the Yucatan
Channel between Cuba and Mexico, the Windward Passage between Cuba and Haiti, the Mona
Passage between Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, and the Anegada Passage between
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Vieques and Saint Thomas. For the control of these maritime routes the U.S. Navy had to
establish naval bases in the islands. Mahan ideas were heard by the U.S. Congress and certainly
by president William McKinley because Mahan was military advisor to the president during the
Spanish-American War.204
The United States established a naval blockade against Spanish possessions to strangulate
the economy of the islands during the conflict. On April 4, 1898 the U.S. marines bombarded
Matanzas in Cuba, on May 1 attacked Manila Bay in the Philippines and on May 12 the people
in Puerto Rico were subjected to a naval bombardment of the city of San Juan. After three hours
of combat Rear Admiral William Sampson halted the shelling and left the island.205 The attack
caused thirteen casualties and more than a hundred were wounded, mostly civilians. However,
the authorities on the island alleged that the attack was a setback for the U.S. Navy. The official
newspaper, Gaceta de Puerto Rico, published greetings from the insular and the Spanish
government to the soldiers and the population thanking them for the heroic defense of the
island.206
On May 31, two weeks after Sampson bombing, the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de
Puerto-Rico re-submitted to the Governor General a request for a new extension of the
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contract.207 The Autonomous Government had important issues to consider especially the
scarcity of consumer goods caused by the naval blockade. The insular government enacted a
special decree to allow the entrance of goods free of duty from neutral nations.208 Fernando Picó
claimed that the blockade against Puerto Rico demonstrated the “consequences of an excessive
reliance on export crops.”209 Scarcity of flour, salted meat, ham, rice, potatoes, and other food
forced the government to institute a rationing of products and this indicated the importance of
diversifying the economy.
On June 1898 the Atlanta Constitution published a note identifying the benefits of gaining
possession of Puerto Rico. The island could be a place for holiday vacations and a place to invest.
The interest in Puerto Rico was not only as a coaling station, where ships could refuel, the island
also had incredible unexploited fertile soil, islanders imported articles produced in the United
States, and more than half of the population was white. At the end of the note it is mentioned that
the lack of “railroad lines of any importance” was not a serious problem because: “Under
American government the island would speedily be overrun with a network of rails and the
commerce become of immense value.”210 This report shows the role media played in setting public
opinion in favor of the war and the occupation of Puerto Rico. In August the New York Times
published a page long essay about the economic possibilities of U.S. businesses in Cuba and Puerto
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Rico. The tone contrasted with the approach that had been made by the Atlanta Constitution. The
New York Times interviewed several firms which agreed with the trade potential on the island but
recognized the difficulties involved. A firm of merchants from Wall Street, L. W. & P. Armstrong,
declared in the interview:
There has been more or less talk about people going to Puerto Rico and making
money very fast. People who expect to find wealth easy to get there had better
stay away. There are social problems, labor problems and financial problems to be
solved in Puerto Rico.211
For L. W. & P. Armstrong Puerto Rico did not look like the “Switzerland of the
Caribbean” as had been suggested in the Atlanta Constitution. The New York Times finished the
article highlighting the disaster of the railroad companies under operation in Puerto Rico. It
discussed the delays of the French company in the development of tracks and culminated with a
narrative of the deplorable service of the railroad and ferries from San Juan to Bayamón.
Consequently, the island had railroads, but none of the companies offered acceptable service. Even
worse the companies operated with absolute impunity, making the possibilities for improvement
difficult:
Trains are run every two and three hours, and the trip from San Juan to Bayamón,
or vice versa, a distance of six miles, is supposed to be made in an hour, but this
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has never been done. Accidents are numerous. There are only two engines and
two boats, all in a very poor condition. This line issue tickets from San Juan to
Bayamon, connecting at that point with the Arecibo train; very often the west
railroad train is late, the passengers misses the Arecibo one, and, as there is only a
daily train, has to wait till next day at his own expense. Civil or criminal suits are
never brought against any railroad, as the plaintiff is quite sure to have judgment
rendered against him.212
The answer to this problem was occupation by the United States. The newspaper did not try
to persuade the reader that the occupation was undesirable. To the contrary the article claimed that
the difficulties could be surpassed if the United States would intervene on behalf of the people of
Puerto Rico through a takeover of the government and with investments to foster the local
economy.
The military occupation began on July 25 under the orders of General Nelson Miles. On
July 29 Major-general Miles ordered the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto-Rico “to
transport the troops of the United States, and would receive compensation for services rendered at
such rates as prevail in the United States, especially on the lines of the Pennsylvania Railroad.”213
Following the orders, the Compañía facilitated the control of the island by transporting U.S.
military personnel, ammunition, and supplies. However, Miles did not keep his promise and
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Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto-Rico did not receive payments from the military.
On November 23, 1898 the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto-Rico once again
submitted a petition for an extension of the concession to the Bureau of Public Works.214 No
decision was possible because the country was waiting for the outcome of the negotiations between
Spain and the United States. The Treaty of Paris officially ended the war and Puerto Rico became a
territory of the United States under the powers of the Congress. In article XIII of the Treaty of
Paris the government of the United States guaranteed the respect of property rights in the
possessions. During the military occupation “means of transportation, such as telephone lines and
cables, railways and boats, may, although they belong to private individuals or corporations, be
seized by the military occupant, but unless destroyed under military necessity are not to be
retained.”215 In other words, during the military occupation railroads continued operating but there
was no certainty about the legal status of the companies. Tramways and railroads were in legal
limbo after the military commander General Guy V. Henry “ordered the revocation of all the
concessions and franchises heretofore granted by the Spanish authorities.”216 Prior to this order, the
construction of new lines had been halted.217
The continuation of the military regime after the Treaty of Paris was a surprise in Puerto
Rico. It was difficult to understand why the “land of freedom” maintain military commanders as
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chiefs of government in Cuba, the Phillippines, and Puerto Rico instead of instituting democratic
systems in the islands. Brigadier-General George Whitefield Davis, Puerto Rico’s military
governor in 1899, commissioned reports from each military department in the island to understand
every aspect of the civil life, the geography, climate, principal crops, its markets and value,
taxation system, mineral and water resources, the state of education; in sum, collect all relevant
information to make an assessment of the life in Puerto Rico. From those reports the Secretary of
War could decide if the territory needed reforms to promote “the general welfare and advancement
of the inhabitants.”218 General Davis included in his report a section titled “Inland Transportation
Facilities.” In this section all districts informed roads in poor conditions with the exception of the
districts in the “military road” (the road from San Juan to Ponce), and wagon roads in good
conditions from Mayagüez to San German and from Ponce to Adjuntas.
Inland transportation was expensive. Departing from Ponce to San Juan using the only line
of carriages in operation costed $30 Puerto Rican currency. The length of the route involved
eighty-two miles with five relays of horses in a period of thirteen hours. Davis reported for Ponce
the following:
Hundreds of carriages, in lieu of street cars, carry passengers from one part of the
city to another for about 8 cents each passenger per trip, or 60 cents an hour, and
besides these a line of busses runs from Ponce to the port for about 10 cents
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(these prices being in United States currency).219
The report also included the costs of transportation between towns in the north coast and to
the mountainous interior. Davis included freight costs for the region which illustrated how
expensive was transportation for farmers:
Regular line of coaches from railroad terminus at Camuy to Aguadilla, single seat, $4.20;
coach for three persons and driver, $9.60. No line from Arecibo to Utuado, but coach for
this road can be procured in either city at $9, or single seat $3; saddle horse, to go and
return, $3.
No line to San Sebastian and Lares; the road will not permit the use of wheels. Saddle
horse to go to Lares and return, $3.60.
Freight by pack per quintal of 100 pounds: Arecibo to Utuado, 60 cents in good weather,
90 cents in wet weather; cart, 4 oxen, $7.20 in good weather and from $12 to $15 in wet
weather. Arecibo to Lares, $l.20 in good weather; carts in dry weather, $15, but road rarely
permits the use. 220
In the section of railroads Davis focused in the “French Railroad Company” and its service
without mentioning the existence of tramways. Davis recommended the acquisition of the railroad
by a company from the United States:
This railroad is a French concern, entirely managed by people in the interest of French
stockholders, and the stock of this “flint-lock industry” being in possession of the people in
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France. For the interest of this island it would be most desirable if some enterprising
American firm should freeze the present stockholders out and reorganize and complete the
line as originally forechadowed and make it a paying investment.221
Davis suggestion was not a surprise and its view of the railroad as a company owned
entirely by French people was not accurate. The Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto-Rico
was a company with stocks owned by French, Spanish, British, and Belgian investors. Precisely on
June 1899, Baron Erlanger from Britain sailed to the United States in search of answers to the
future of the railroads in Puerto Rico. There was a great concern about the status of the company
under the new regime and the risks of their investments.222
The first census after the island became a territory of the United States, conducted in 1899,
reported that the transportation on the island was “scanty.” The report continued: “There are
altogether about 159 miles of railway in the island, but they are in disconnected pieces and closely
parallel the coast, none extending into the interior.”223 This suggested two things: first, there was a
need to join the fragments of railways and second, the railways had to be extended to the interior of
the island. However, eventually the new U.S. controlled government allowed the development of
railways on the coast, and financed the construction of roads to connect interior towns. The reason
was directly related to the interests of particular economic sectors.
The economic possibilities of Puerto Rico were multiple. Karl Stephen Herrman, a soldier
of the Independent Regular Brigade, noticed that pineapple plantations were profitable and did not
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require too much capital for investment; yet, local planters did not take part in this business. The
reason, claimed Herrman, was the problem in finding “swift and adequate transportation from field
to market.”224 By surpassing this problem local planters would consider pineapple-growing a
“tempting industry”.225
In 1900 the military governor indicated that banana plantations would be a profitable
enterprise if a railway system was built to facilitate speedy transportation of the crops to the ports,
and if the steamship lines increased the frequency of service from weekly to daily departures to the
United States. To transform a subsistence crop to a profitable product a significant investment in
infrastructure was essential. The banana trade never materialized because the coast was dedicated
to sugar production and there was an absence of native capitalists or U.S. corporations “prepared to
embark in the enterprise.”226 Puerto Rico never became a ‘Banana Republic,’ although plantains
and bananas were central to the diet of the Puerto Ricans, and a product always in demand for local
consumption. A decade after this report the production of plantains had a value of $336,577 and
bananas $996,371.227
From the 1870s coffee was the main sector of the export economy and the main source of
revenue for the island. However, from the perspective of George W. Davis, Brigadier-General of
the U.S. Army and the fourth Military Governor, coffee raising was “essentially a poor man's crop,
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for a small capital suffices.”228 For Davis, coffee was a crop of the past and sugar would be the
plantation of the future. He added: “The Porto Rican trade in sugar will soon be doubled, tripled, or
quadrupled and the laborers will be attracted from the mountains to the lower sugar land.”229 If the
future of Puerto Rico lay on the coast, it was evident that the infrastructure should be developed on
the coast. In the next report, this time by Governor Charles H. Allen, it was reported that only 20
percent of the soil was cultivated and most of the land was cultivated with “miscellaneous crops.”
Miscellaneous crops were corn, rice, beans, potatoes, and fruits harvested for home
consumption.230 This so called “miscellaneous” or “minor” crops occupied 201,815 acres followed
by coffee with 166,164 acres.231 These data suggests that a significant amount of the agroproduction was for internal consumption followed by export crops.
The change of sovereignty led to a decline in the coffee industry. After the war Spain and
Cuba, principal coffee markets before the Spanish-American War, imposed taxes on Puerto Rican
coffee imports. In 1899 the coffee exported to Spain had a value of 8,337,807 pesetas, but paid
1,868,490 pesetas in taxes. Although coffee producers in Puerto Rico had to pay higher taxes than
ever before in the history, coffee exports still represented 42 percent of all the coffee imported by
Spain. The next year, in 1900, coffee exports from Puerto Rico to Spain dropped to 11.3 percent of
Spanish coffee imports falling behind Guatemala with 31.8 percent and Venezuela with 19.1
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percent of the coffee imported by Spain.232 However, a natural disaster more than higher tariffs
was the main cause behind the dramatic decline of coffee exports. Hurricane San Ciriaco destroyed
the economy of the island on August 8, 1899 with 35,889,000 pesos in total property loses. The
figures for coffee property losses amounted to 18 million pesos, in minor fruits amounted to 4.7
million pesos, and sugar property losses amounted to 3.2 million pesos.233 The population suffered
more than 3,000 casualties and thousands of people were left without shelter and food. The
military government created a Board of Charities to distribute food and avoid starvation. One of
the problems in the distribution of the relief was the limitation in transportation because roads and
rail lines suffered serious damages and debris obstructed many lines and roads. The report of the
officer in charge of the central depot illustrates the degree of damage:
The storm had been specially destructive to all large bridges in the country, and
the military road at a great many points was filled in with debris, caused by
washouts and landslides; the ordinary country roads were obliterated; the railroads
of the country were entirely gone for miles; all railroad bridges over large streams
were gone, and shipping was badly demoralized.234
The food was successfully distributed by using mixed means of transportation. After the
immediate assistance to people in need, the country had to rebuild its economy and infrastructure.
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Most railroad companies had to invest in the reconstruction of rail tracks to resume operations
promptly, although the owners of the Compañía de Ferrocarriles de vía estrecha de Mayagüez (a
17 kilometer rail line) decided that “it does not pay its operating expenses” and decided to close the
railroad after assessing the damages caused by the hurricane.235
The impact of the hurricane to the coffee production was worse than on other crops,
because coffee shrubs could not recover as fast as sugar or tobacco plants. Coffee shrubs took
several years to produce the first harvest. After a series of calamities including the plunge of the
prices in the international markets in 1897, the impact of the blockade during the war in 1898, and
the hurricane of 1899, the final blow was the Foraker Act of 1900. The Foraker Act established a
civil government and the economic base of the island as a territory of the United States. The Act
indicated that Puerto Rico’s products had free access to U.S. markets and the tariff laws in the
United States equally applied on the island. Sugar had a protective tariff because the states
produced sugar, but coffee did not, because in the United States coffee was not produced but
consumed. The ruined coffee production justified a special protective tariff only to Puerto Rican
markets: “on all coffee in the bean or ground imported into Puerto Rico there shall be levied and
collected a duty of five cents per pound.”236 Internal consumption was important for insular coffee
growers, but more importantly was the establishment of a protective tariff in the United States to
compete with the cheap Brazilian coffee. The Congress did not approve a coffee tariff for the
United States to protect Puerto Rican coffee producers. As a result the urgency to connect the
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mountains with the coast started to vanish.
Apart from the discussion of duties, the approval of the Foraker Act was contentious.
Among the sectors behind the approval of the Foraker Act were potential investors in Puerto Rico.
These capitalists lobbied for an end to the military regime in favor of a civil government with the
authority to grant franchises to develop new railroads, or to administer companies already in
operation.237 The Congress approved the Foraker Act establishing the civilian government in April
1900. Governor Charles H. Allen was installed in May and received the first petition for a railroad
franchise in September. The press in the United States favored speedy approval of railroad
requests:
surveyors and engineers have been in the field for some months exploring and
surveying different routes and making estimates of probable cost. Considerable
sums of money have thus been expended, and the several inchoate corporations
are said to have been quite successful in securing rights of way and other
privileges. If all the projects should be carried out, and the railroads built, the
island of Porto Rico would be better supplied with that means of transportations
than any State in the Union.238
The Congress gave the governor and the Executive Council, which was the insular
legislative and executive branch of government, the authority to make Puerto Rico a place with the
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best railway infrastructure of the United States. Although this idea was an exaggeration of the New
York Daily Tribune, it was accurate that the new civil government would finally move forward
with the economic development of the island.
The Executive Council refused to recognize the agreements signed by railroad companies
made during Spanish rule. This determination was unfavorable for the Compagnie des Chemins de
Fer because the company had finished 132 miles subject to an 8 percent dividend, but the military
government did not disburse the payment, which the New York Times estimated at $28,000 per
mile. The Attorney General issued an opinion establishing: “that Congress alone has authority to
act in the premises.”239 Consequently, the Executive Council rejected any monetary responsibility
with the Compagnie des Chemins de Fer.
New franchises
Railway franchises obtained under the Spanish government became null and void and this
forced tramway and railroad companies to submit all the paperwork to acquire new permits. The
Executive Council had the authority to receive, evaluate, and approve petitions from railway
companies to develop and administer existing and new lines. In addition, the Executive Council
was responsible for railway regulations.
J. G. White & Co., an engineering corporation from the United States, purchased Ubarri’s
tramway, which travelled from San Juan to Río Piedras.240 This company began its operations in
1890 constructing power plants for electric lighting and power transmission and later expanded the
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business to street railways in several states.241 This same company invested in the Phillipines and
organized in Puerto Rico the San Juan and Rio Piedras Railroad Company with headquarters in the
Borough of Manhattan in the state of New York.242 The amount of its capital stock was $300,000.
James Gilbert White, president of the company, not only acquired the rights for the operation of
electric tramways, but also the permits to build hydroelectric plants for the generation of power.
For this operation the company founded the San Juan Light and Transit Company with a capital
stock of $600,000.243 It was incorporated in Albany by P.H. McMillan, F.K. Curtis, J.J. Kenedy,
R.B. Merchant, Waren H. Spurge, and Robert Seager.244 J. G. White & Co. decided to change the
machinery from steam to electric and increase rail gauge from 29½ to 40 inches (one meter), which
was the standard gauge measurement for public service railroads in Puerto Rico. The passenger
rates would be “5 cents between all points in San Juan proper and its barrios, or wards, of Puerta de
Tierra and Santurce, including its branch line to the sea front at Borinquen Park.”245 The electric
tramway was in operation for the first time in Puerto Rico after a year of construction. The local
newspaper La Correspondencia published:
Acaba de pasar por frente a las puertas de esta redacción el primer carro
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eléctrico que entra en la ciudad de San Juan. Un gentío inmenso le seguía y el
pueblo alborozado se felicitaba de este gran paso de adelanto por la vía del
progreso.
LA CORRESPONDENCIA se honra enviando sus plácemes a la Compañía
americana, que no ha tenido miedo de emplear sus capitales en nuestra tierra,
dotando al país de un medio de comunicación fácil, rápido, decente y elegante.
Día de júbilo es este para todos los habitantes de San Juan y Santurce. Ya no
hay distancias, entre la Capital y sus barrios.
¡Bien por la Compañía, que á pesar de todas las dificultades, ha sabido luchar y
vencer!246
This first franchise appeared to fulfill the expectations of the capital city residents, which
were actively looking for and expecting change and progress. The Correspondencia reported the
euphoria of the people waiting to see the new electric tramway. Electric power was a novelty in
contrast to the steam power that was currently used. New technology translated into progress for
the country and the people. This technology impacted the idea of space and the perception of
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distance at that time: “Ya no hay distancias, entre la Capital y sus barrios.”247 Geographer David
Harvey said that “capitalism has long evinced a very practical interest in technologies that
facilitates speed-up and reduce the friction of distance.”248 Students of railroads in the United
States stressed the importance of railroads in connecting the east with the west, and stressed how
long distances shrank to unite the country as a nation. But, in Puerto Rico distances were not as
impressive as in the United States. Furthermore, the electric railroad only had 9.5 miles of tracks.
More than the unification of the country, it was simply an improvement of the urban transit system.
However, for the reporter of La Correspondencia this was a big step towards destroying the
barriers of distance between certain neighborhoods in Río Piedras.
The new electric tramway proved the benefits of U.S. investments on the island. Under
Spanish rule, the steam tramway in Río Piedras was indeed a step forward on the road to
modernization, but now a U.S. corporation had developed an even more modern technology: the
electric tramway. However, the idea to develop an electric tramway was not new because in 1899
T. Larrinaga submitted a proposal to establish an electric tramway from the Delicias Plaza to the
port of Ponce. This tramway would transport up to 40 passengers using the latest electric
technology at a tariff of 10 cents. In addition, the passengers could transfer to the beltway railroad.
This project for Ponce did not materialize during the Spanish regime but capitalist of the new
American empire did bring an electric tramway to San Juan. The people in Río Piedras finally
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enjoyed an “easy, fast, descent and elegant” tramway.249 It was the 9.5 miles electric tramway the
initial step to overcome natural barriers that kept towns isolated.
In the south, the town of Ponce also moved towards the establishment of an electric
tramway. W. S. H. Lothrop requested a permit to construct four miles of track from the city of
Ponce to the port.250 The Ponce Railway and Light Company was incorporated under the laws of
New Jersey although the headquarters of the corporation were in Boston, Massachusetts. The
object of the business was “the construction, operation and maintenance of street railway and
electric light and power plants.” They authorized $50,000 capital stocks at a value of $100 per
share.251 The members of the board were J. W. Hallowell, H. R. Hayes, H. B. Sawyer, H. H.
Picking, and Eliot Wadsworth.252 The project for an electric tramway developed during the last
years of the Spanish regime by Don Vicente and José Usera finally materialized under a foreign
corporation with the endorsement of the Insular Government. W. S. H. Lothrop business activities
also included the development of power plants like J. G. White & Co. as had been done in Río
Piedras. Both companies practiced vertical integration through the establishment of plants to
generate, transmit and distribute power to tramways and the town.
Another initiative in the south came from Henry De Ford, an investor from Boston and
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organizer of the Central Aguirre Sugar Company. Central Aguirre was a 1,950 acre sugar
plantation in Salinas with a mechanize mill able to grind the sugarcane cultivated in estates from
Juana Diaz to Guayama. The firm requested a permit from the Executive Council to construct and
operate a railroad line under the franchise Ponce & Guayama Railroad Company to transport
sugarcane from neighboring estates to Aguirre’s mill.253
The Ponce & Guayama Railroad Company was incorporated under the laws of New Jersey
with a capital stock of $500,000.254 Initially the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico had
the responsibility of developing the railways in that area, but in 1904 the government approved the
transfer of the rights of exploitation to the Ponce & Guayama Railroad Company. Three years later
the Ponce and Guayama Railroad Company requested permits to add branch-lines in Salinas, Santa
Isabel, and Guayama to connect sugarcane estates.255
The interest of Henry De Ford in the railroad industry was part of a vertical integration
strategy to decrease transportation costs. In 1898 De Ford established a bank firm in Ponce named
Henry De Ford & Company, then in 1899 purchased the Central Aguirre in Salinas (a sugar estate
with a 12-mile rail system to transport sugarcane to the mill), rented 2,468 acres to cultivate
sugarcane, and obtained an agreement with three haciendas (Esperanza, Margarita and Los Canos)
to grind their sugarcane. De Ford and his partners from Boston lobbied for the approval of a civil
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government in the U.S. Congress.256 In 1900 investors from the United States were enticed to do
businesses in Puerto Rico after the Foraker Act established: (1) the use of the United States
currency, (2) open access to U.S. markets, and (3) the appointment of the island’s governor and
Executive Council by the President of the United States with the consent of the U.S. Senate.
Consequently, Puerto Rico would be an ideal place for investment in the absence of tarrifs and
political upheavals which threatened U.S. economic interests in other Caribbean islands. Finally, in
1904 the corporation secured the franchise to operate the Ponce & Guayama Railroad Company to
transport the sugar produced in Central Aguirre to the port in Ponce. Vertical integration would be
the norm for the succeeding U.S. sugar corporations in Puerto Rico. De Ford acquired control of
every aspect of the sugar production: First the bank to finance the acquisition of land to plant sugar
cane, the mill to produce the sugar, and the railroad to transport raw cane from the estates to the
mill and to the ports. De Ford not only would monopolize the sugar business in the area, but also
would control railroad transportation of freight and passengers.
In the west, in 1901, the Sociedad Anónima Tranvía de Mayagüez was incorporated with a
capital stock of $48,000. This urban tramway, with offices on Concordia Street in Mayagüez, built
four miles of tracks operated by horse carts.257 This company had local directors: José Menéndez,
president; Federico Philipi, vice-president, José L. Montalvo, secretary; José L. M. Castro,
treasurer.258
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The Compañía de Ferrocarriles de Vía Estrecha de Mayagüez was another company
founded with local capital in 1896 but halt its service on December 1902. This railroad had
problems to finance the construction of the line and the tracks and other structures suffered serious
damages after hurricane San Ciriaco. In 1905 the Department of State received a communication
from Miguel Esteve declaring that the company was no longer operating. He also informed the
Department of State that he was part of a lawsuit for compensation of $32,000, based on the loss of
income, after the abandonment of the facilities.259 The shutdown of the Compañía de Ferrocarriles
de Vía Estrecha de Mayagüez, the only second-class railroad founded with local capital for the
service to coffee farmers, may well relate to the decline in coffee exports after Hurricane San
Ciriaco. The the railroad was acquired by Sucesores de Bianchi a sugar central interested in the
transportation of sugar cane in Añasco.260
The Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto-Rico, like the other companies, submitted
paperwork requesting the approval of a franchise. The Executive Council of Puerto Rico granted
the franchise on October 28, 1901 and the Legislative Assembly passed an act on February 4, 1902
granting tax exemption from insular, municipal and local taxes for a period of twenty-five years.261
After the approval of the franchise and tax exemption the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles
reorganized with a capitalization of $1,000,000 from investors in the United States. The American
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Railroad Company of Porto Rico (ARRC) constituted in New York on May 1902, acquired the
rights of construction granted initially to the Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de Porto Rico and the
rights of operation from the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto-Rico. The ARRC franchise
was approved for 150 years. The board consisted of investors from New York as well as from
France, and Puerto Rico. The Directors were “J. de Lapisse, Henry Wiener, Paul Leveque, and
Gabriel Maurel of Paris, France; Eduard Lauterbach, Herbert R. Limburger, and Hernand E. Behn
of New York City; Jean Charles Charpentier of San Juan, Porto Rico.”262 The new company
decided to resume the construction of the beltway railroad as had been planned under the Spanish
regime.
The ARRC operated the sections of the beltway railroad with initial success. In 1899 the
ARRC transported 125,027 passengers, the next year 153,056 passengers, and in 1901 the
corporation transported 149,597 passengers. Although the numbers for 1901 reveals a decrease in
passengers, freight tonnage improved considerably (Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.1. ARRC Freight Receipts, 1898-1901.
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SOURCE.- Report of the Governor of Porto Rico, 1902, 40.
To increase profits in freight transportation the company had to focus on finishing the
beltway route. To assist in this effort the Executive Council of the insular government leased
public land in San Juan to the Compagnie des Chemins de Fer for the establishment of a new
terminal.263 The permit also allowed the ARRC to add one-mile extensions to link sugar
plantations to the main line. At the time of acquisition the sections under operations were: (1) San
Juan-Camuy, (2) San Juan-Carolina, (3) Aguadilla-Mayagüez, and (4) Yauco-Ponce. The ARRC
was committed to continuing with the development of new stations until the route became a single
line. The company provided four trips per day for each section or route, until construction was
completed. There was a morning departure and an afternoon return from each end of the line:
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Table 3.1. Timetable of the American Railroad Company of Porto Rico, 1901

Station
San Juan
Santurce
Martín Peña
San Patricio
Bayamón
Toa Baja
Dorado
San Vicente
Vega Baja
Manatí
Río Manatí
Barceloneta
Cambalache
Arecibo
Hatillo
Camuy

Station
San Juan
Santurce
Martín Peña
Río Piedras
Carolina

Station
Aguadilla
Aguada
Rincón
Córsica
Tres Hermanos
Añasco
Mayagüez Playa
Mayagüez Ciudad
Hormigueros

Morning
6:30
6:39
6:46
--7:09
7:31
7:35
7:55
8:05
8:29
8:53
8:58
9:33
9:56
10:19
---

SAN JUAN-ARECIBO-CAMUY
Afternoon
Station
1:20
Camuy
1:30
Hatillo
1:39
Arecibo
1:49
Cambalache
2:07
Barceloneta
2:34
Río Manatí
2:40
Manatí
3:03
Vega Baja
3:15
San Vicente
3:51
Dorado
4:36
Toa Baja
--Bayamón
--San Patricio
--Martín Peña
--Santurce
--San Juan

Morning
--------8:20
8:58
9:12
9:43
9:49
10:15
10:20
10:47
11:00
11:11
11:18
---

Afternoon
3:00
3:04
3:32
3:40
4:13
4:32
4:43
5:10
5:15
5:36
5:40
6:30
--6:25
6:30
---

Morning
8:25
8:38
8:50
9:01
---

SAN JUAN-CAROLINA
Afternoon
Station
5:00
Carolina
5:13
Río Piedras
5:25
Martín Peña
5:36
Santurce
--San Juan

Morning
7:00
7:28
7:42
7:50
---

Afternoon
3:40
4:08
4:22
4:30
---

Morning
8:15
8:31
8:56
9:03
9:21
9:31
9:56
-----

AGUADILLA-MAYAGÜEZ
Afternoon
Station
5:00
Hormigueros
5:16
Mayagüez Ciudad
5:41
Mayagüez Playa
5:48
Añasco
6:06
Tres Hermanos
6:16
Córsica
6:40
Rincón
6:45
Aguada
--Aguadilla
146

Morning
5:55
6:16
6:22
6:46
6:54
7:13
7:20
7:45
---

Afternoon
--3:00
3:06
3:30
3:38
3:57
4:04
4:30
---

Station
Yauco
Guayanilla
Tallaboa
Ponce

Morning
6:45
7:13
7:40
---

YAUCO-PONCE
Afternoon
Station
3:00
Ponce
3:28
Tallaboa
3:46
Guayanilla
--Yauco

Morning
8:30
9:02
9:20
---

Afternoon
5:00
5:31
5:49
---

SOURCE.- “Compañía de los ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico; Itinerario de trenes,” La
Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 2 January 1901.
The unification of the railroad lines was closer after two years of construction. On October
12, 1903 the press in Puerto Rico and the United States published articles celebrating the opening
of a railroad extension connecting Aguadilla and Ponce. The New York Times and The Chicago
Sunday Tribune highlighted the presence of Governor Hunt and other high officials at the
festivities, which included an inaugural ride, banquet, and concert. For someone unfamiliar with
the island, the newspaper emphasized that “the road opened up a rich coffee, sugar and fruit
territory,” and even further the opening was “considered the most important railroad event in the
history of the island.”264 Local newspapers provided a detail chronicle of the opening celebrations.
The Águila de Puerto Rico published the long list of the guests at the banquet, and the creative
dishes that were offered by the Français Hotel:
MENU
Hors d’œuvre Progress
Consomme Vitesse
Poulet Aguadilla

“New Railway in Porto Rico,” New York Times, 11 October 1903, 12; and “Porto Rico Railroad opened”
Chicago Sunday Tribune, 11 October 1903, 13.
264
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Patés Añasco
Petit-pois Mayagüez
Beignets Saint German
Filet Guánica
Viennas Guayanilla
Dessert Ponce
Sorbets Republique
Café Yauco
Vins. Champagne
Sauterne Medoc
The unique menu resembled a map, which traced the route of the railroad. Each stop had its
corresponding course. To start the appetizer, which was called “progress”, and then the menu went
station to station ending with the Ponce dessert, the route’s last stop. When Governor Hunt made
his toast he stressed the influence railroads had had on the progress of the country and its people
and the importance foreign investments played in the promotion of the island’s economy. For this
celebration, members of the Partido Republicano congregated at the station to welcome Governor
Hunt and other “honorable” dignitaries.265 The Boletín Mercantil published an article written
poetically where it praised the benefits of the new section and stressed the progress and vitality
created by railroads in Puerto Rico. Railroads were depicted as the blood that communicated
different organs to provide life to an organism. The isolation of interior towns would disappear and
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goods would run to the cities and the ports without delay.
However, the tone of the article published by the Boletín Mercantil suddenly changed, and
it criticized the slow development of infrastructure on the island. The Boletín used the celebration
as a pretext to demand a more active role on the part of the government in the promotion of roads
and the support of corporations like the ARRC.266 The critique of the governmental handling of the
infrastructure development was unfounded because U.S. administrators had allocated funds to
develop new roads and also facilitated the influx of new U.S. railroad corporations.
In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt granted the ARRC the right to build a branch-line
from Lajas to Boquerón in Cabo Rojo.267 This seven-kilometer branch-line formed an irregular
ring to access land in the southwestern coast, but it did not solve the problem of the need to
connect the island’s interior. The following year, the ARRC requested a permit to develop another
branch-line between Hormigueros and San Germán. The company also planned the establishment
of branch-lines for the towns of Aguadilla, Arecibo, Carolina, Mayagüez, and Ponce. These
initiatives were proof of the aggressive expansion of the railroad by the ARRC. In 1910 the
company continued its construction with 23 kilometers of tracks to link the north (117 kilometers)
with the southwest (160 kilometers) that is, to connect the station in Camuy with the station in
Aguadilla.268
A petition for a railroad franchise in the municipal district of Caguas was submitted by the
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newly created Port America Company. The initiative to establish a railroad in the Caguas region
was not novel because the first efforts could be traced back to February 1885 when the Spanish
Parliament approved the construction of a 0.762 meter narrow-gauge railroad.269 This railroad
would be a second-class-railroad designed to connect Caguas with the port in San Juan. The
project did not prosper, thus a decade later Don Juan F. Vías, a lawyer and Property Registrar in
Caguas, revived the plans to construct the narrow-gauge railroad. On October 23, 1896 the
government granted the permit to organize the corporation and Vías directed the meetings for that
end. In the first meeting 450 shares were sold at 100 pesos each and for the second meeting they
sold another 430 shares.270 Time passed and the railroad did not succeed, so the Port America
Company represented a new hope for a railroad in the region.
In 1901 the Port America Company received the approval from the Executive Council of
Puerto Rico to build and operate a railroad for the island’s interior. The projected route consisted of
two separate lines with Caguas at the heart and center. The corporation projected a line starting in
San Juan, passing through Guaynabo and Caguas. Then, the railroad continued southward with
stops at Aguas Buenas, Cidra, Cayey, Guayama, and Aguirre (Salinas). The second line ran to the
east from Caguas with stations in Gurabo, Juncos, Naguabo, and Ensenada Honda (Ceiba); and,
westward from Cidra with stops in Naranjito, Corozal, Morovis, Ciales, Utuado, Lares, San
Sebastian, and Aguadilla. The Port America Company also projected the construction of branchlines to provide service to the towns of Trujillo Alto, Bayamón, Toa Alta, Aibonito, Barranquitas,
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Barros (Orocovis), and Jayuya. This project was grandiose, and furthermore it had backers like
General Roy Stone, an ardent supporter of the developments of road infrastructure in Cuba and the
United States, which received from the military government the direction of the Bureau of Good
Roads.271
The Port America Company tried to secure a tax exemption for twenty-five years, but the
Attorney General did not approve it.272 This route would have provided a real improvement to the
infrastructure of the island because it complemented the beltway railroad by connecting the interior
with the coast. Most of the projects approved by the Executive Council of Puerto Rico had just
been continuations of the work started or planned during the nineteenth century. However, the Port
America Company provided a new route benefiting the economic integration of the island. The
linkage of coffee, tobacco, and food producing areas with coastal markets and export ports would
strenghten the insular economy. After the corporation invested $25,000 in surveys, explorations
and such procedures, it was discovered “that General Stone’s calculations in regard to the
practicability of the enterprise were mistaken, and that the railroad itself could not make a return
upon the investment.”273 In 1905 the government declared the franchise “null and void” and
forfeited the sum of $12,500 the corporation had given as deposit.274
With the breakdown of the Port America Company the possibility of connecting the
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highlands with rails had vanished, but the desire to establish “iron roads” in the valley of Caguas
continued. In 1901, the Vandegrift Construction Company, which was created by investors from
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania committed to “construct, maintain and operate a railroad” between
Caguas and San Juan in just a year. The Vandegrift Construction Company was backed by J. G.
White & Co., the owner of the San Juan and Rio Piedras Railroad Company. The company was to
construct fifty miles in one year at a cost of $773.679 dollars.275 The construction material would
come from Pittsburgh: “all the steel rails will be manufactured by the Carnegie Company, while
other material, such as machinery, will be produced from local concerns.” 276 The Executive
Council approved the franchise in 1903 but Vandegrift Construction faced problems meeting the
deadlines. In 1905 the Executive Council revoked Vandegrift Construction Company’s permit
because the corporation had failed to perform the work as conferred in the franchise.277 This
situation frustrated the tobacco companies in the area of Caguas that would have benefited from
cheap transportation to the ports.278
Tobacco was the second agricultural product, after sugar because of investments with U.S.
capital after the occupation of the island by the U.S. military. The first civil ship to arrive in Puerto
Rico after the military invasion carry a group of tobacco investors, among them a representative of
the American Tobacco Company (ATC), to explore the economic potential of the tobacco business
in the island. The delegate of the ATC promoted their cigarettes among the U.S. soldiers and
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investigated the quality of the tobacco leaf cultivated on the island. Although tobacco in Puerto
Rico did not have the high quality of the Cuban tobacco still it would be profitable.279 John
Blackwell Cobb, the representative of the ATC send to Puerto Rico, returned to the United States
and incorporated the Porto Rican American Tobacco Company (PRATCO) in Newark, New
Jersey. PRATCO would be the subsidiary of the ATC on the island. PRATCO negotiated the
acquisition of two important cigar factories: (1) La Colectiva in San Juan owned by Fausto
Rucabado and José Portela, and (2) Toro y Cía. in Ponce owned by Luis Toro Pasarel.280 In 1901
the West Indies Cigar Company was incorporated in New York to produce cigars in Puerto Rico
and became the strongest competitor of PRATCO.281 1902 the Porto Rico Leaf Tobacco Company
was incorporated for the acquisition of land for the cultivation of the tobacco leaf. The Porto Rico
Leaf Tobacco Company would supply the leaf for the cigars manufactured by PRATCO. Evidently
the tobacco business in Puerto Rico experienced a quick transformation. In the nineteenth century
tobacco was cultivated by peasants in small and medium family farms and the production of cigars
occurred in urban artisanal workshops (“chinchales”), but after the arrival of U.S. corporations the
cigar workshops became factories. Farmers were subject to the prices established by absentee
capital factories, which produced cigars or exported leaves for cigarette factories in the United
States. In a period of five years, from 1900 to 1905, tobacco exports value increased from
$681,642 to $2,589,933 surpassing the value of coffee exports the main source of revenues in the
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nineteenth century.282 This growing tobacco industry needed cheap transportation for the leaves
and the cigars to the ports.
On August 1903 the Porto Rico Railway, Light and Power Company was incorporated in
the state of New Jersey with a capital stock of $125,000. The directors were Thomas B. Hall, J.
Holland Paist, and L.R. Holems.283 This railroad would depart from San Juan with stops in Caguas,
Cayey, Coamo, Juana Diaz, and finally arriving at Ponce Playa. But on November 1905 the insular
Department of State received “a letter from Mr. Hawkins stating that the company no longer was
doing business in the island.”284 Afterwards, the Executive Council authorized J. G. White & Co.
in 1906 to construct, maintain, and operate a railroad from San Juan to Caguas.285 It was public
policy “to increase as far as possible railway facilities in the island” as Laurence H. Grahame,
Commissioner of the Interior stated.286
The American Railroad Company of Porto Rico protested the government decision in favor
of J. G. White & Co. claiming they already had the rights of exploitation for that area. The original
plan was to extend a branch line from Carolina to Caguas but the ARRC decided to change the
route from Río Piedras to Caguas because it was shorter and more favorable from an engineering
perspective. In the struggle for the control of the railroad route between Caguas and Río Piedars a
third corporation emerged. The Porto Rican American Tobacco Company also had interest in the
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route because their tobacco factories were at and beyond Caguas. For this purpose the PRATCO
“created the San Juan and Caguas Railway Company. This company was organized in the state of
New Jersey on June 14, 1906, and was authorized on June 28, 1906, to do business in the island.
Its capitalization was fixed at $300,000.”287 However, the PRATCO agreed with the ARRC to
withdraw their application for the railroad franchise after the ARRC guaranteed satisfactory freight
rates for their tobacco shipments. Likewise, PRATCO committed to fund part of the railroad
construction and the ARRC resumed their attack against J. G. White & Co.
The government granted the franchise to either company, first the ARRC received the
franchise for a steam railroad on July 19, 1906 and some days later, on July 26, J. G. White & Co.
obtained their franchise for an electric railroad. This decision was uncommon because the insular
government promoted the establishment of railroads but did not encourage competition between
railroad corporations. After the decision, the ARRC offered J. G. White & Co. to abandon the
Caguas route if they guarantee to turn over all the freight to the ARRC at their Río Piedras station
and the ARRC also committed to transfer all freight to Caguas to the J. G. White & Co. railroad. In
sum, freight from San Juan to Caguas would use the tracks of two railroad companies, 30 percent
of the route would be under the ARRC operation and 70 percent under the J. G. White & Co.288
The polemic for the control of the Caguas route was finally settled, but shortly thereafter J. G.
White & Co. would be acquired by another company.
British investors formed a corporation in Canada to operate the San Juan Light & Transit
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Co. and the Porto Rico Power & Light Co. The Canadian corporation built a hydroelectric plant to
provide electricity for the metropolitan areas of San Juan, Santurce, and Río Piedras as well as
provide power to the electric tramway from San Juan to Río Piedras, and the tramway from Río
Piedras to Caguas.289
The Caguas Tramway Company was incorporated in Portland, Maine, on July 1907.
Millard W. Baldwin, Clarence E. Eaton, and Charles D. Fullerton were the directors with a capital
stock of $100,000.290 The Caguas Tramway Company employed 1,400 men to develop roughly 25
miles of rail tracks “operated by electricity furnished from the Comerio water falls.”291 The Porto
Rico Railways Company, Limited (PRRC) operated both the San Juan Light & Transit Co. and the
Porto Rico Power & Light Co. In 1907 Brill’s Magazine published a photo of the wagons that
would be acquired by the Caguas Tramway Company. The corporation purchased eight wooden
“Semi-convertible type” cars designed particularly for tropical areas.292 The Caguas Tramway
Company would start traffic service in 1908 with the guarantee they would profit from the sugar
and tobacco production of the area:
An agreement has been entered into with the Porto Rico Leaf Tobacco Company,
under which that company gives all their freight, going and coming, to the Caguas
Railway Company for ten years from completion of the road, which is expected to
be ready for operation by January 1, 1908. This freight, with that of the Cayey-
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Caguas Tobacco Company, The Belgian Sugar Central and the general freight and
passenger business of this populous territory, will undoubtedly show handsome
profits upon the investment.293
In April 1911 all of the above noted companies merged under a new corporation registered
and incorporated as the Porto Rico Railway, Light and Power Company. In the articles of
incorporation the company expressed the desire to “take over all the assets, rights, properties and
businesses of the said five companies and to carry on and continue such businesses.” 294 These
companies were the Luz Eléctrica organized in Puerto Rico; the San Juan and Río Piedras Railroad
Company, and the San Juan Light and Transit Company organized in New York; and the Porto
Rico Power and Light Company, and the Caguas Tramway Company organized in Maine. The
corporation had a capital stock of $3,000,000 divided in 30,000 shares of $100 each. The directors
were A. E. Ames from Toronto, Canada and F. W. Teele, George F. Abbott, C. S. Jenner and
Henry F. Hord, residing in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The board immediately assumed the payment of
debts and bonds from the companies they acquired. The corporation, which included power
production and railways reported consistent increase in their earnings during the first years of
operation (Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.2. Earnings of the PRRC, 1907-1911.
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SOURCE.- “Porto Rico Railways Co., Limited.” The Times, 21 May 1912, 21.
The Línea Férrea del Oeste, with a ferry from the port of San Juan to the port of Cataño,
and a railroad between Cataño and Bayamón was a railroad line that used domestic capital and was
able to survive the change in sovereignty. On 1901 the Línea Férrea del Oeste reported gross
earnings of $30,518 and operating expenses of $24,602 for the transportation of 252,772
passengers.295 In 1912 the legislature conducted a study of the service provided by Línea Férrea
del Oeste in response to multiple complaints. The final report mandated “the formulation of 19
specific charges of failure to comply in as many respects with the obligations imposed upon the
owner by the terms of his concession.”296 The company had a limited period of time to make the
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necessary modifications to improve the service or the Executive Council would cancel the
franchise. Two years later the Línea Férrea del Oeste offered 15 departures from San Juan and
publicized its service as secure and comfortable:
Estudiantes y oficinistas: recordad que esta empresa expende libretas de abono
con 60 tickets, válidos en primera clase, entre San Juan y Cataño y vice-versa, al
mínimo costo de un dollar. Le sale el viaje a un centavo y dos tercios, y viaja con
seguridad y comodidad.297
In March of 1917 the company was incorporated with a capital stock of $75,000 divided in
750 shares of $100 each. The directors were Ramón, Alfonso, and Sabino Valdés, Frank Martínez,
and Ramón Siaca Jr. all from San Juan.298 The Valdés brothers inherited the direction of the Línea
Férrea del Oeste from their father and an electric company in Mayagüez. In this town, the Valdés
brothers established the Compañía Cervecera de Puerto Rico in 1937, which became a real
success, more than the steam railroad.
In the eastern part of the island three sugar companies provided public-service railway for
the region. The Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico originally had the right to construct
this section, but decided to keep the western side of the route, and release their rights in the east.
Antonio Roig received in 1905 the approval to “construct and operate a steam railway
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between the city of Humacao and Comercio Street in Humacao Playa. Antonio Roig was the owner
of a Sugar Central in Humacao and his railroad would run through the lands of R. Fulladosa and
Emilio Muñoz, Ramón Pou, Salvador Rocafort, Julio Guzman, José Toro Rios, Emilio Faura and
Petrona Julbe. These men and women were owners of sugarcane lands and would benefit from the
access of a railroad to transport raw cane and refined sugar but the Executive Council of Puerto
Rico declared the railroad “to be of public utility for all purposes.” 299 The track gauge approved
for this railroad was 75 centimeters although the company had to change to one-meter standard
gauge in a period of 10 years to allow the transfer of freight and passengers in a future transfer
station to be constructed by the ARRC when they finished their route. The service would consist
on two rides per day during working hours. The Executive Council approved a passenger rate of
three cents per kilometer, children would paid reduced rates, and police, military, and any other
justice department officer on duty had to be carried free of charge. The rate for transportation of
freight in bulk would not exceed 20 cents per ton per mile. The final requisite for the approval of
the franchise was the payment of “an annual royalty of five per cent on the gross amount of freight
and passenger charges collected” by the railroad company.300
The Fajardo Development Company was organized in Connecticut in 1905 and that same
year received the approval of the Executive Council to construct, maintain, and operate a railroad
departing from Mameyes (Río Grande) with stops in Luquillo, Fajardo, Ceiba, and Naguabo. In
Fajardo the corporation planned to extend two branches, one from Fajardo to Fajardo Playa and the
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other “from Fajardo into the interior in a southwesterly direction to the barrio of Río Arriba in the
Municipal district of Fajardo.”301 The Fajardo Development Company received the approval to
construct a one-meter gauge railroad powered by steam or electricity with the exception of the branch
between Fajardo and Fajardo Playa that would operate by animal force. Passenger and freight service
would be offered between Mameyes and Naguabo, but the branch lines of the route to Fajardo would
exclusively transport sugar cane. In 1912 the Fajardo Development Company had to be prepared to
connect in Río Grande (Mameyes) with the ARRC en route to Carolina.
The Fajardo Development Company was in charge of the transportation of sugar for the
Fajardo Sugar Company, incorporated in 1905 in New York by Jorge Bird Arias, a planter from
Fajardo, and Charles P. Armstrong of New York. The Fajardo Sugar Company operated the mill and
all the factory buildings and the planting of the sugar cane was controlled by the Fajardo Sugar
Growers Association and the Fajardo Fruit Company. These four companies make the Central
Fajardo a successful sugar complex in the eastern area. Furthermore, Sociologist César J. Ayala
traced the participation of the board members in the Fajardo Sugar Company and found that Thomas
A. Howell and James Howell Post were directors in Fajardo and director in the Aguirre Sugar
Company. In addition, James Bliss Coombs was president of the Fajardo Sugar Company and the
Fajardo Development Company, and also was in the board of directors with James Howell Post of
the National Sugar Refining Company in New Jersey, The Cuban-American Sugar Company and
the West India Sugar Finance Corporation with operations in Cuba and Dominican Republic. Ayala
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showed the networks among executives in the United States and the Spanish Caribbean islands
occupying seats in banks, sugar mills, and railroad company boards simultaneously.
The Esperanza Sugar Company submitted a petition for a franchise to construct and operate
a railway from Ceiba to Naguabo.302 This decision provoked a conflict between the Fajardo and
Esperanza Sugar Companies, because in Ceiba and Naguabo the routes overlapped. Fajardo
Development Company protested because they had received their permit in 1905 and began the
construction of 39 miles of tracks, but in 1909 the government approved a new franchise to
Esperanza Central Sugar Company, which was in detriment to their economic interests. The reason
for the Esperanza Central Sugar Company to build a railroad was to provide railway transportation
to a new wharf to be built by Robert Sweeny in Ensenada Honda, Ceiba. The Fajardo Development
Company had 30 miles of tracks in operation, but they had not finished the route because in the fall
of 1907 a financial panic prevented the corporation from continuing the project. After the panic,
the corporation applied for an extension in time to culminate the route. In the meantime, the
Esperanza Central Sugar Company received the permit to construct 6 miles of railroad from the
point the Fajardo Sugar Company ended their rail line to the projected wharf. The Fajardo Sugar
Company complained that behind the railroad of the Esperanza Central Sugar Company lied unfair
competition:
the whole meaning of this attempted franchise was to shut off competition and
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compel the planters to grind at the Esperanza factory rather than make the
Esperanza and Fajardo Factories open competitors for the planters. That this
franchise is an attempt to bolster up a company which is in the hands of a receiver
at the expense of the planter.303
This clash between the Esperanza and the Fajardo Sugar Companies for the control of the
public-service railroads was part of a tough competition for the control of the sugar business, and
was not an effort to control the railroad service per se. Sugar corporations considered the railroads
essential for the transportation portion of their sugar business. For this reason, Central Aguirre
established the Ponce & Guayama Railroad in 1904, and Central Fajardo followed in 1905.
Another sugar central incorporated in New Jersey in 1900 under the name South Porto Rico Sugar
Company did not establish their own public-service railroad because at the time of the
incorporation, the ARRC had railroad service near the mill in direction to the port of Ponce.
Similar to the experience of the creators of Central Aguirre, investors of the South Porto Rico
Sugar Company started their presence in Puerto Rico in the banking business in times of the
occupation army. The New York bank firm Muller Shall & Company first made an alliance with
the American Colonial Bank of Porto Rico and after the “Puerto Rican sugar was granted tarifffree entrance to the Unites States, Muller and Schall moved toward investment in sugar.”304 In
other words, railroads were integrated into the complex industrial plantation system characterized
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by Cesar J. Ayala as the “American Sugar Kingdom.”305 To understand the railroad industry in
Puerto Rico it is necessary to consider how they participate in the metropolitan and colonial
business networks.
In Arecibo Finlay Brothers and Waymouth Trading Company established a steam railroad
from Vega Alta to Dorado. The route of the steam railroad included a transfer point to the ARRC
station at Dorado. This railroad was approved in 1905 like the Roig Railroad in Humacao and the
provisions for the operation was similar. The Vega Alta – Dorado railroad offered service to a
region of sugar estates, the fare for the transportation of freight in bulk would “not exceed twenty
cents per ton per mile,” passengers would not pay more than “three cents per kilometer, equivalent
to four and eight tenth cents per mile,” children had to pay half rate, and justice department
employees, military and police officers on duty had to be transported free of charge.306 The main
difference with the Roig Railroad was the gauge width, because the Vega Alta – Dorado railroad
had to construct one-meter gauge tracks to allow the transfer in Dorado with the ARRC. Years
ahead, the Vega Alta Railroad became the Northern Porto Rico Railroad Co.
The establishment of the Vega Alta – Dorado railroad was another initiative by a central
for the control of public-service railroads to connect surrounding sugar cane lands with the sugar
mill. This initiaves complemented the investment of narrow gauge railroad tracks for the private
use of the centrales. Antoher example was the Central Canóvanas that interconnected seven
colonias and villages (poblados) with their railroad network. Only three centrales: Soller in
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Camuy, Pellejas in Adjuntas, and Santa Barbara in Jayuya did not invest in railways (Map 3.1).
These internal railroad systems transported raw cane from field to mill and sugar processed in the
centrales to the ports through the public service railroads. As shown, sugar centrales relied in the
railroads for their sugar business and railroad corporations as the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de
Puerto-Rico equally relied in stations established near the centrales to profit from the freight of the
sugar business.
In 1912 investors from Mayagüez incorporated the Mayaguez Tramway Company with a
capital stock of $50,000 in 500 stocks of $100 each. The directors of the board were Don Julián
Herencia y Gozalvo, Don Clemente Javierre y Lope, Don Matías Gil y Jaca, Don Félix Ramos y
Jurado and Don Antonio Amill y Negroni. The Mayaguez Tramway Company acquired the assets
and property of the Sociedad Anónima Tranvía de Mayagüez to continue with the operations of the
tramway.307 The company imported electric machinery to substitute horse-driven carts of the
Sociedad Anónima Tranvía de Mayagüez. Almost five decades earlier Mayagüez had been the
pioneer city in the establishment of urban tramways, although there was later the development of
electric tramways in cities such as Río Piedras and Ponce. At this point, electric-urban-tramways
were operating in the principal cities, the beltway railroad finally linked most of the section in the
west, and in the east more kilometers were under construction.
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Map 3.1. Centrales and railroads.
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The first twelve years of the civilian government witnessed the establishment of electricurban-tramways in three cities for the transportation of passengers, and the expansion and
consolidation of steam railroad corporations providing passenger and freight service. The
increasing number of “iron roads” clearly stimulated economic growth. The Register of Puerto
Rico reported that estates near roads increased their value: “in the country districts, within easy
access of the railroad or macadam roads, fairly good land average $40.00 per acre; and in the
interior and in places remote from transportation, grazing land can still be purchased as low as
$5.00 to $10.00 per acre.”308 The construction and operation of railroads also created jobs, which
benefited unemployed workers.
All railroads in Puerto Rico were privately owned, however the state regulated the
operations of railroads that provided services to the public. The Executive Council had the
responsibility to review railroad tariffs every five years and accordingly the House of Delegates
approved a study of freight rates to make an informed decision. Governor Beekman Winthrop went
to Washington, accompanied by other governmental officials and business man from Puerto Rico,
to hold a conference with members of the Interstate Commerce Commission on December 1906.
Governor Winthrop requested “the Interstate Commerce Commission to instruct railroad officials
and shippers alike in matters of transportations.”309 James Peabody from Chicago, with experience
in the railroad industry, was the advisor to Governor Winthrop in the committee created to adjust
freight tariffs in the public-service railroads. Mr. Peabody concluded that the rates had to increase
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to maintain profitability.310 Sugar entrepreneurs rejected Peabody’s suggestions, arguing that this
would cause the ruin of their businesses.311 There was a clash between railroad companies and
sugar centrales. Passenger fares were not really an issue at the moment as the issue was mainly in
freight transportation.
The state also observed the accomplishment of safety practices in public-service railroads.
In 1907, Treasurer Groomer complained about the overcrowding of the wagons in the “trolley”.
The electric-street-tramway from San Juan to Río Piedras, known commonly as the “trolley”,
transported approximately 75 passengers in a wagon with a capacity of 37 passengers. This was
unsafe, abusive, and uncomfortable for the commuter who paid a tariff of 5 cents. Unsurprisingly,
the trolley had more than five derailments in only one week.312
Another controversy between the state and a railroad company occurred in 1910 in relation
to the tax exemption granted to the ARRC. In 1901 the ARRC requested a tax exemption that was
granted by the Executive Council for a period of 25 years. Later, the ARRC ceded their rights of
development to other companies, including the Ponce & Guayama Railroad. The Ponce &
Guayama Railroad believed they would enjoy the exemption granted originally to the ARRC in
1901, but in the eyes of the government this was not transferable. This controversy forced a
discussion about the legal power of the Executive Council to allocate tax exemptions, although it
was clear that they had the power to grant franchises and concessions. The end result was that the
government rejected any exemption to the Ponce & Guayama Railroad.
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Natural disasters also posed economic challenges to the railroad companies. For example,
heavy rains on May 17, 1909 paralyzed the traffic of the San Juan-Caguas railroad, because the
floods wash-out the tracks.313 On September 7, 1910 a hurricane struck the island with winds of 72
miles and “precipitation of five inches in one hour and a half, the heaviest ever recorded.”314 The
companies and the people did not have time to prepare themselves because the Weather Bureau did
not alert them promptly. The winds destroyed distribution lines, and as a result the electric
tramways had no power to operate. In addition, fallen trees blocked the passage in some places.
The railroad and vessels operating from San Juan to Bayamón were forced to halt operations
because of the inclement weather. The ship known as “Pepita,” departed to Cataño at 5:00 p.m.,
but got stranded in Cabra Island in San Juan Bay. At 11:30 p.m., in the middle of the storm,
passengers were finally able to disembark. The following day the company resumed limited
operations because trees and telephone posts had fallen on the tracks.315 The day after the storm,
the San Juan trolley resumed full operations at 11:45 a.m. but many passengers protested a high
and abusive fare increase charge for the first trip.316 The ARRC also suffered serious damages,
particularly the tracks of Arecibo, but the corporation made the necessary and resumed operations
the following day.317
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Roads
The railroad boom was the result of a flood of private-foreign-investment endorsed by the
colonial government. At the same time the government allocated funds to maintain and build roads
that crossed the island. For U.S. administrators, the 284 kilometers of road constructed during the
Spanish regime were inadequate to promote agriculture and “demonstrates the backwardness in
development.”318 From the perspective of the U.S. administrators, the costs of road construction on
the island were higher than in the United States, because of the weather. Often excessive rain,
ruined the advances that had been made during a work day, and had to be repaired before the day’s
construction was to begin.
The need for technical personnel during the construction of the railroads justified the use of
foreigners since there were so few skilled mechanics and other professions needed for railway
construction. Historian Aurelio Tío mentioned that malaria and yellow fever attacked technicians
unaccustomed to the tropics and those deaths partially explained the delays in the construction of
the beltway railroad.319 When Tío referred to “technicians,” he did not specify their country of
origin, but probably most were personnel from the United States with technical knowledge of the
railroad business.
Studies on the railroad industry in Puerto Rico do not mention the use of foreign unskilled
workers for the construction of the “iron roads”. However, in a note published in the
Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, the newspaper revealed the presence of immigrant workers in the
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construction of the electric trolley at San Juan. The mayor of San Juan denounced the preference
for Tortola British-Island workers over the nationals of the country:
Una cláusula: «todo individuo domiciliado en San Juan, tiene derecho á trabajar
en las obras del tren eléctrico».
La idea fué que trabajaran los obreros de San Juan, que bien lo necesitan; pero…
la redacción fué tan hábilmente hecha que solo trabajaban los «tortoleños» que se
domicilian.320
This note shows the government’s commitment to create jobs for the people in San Juan,
although the tramway company favored the use of immigrant workers from the Lesser Antilles.
Perhaps other railroad companies also hired unskilled immigrant workers living on the island.
Road construction was clearly the work of native labor. The state did not rely on cheap
immigrant labor because it had the option of using convict labor for road maintenance and
construction. The use of prisoners in the construction of roads under the Spanish regime was
discussed in the first chapter and was an attractive strategy also used by the new U.S. controlled
government. The governor of Puerto Rico, Regis H. Post, in a 1906-07 report stated: “the prisoners
in the jails have been utilized very extensively during the past year on road work. They are sent out
in gangs of from 10 to 20 under guards, and are used principally for breaking stone on the
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highways and on general repair and construction work.”321 For the next two fiscal years the
prisoners assigned to road construction and maintenance decreased because the number of
prisoners also decreased. The reports submitted to the governors expressed satisfaction with the
economic benefits of this cheap labor force:
The employment of convict labor upon the insular highways continues to be
successful, both from the standpoint of economy in road maintenance and
construction and the condition of the men employed.322
Fernando Picó study the prisons in Puerto Rico and he claimed that U.S. authorities
conceived confinement the objective of the punishment in the period from October 1898 till the
opening of a new penitentiary in 1933. However, the Bureau of Prisons pursued the humanization
of the imprisonment by rewarding good behavior with sentence reduction.323 Prisoners performed
works inside and outside the penitentiary and those with good performance and conduct would be
rewarded with a reduction in sentence up to five days per month.324 In 1912 the cost of maintaining
penal institutions was $184,998.93 but the Bureau of Prisons received $86,475.50 due to the
services rendered by prisoners in the construction of roads.325 That is to say, inmates could be
outside the penitentiary confinement by working in road construction and potentially reduce their
sentences; the state reduced payroll expenses in public works and partially financed the
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maintenance of the prison system.
During the first year of military occupation road maintenance was expensive with a cost of
$1,000 per kilometer. However, U.S. administrators always stressed the importance of road
building and maintenance for the economic progress of the island. Early in 1901, Governor Charles
H. Allen reported: “The crying need of the island is above all things roads.” 326 This initial effort
towards developing a web of good roads was justified in the promotion of freight transportation
from the interior to the coast for the economic advancement of the island. Roads were essential for
the export economy and the state had to improve and develop new ones at any cost.
Figure 3.3. The cost of road maintenance, 1903-1913.
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SOURCE. - Annual Reports of the Governor of Puerto Rico, 1903-1913.

Roads also became important for the appearance of a new luxury good: the automobile.
The incipient automobile industry in Puerto Rico had an ongoing need for new roads and efforts by
the government to maintain existent roads in good condition. Early in the century, the legislature
promoted the acquisition of automobiles by reducing the fees to acquire licenses for private
automobile circulation. In 1907 Laurence H. Graham, Commissioner of the Interior, reported that
there were 96 private motor vehicles on the streets, and that “Several automobile manufacturers
have established agencies in San Juan. Owing to the magnificent roads in the island there is an
increasing demand for automobiles, and the industry will most likely be a profitable one.”327 As
previously noted, kilometers of new roads increased and the government allocated considerable
sums for the maintenance of existing roads (Figure 3.4).
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Figure 3.4. Construction of new roads, 1900-1914.
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SOURCE.- Annual Reports of the Governor of Puerto Rico, 1900-1914.
After just five years the Commissioner of the Interior, John A. Wilson, complained of the
poor condition of the island’s roads. He reported: “the influx and operation of a large number of
heavy motor trucks in addition to the constantly increasing number of automobiles have in some
cases resulted in the destruction within a few months of roads which were, until that time, in a fair
condition to carry the ox-cart traffic for which they were designed.”328 Evidently the investment in
infrastructure had a dual impact: an improvement in the transportation of goods on the island, as
well as the promotion of the consumption of automobiles and trucks manufactured in the United
States.
In the early years of the 20th century the purchase of automobiles was a luxury, but later
could become an investment in itself. New commercial opportunities emerged, such as taxis for
passengers’ transportation or trucks for freight carriage. The railway system began to be considered
a “necessary complement to the system of macadam roads”.329 Motor vehicles provided new
economic possibilities and also produced new ideas of modernity. Automobiles and trucks became
icons of liberty in contrast with the steady tracks of railroads and tramways which had fixed routes
and schedules. Roads became the path to the future. In a commercial guide published in 1910,
under the topic “road building” the ideas of progress and modernity were palpable: “From the
finished roads, the broad-tread, high-wheel ox cart is slowly but surely disappearing and the
lighter, cleaner, and more scientific vehicle, the American wagon, is coming to the front”.330 The
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economic benefits of motor vehicles were tangible for the planters. For example, coffee growers in
Utuado paid an estimate of one dollar per 100 pounds of coffee transported by mules to the port in
Arecibo, but the costs decreased to only ten cents by using the “the American wagon.” In the sugar
industry, planters in Arecibo paid ten cents to the port but if they used the railroad the cost dropped
to “3 or 4 cents per 100 pounds” of sugar.331 Annually this savings translated into thousands of
dollars in profits for farmers.
These changes were gradual did not occur overnight. In the landscape it was common to
appreciate traditional ox-cart transportation coexisting with modern railroads. For example, in
1910 supplies to Isabela were “transported mostly from Aguadilla by bull carts, or from San Juan,
Arecibo or Mayaguez by train.”332 Oxen-drawn carts (bull carts) and railroads together were
necessary to supply Isabela with goods from diverse locations, but the proliferation of motor trucks
eventually would replace oxen or horse driven carts. Furthermore, animal powered railways also
had to move aside to open the path for the modern-mechanical-powered transportation. The
Sociedad Anónima Tranvía de Mayagüez, a horse-driven tramway company, operated since the
nineteenth century in the urban area of Mayagüez but shut down operations in 1912. On May 2
Pedro E. Ramírez informed the Secretary of Puerto Rico the final sale of the company’s
property.333 The following year, the Executive Council approved a franchise for the Mayaguez
Tramway Co. This company modernized the old horse traction system with an electric tramway for
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the city. The change to an electric tramway in Mayagüez closed the era of the “railroad boom”. In
the nineteenth century, with the establishment of a horse-driven tramway, Mayagüez opened the
era of the first railways, and closed the era of the “railroad boom” with the establishment of the
third urban-electric-tramway in the Island after San Juan and Ponce.
Railroad’s workers
The census of 1910 reported six railway-related businesses, which employed 342 male
workers. This figure represented 2.2 percent of wage earners classified as manufacture workers in
Puerto Rico. Railroad laborers under the category of “Cars and general shop construction and
repairs by steam-railroad companies” worked an average of 60 hours (ten hours per day) and in
some cases 72 hours per week.334 In March 1908 the legislature in Puerto Rico approved a law to
regulate working hours for railway employees. Under this law, railroad workers could work for a
maximum of 12 hours and could return to work for a new shift only after eight hours of rest. Any
corporation in violation of the law was subject to a fine from $100 to $500.335 This law attempted
to assure the security of workers and passengers.
Then there was the problem of safety. The Puerto Rican Civil Code stated that family
members of any worker who was injured or died as a result of negligence by the company could
claim compensation:
the employer who has charge of, or physically controls, any signal, switch,
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locomotive engine, car, or train in motion, whether attached to an engine or not,
upon a railroad, the employee, or, in case the injury results in death, his widow or
children, or both of them, and if there be no such widow and children, then his
parents (provided that said parents were dependent upon such employee for
support) may maintain an action for damages against the employer, pursuant to
the provisions of this Act.336
However in 1908, a federal act applied to railway workers in Puerto Rico overrode the
insular law. Because of this, the federal courts were the scenes of litigation between railway
companies and workers’ relatives. Two cases in particular went as far as the Federal Supreme
Court. Both lawsuits were filed by relatives of workers who died on duty. In 1912 Ann Elizabeth
Birch sued the ARRC for $10,000 after the death of her husband Francisco Abraham Birch. Ernest
Victor Birch, the son of Francisco, also joined the lawsuit. The fatality occurred in Aguadilla when
Birch was at his post as a brakeman. The railroad was running at high speed and one of the wheels
of the wagon “left the tracks and was thrown to the ground, crushing the deceased beneath it, and
thus causing instant death.”337 The widow and son alleged “that a proper inspection of the wheels
would have disclosed the defect in it, and, further, that if the train had been running within the
limits of the requirements of the law, the train might and would have been stopped before the
accident occurred.”338 The defense indicated that Mr. Birch was 47 years old at the moment of the
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accident and earned $42 per month. He “was a skilled and efficient railroad employee, and was in
vigorous health and strength. And it is alleged that his death was caused without negligence on his
part, and while he was in the faithful discharge of his duty.”339 Their lawyers made reference to an
act of Congress entitled, 'An Act Relating to the Liability of Common Carriers by Railroad to Their
Employees in Certain Cases,' approved on April 22, 1908. This act expressed in Section 2:
That every common carrier by railroad in the territories, the District of Columbia,
the Panama canal zone, or other possessions of the United States, shall be liable in
damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in
any of said jurisdictions, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her
personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and
children of such employee, and if none, then of such employee's parents…340
ARRC’s lawyers challenged the arguments of Birch’s heirs. The corporation denied that
the railroad was running at high speed and affirmed that no defect was visible when the company
inspected the wheels, as required by law. In the Supreme Court the essence of the argument was
not whether Francisco Abraham Birch was or was not responsible for the accident, but the right of
the widow and the son to sue.
In 1913, the Supreme Court reviewed another lawsuit against the ARRC. The rational for
the lawsuit was that Pedro Didricksen was “an employee of the American Railroad of Porto Rico,
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who died from an injury sustained while in its service,”341 his parents demanded compensation.
The motion did not offer more details of the accident, because the court was not concerned about
the accident per se, but about the rights of the parents to sue the company. In both cases the ARRC
struggled in the courts to avoid any compensation to the families of the deceased. This was no
surprise but what is important to note is the centrality of the political relations between Puerto Rico
and the United States for finding legal resolutions to conflicts.
An example was the extension of the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908 to the island.
Although Puerto Rico was not literally mentioned in the act the text includes “other possessions of
the United States,” and the judges decided that Puerto Rico was indeed a “possession.” Another
case in point was the extension of the Safety Appliance Act to the island, which impose sanctions
to a railroad company if failed to maintain required appliances in good conditions. In Birch’s
decision, the issue was left unanswered. In Didricksen’s case the Safety Appliance Act had to be
resolved. The judge interpreted that it applied to the island, even when the Safety Act did not use
the term, “possessions of the United States” as it was used in the Liability Act. The Safety Act only
mentioned territories and the District of Columbia, however the judge interpreted that even when
the term “possession” was not used “for all purposes, the Island of Porto Rico has not been fully
incorporated into the United States, it obviously is not foreign territory, nor its citizens aliens.”342
The definition of the political relation between the U.S. and Puerto Rico was a political issue on
the island, because the status of “possession” was uncertain and the politicians in Puerto Rico
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wondered what the political future of the island would be. Citizenship was another significant
issue, because the people of Puerto Rico were not U.S. citizens although the island was a
possession of the United States. Pedro Didricksen case about a railroad accident obliged the U.S.
Supreme Court to determine if a Federal Law did apply in Puerto Rico even though the island was
not a state but a possession.
Improvement in salaries became another struggle for railroad workers on the island. After
the U.S. occupation of Puerto Rico in 1898 workers from various guilds created the Federación
Regional de Trabajadores (Worker’s Regional Federation). The initial claim of the labor
movement was the extension of U.S. constitutional rights to Puerto Ricans (freedom of speech, of
the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble). Internal discrepancies divided the
Regional Federation and provoked its premature dissolution but one faction founded a new union
in 1899 under the name Federación Libre de los Trabajadores (Free Worker’s Federation, FLT).
In 1904, the FLT leaders were under arrest and sentenced to jail for charges of “conspiracy to alter
the price of work.” Samuel Gompers, president of the U.S. union American Federation of Labor
(AFL) requested President Theodore Roosevelt to intervene in favor of the FLT leadership. 343 The
FLT affiliated with the AFL in 1901, and the result of that alliance was manifest after Governor
Hunt recommended the revocation of the Spanish labor code under effect and the adoption of a
new labor code to allow pacific assemblies and to legalize unions. The FLT leaders were released
from jail and the unionization of workers became easier under the new legal order.
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Tobacco workers were the most active sector of the insular labor movement with strikes
and protests in the period of 1905-15. In 1915 workers in the sugar industry declared strikes and
railroad workers followed with strikes demanding higher wages. The need for better salaries in the
railroad industry was clear to its workers. Already in 1907 Treasurer Groomer declared that
problems in the “trolley” of San Juan could be related to the workers’ low salaries: “se les paga 11
centavos por hora de trabajo y hay hombres de esos que solo cobran $2 en una semana. Yo no veo
que con esas condiciones se pueda esperar un buen servicio de esos hombres.”344 However, the
strike did not started in the electric “trolley” of San Juan operated by the PRRC, but in the Línea
Férrea del Oeste. From February to March 1915, the Línea Férrea del Oeste was confronted with
a workers’ strike demanding higher wages. The strike succeeded when the company increased
workers’ salaries by 25 cents.345 Trolley employees declared their strike a year later but the
triumph was less astounding with a 1.5 cent increase.346 The PRRC dealt with another strike that
same year. The company reported losses of $4,000 after a five day lock out in solidarity with
laborers from other trades.347 This activism of railroad workers was associated with the
radicalization of agricultural workers. In 1916 agricultural workers declared a strike with an
estimated participation of 40,000 laborers from a total agricultural labor force of 399,075 (ten
percent of the labor force in sugar, coffee, tobacco, and fruit plantations). 348 The FLT organized
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several agricultural workers unions and also organized the workers of the ARRC in lodges. These
lodges could paralyze the railways to pressure the railroad company for higher wages, and could
halt operations in support to FLT colleagues on strike.
The power of the workers was in their capability to halt production but railroad workers did
not produce any goods, they transported them, so in the railroad industry the power of the workers
was their capability to halt the movement of goods. The effectiveness of a walkout of railroad
workers increased if they had the collaboration of other guilds to prevent the shipping of goods.
The FLT provided that network of workers. One weakness of railroad activism was the increasing
availability of trucks, which offered reliable freight services. In the absence of railroad service
many companies, such as sugar mills, could relied on trucks for the transportation of goods to
different places of the island. During fiscal year 1915-16 the Commissioner of the Interior reported
109 trucks in circulation.349 This figure may seems insignificant but trucks turned into the
transportation alternative for areas without railroad access, such as the highlands towns of
Adjuntas, Aguas Buenas, Aibonito, Barranquitas, Ciales, Cidra, Coamo, Comerio, Corozal,
Jayuya, Lares, Las Marías, Maricao, and Utuado. These towns did not have access to railroad
tracks and relied solely on traditional ox-carts for freight transportation. Railroad workers may not
have considered truck drivers as strikebreakers at this moment but the increasing presence of trucks
on the island landscape would eventually became a serious concern for union leaders during
strikes.
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War anxieties
At the beginning of the First World War in Europe the American Railroad Company of Porto
Rico was the largest corporation followed by the Porto Rico Railroad Company. The principal source
of income for these companies was the transportation of raw cane to the mills and refined sugar to
the ports. The expansion of sugar production with 41 centrales in operations (33 owned by Puerto
Ricans, 5 owned by Americans, and 3 owned by Europeans) in 1910 and the integration of Puerto
Rico to the U.S. markets with the protection of tarrifs were crucial for the growth of the railroad
business. 350
Freight railroads were inspected by the Bureau of Weight and Measures to assurance track
and carts scales were correctly calibrated. The inspections of the bureau would benefit the colonos
(cane growers) because errors in the scales apparently benefited the mills. In 1914 the loss “amounted
to 12,314.3 quintals of sugar, which, valued at only $3 per quintal, amount to a total loss for the
colonos of $36,942.90.”351 This loss equated to 6 percent of sugar production for 1914. The
calibration of the scales was a problem with a clear solution, however, railroad companies confronted
new problems without clear solutions when the prices of sugar fell in 1913 and the Congress in the
United States started deliberations for the end of protective tariffs.
In 1914 the PRRC reported a decrease in freight transportation from 194,094 tons in 1913 to
106,510 tons, which was equivalent to $70,395 in lost income.352 The company reported that a drop
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in sugar prices was the reason for the reduction in freight transportation. The fall in prices was the
consequence of the Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, which reduced sugar duties
on 25 percent effective in March 1914 in anticipation of May 1916 when sugar would be duty-free.353
In Puerto Rico the average price per ton of sugar exported decrease from $85.92 in 1912 to $69.55
in 1913 to $63.12 in 1914, the lowest value in fifteen years. Furthermore, the enactment of the Act
severely affected the insular government revenues.354 Over the next two years the company reported
increases in the net income by $3,835.88 in 1915 and $41,156.65 in 1916.355 The reason for this
recovery also had to be related to sugar prices. On April 27, 1916 the U.S. Congress repealed the
duty-free clause and sugar values raised to an unprecedented $107.79 average price per ton in 1916,
a significant increase from the $92.64 in 1915. Scholars Sara Fisher Ellison and Wallace P. Mullin
claimed that “the action of 1916 was intended to ‘postpone’ free trade in sugar until after World War
I was resolved and ‘normal’ conditions returned to the sugar market.”356 This relation between the
prices of sugar and the income of the PRRC revealed the great dependency of this railroad company
to the transportation of sugar. A crisis in the sugar business would translate to a crisis in the PRRC.
The Ponce Railway and Light Company was a smaller urban tramway with plans to
strengthen its operations with the opening of a pier in Ponce in 1914 (located in cape Peñoncillo).
The projections were to transport “a large percentage of the fruit, tobacco and coffee exports and
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lumber, coal and other imports” to this port. The Stone & Webster Public Service Journal celebrated
that Ponce at last had “an opportunity to land and discharge cargo by modern methods.”357 Although,
the journal’s impression was that Puerto Rico’s infrastructure was underdeveloped, the essay clearly
stated how the railroad had a direct relationship to the development of this new pier. That is to say,
railways continued to be considered essential elements in the construction of a modern economy and
the progress of the country.
The idea that railroads promoted economic prosperity and the modernization of the island
infrastructure was manifest in long-term projects like the new pier in Ponce with railroad access
and through less significant developments like new sidewalks. Case in point, the pavement of the
“trolley” line in Mayagüez stimulated property owners to asphalt their entrances. The press praised
the importance of this initiative for the enhancement of the city:
-La pavimentación de la vía del trolley está animando a los propietarios de las
fincas urbanas de la calle Méndez Vigo a asfaltar el frente de sus casas. Si ello se
realiza será un gran paso de progreso en la hermosa avenida orgullo de
Mayagüez.358
This note in La Democracia credits the trolley as being the engine of progress in
Mayagüez.
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In March, the U.S. Congress approved a new organic act for Puerto Rico: The Jones Act of
1917. Article 38 transferred the responsibilities related to franchises, concessions, and rights from
the Executive Council to the Public Service Commission, and Article 18 created the Commissioner
of Agriculture and Labor. The first action of the Public Service Commission was litigation against
the ARRC. The Circuit Court of Appeals in Boston decided against the ARRC by forcing the
company to repay sugar producers for an illegal “increase of 20 percent over the approved tariffs of
the rates on sugar and its products without the consent of the Executive Council of Porto Rico.”359
Sugar producers received their compensation. The progressive plea for railroad regulations so
prevalent in the United States perhaps had an impact in Puerto Rico.
Residents in Puerto Rico were granted U.S. citizenship by the Jones Act in March 1917 and
on April 6 the Congress of the United States declared war on the German Empire. Puerto Rico as a
U.S. territory and Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens were also in war and suffered early in the conflict
the uncertainty of food availability. A month after the U.S. declaration of war the legislature
approved the creation of a Food Commission under the presidency of Antonio R. Barceló. The
Commission appointed a Committee of Agriculture, a Committee of Transportation, and a
Publicity Committee to promote the domestic production of food, to stimulate economic
independence, and decrease imports. After a year, the acreage planted with rice, corn, beans, and
vegetables increased from 102,575 acres to 334,725 acres.360 In this scenario of increasing food
production for local consumption and exports threatened due the war, railroads had to modify their
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operations to provide the needed transportation of food crops to local markets. Railroads had
concentrated their freight service in the transportation of export goods, in particular sugar, but in
the war the attention had to be shifted. Already in 1908 the Department of Agriculture received
pressure to study the “fruit transportation problem.” The governor of Puerto Rico at the time, Regis
H. Post, wanted solutions for the lack of transportation alternatives for these products, which he
considered “far heavier” than they should had been.361 The island exported pineapples, oranges,
grapefruits, and coconuts but these and other food products also might be sold in the local markets.
Although the transportation problem of food crops was not further discussed the issue resurfaced
during the war. However, the main concern of railroad companies was not the transportation of
food, but rather support the war effort.
The ARRC demonstrated their commitment to the defense of the United States through the
investment of almost $40,000 for the construction of “a spur from the main road to Camp Las
Casas.” The director of the ARRC, Mr. George Villard, agreed to transport troops and other
personnel without charge, and the company “enrolled every employee as a member of the Red
Cross” and “every employee contributed one’s day pay to this organization.”362
The PRRC also demonstrated its commitment to the war effort. In a “personal and
confidential” circular letter, O. M. Sewell, General Manager of the PRRC, invited “selected business
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and professional men of the highest type” to join the American Protective League.363 The American
Protective League, created in Chicago, recruited “volunteers” to help the government collecting
evidence of “enemies” or Germans living in the United States.364 Sewell wanted to organize a Puerto
Rican chapter of the League to assist the federal government in the surveillance of foreigners and
“unfriendly” citizens living on the island. The operation of the league was secret and under the
approval of the United States Department of Justice and the Bureau of Investigations (BI). Sewer
consulted a special agent of the BI in relation to prospective members for the League. By December
18, 1917, Sewell recruited 25 supporters, all of them in San Juan.365 The selection of Sewer as the
head of the American Protective League in San Juan was not surprising, because Albert M. Briggs,
the founder of the League in Chicago, “wanted only ‘big names’ to run state inspectorates.”366 Briggs
recruited only elite professionals and businessmen. For example, one of the members of Briggs’
chapter of Chicago was the president of the Chicago and North Western Railway. Scholar Nick
Fisher proposed that companies benefited from the League mostly by curtailing union activism.
Fisher wrote: “Rank and file members, generally unquestioning, became the lackeys of big business,
clearing their industries of troublesome employees free of charge.”367 The members of the League
defined themselves as the “Minute Men” of the time, with no partisan intensions and “no concern
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with labor questions”.368 However, Sewer, leader of the league and manager of the PRRC, had to
deal with a significant labor conflict on September 26, 1917. The workers denounced low salaries,
bad treatment from managers, and the refusal to acknowledge their right to unionize. Sewell’s
attitude was far from conciliatory and indicated when Carmelo Honoré, Chief of the Bureau of
Labor, suggested a meeting between the two parties in order to settle the conflict. In Sewell’s words:
“we have gone ahead employing new men with the view of filling the places vacated by the striker,
a large number of the vacancies have already been filled with good, reliable men and it would not be
fair to throw these new men out now to make room for those who went on strike.” Thus, in his view
the meeting was unnecessary.369 Without hesitation, O. M. Sewell decided to dismiss 155 conductors
and motormen of the electric tramway. But the situation changed when the Governor invited Sewell
for an interview in response to the traffic problem in the city. On October 2 the PRRC ordered its
employees to return to their jobs with an increase wages (based on seniority), the right to appoint a
committee to settle labor disputes, and the recognition of the right to form a union. Moreover, “the
manager donated $100 to cover the expenses of establishing their local union.”370 Clearly, the
workers were victorious, and surely, Sewell intended to use the American Protective League as a
tool to avoid future labor upheavals.
It is very difficult to justify the creation of an American Protective League Chapter for the
surveillance of Germans or Austro-Hungarians residing on the island. In the United States the large
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German and Austro-Hungarian population was significant but this was not the case in Puerto Rico.
In 1910, before the Great War, the German population was comprise of only 1.6 percent of the
foreign-born population on the island, and Austrians just 0.1 percent.371 After the war, in 1920, the
German population decrease to 1.2 percent of the foreign-born population on the island, and
Austrians did not appear as a category in the census.372 In absolute numbers the German population
dropped from 192 to 94 inhabitants in a decade. Although the American Protective League alleged
they persecuted the German and Austro-Hungarian traitors, it is difficult to sustain they were the
reason behind their decrease in numbers.
During the war the main concern of Sewell as manager of the PRRC should have been the
quality of the electric tramway service since the conditions of the equipment and the service was
deplorable. Jorge Romani, a member of the insular House of Representatives, requested a study of
the electric tramway service provided in San Juan. He declared that the service was terrible and the
facilities a disaster:
Yo conozco, porque resido en Rio Piedras, el servicio tan irregular y deficiente
que esta Compañía viene prestando en perjuicio del público…casi todos ellos
tienen los asientos rotos; las ventanillas inútiles en casi su totalidad; en que en el
interior de los tranvías reina mucha suciedad; en que continuamente los “swiches”
acumuladores de corriente eléctrica se incendian, poniendo en peligro la vida de

371
372

“Table 20: Place of Birth and Year of Immigration,” Thirteenth Census of the United States: 1910, 1198.
“Table 5: Country of Birth of the Foreign-Born population: 1920,” Fourteenth Census of the United States: 1920,

4.

191

los conductores y hasta del pasaje mismo…373
No doubt the PRRC had its problems but those problems had no relation to the German
“enemies”. Sewer needed to focus on the improvement of the PRRC service and not waste his
efforts on the surveillance of his employees. The company had to invest in repairs and maintenance
to retain its competitiveness.
Competition
The PRRC obtained significant profits from passenger transportation and the beginning of
the war marked an increase in freight rates. However, in 1917 operational costs rose due to
increasing coal prices. The PRRC used coal to fuel the steam railroad but the importation of coal
from the United States decrease from 145,889 tons to 104,908 tons and this was accompanied by
rising prices.374 President Woodrow Wilson ordered the creation of the Federal Fuel
Administration to normalize fuel supply and to halt increasing prices. In addition to the coal
problem the PRRC also augmented the payroll after a wage increase granted to the workers. In this
scenario of fiscal challenges the PRRC confronted its nemesis: the automobile. The board of the
company recognized in its annual report its failure to maintain profits after the emergence of
competition: “Jitney competition has continued unabated, involving inadequate returns from our

Translation: “I know, because I live in Rio Piedras, the irregular and inadequate service this Company has been
providing to the detriment of the public... almost all of them have broken seats; useless windows almost entirely;
that inside the trams reign a lot of filthiness; that the power switches are continually catching fire, risking the lives of
drivers and even of the passenger itself...”
“Las franquicias de la Porto Rico Railway Light and Power Co.”, La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, 8 September
1917, 4.
374
Reports of the Governor of Porto Rico, 1917, 8, and 1918, 13.
373

192

Trolley Division.”375 Buses and the carros públicos (collective taxis) were tough competitors
because they provided fast and flexible service. Already in 1914 a publication about Puerto Rico
printed in the U.S. coincided with the observation of the PRRC:
To-day nearly all the passenger and a great proportion of the freight transportation
is carried on in automobiles, auto trucks, and railway trains, but an enormous
amount of freight is still hauled in wagons, carriages, and ox-carts. At the present
time there are about one thousand automobiles on the island, and several
companies operate passenger and freight lines of autos running on a regular
schedule between various points. The railway facilities of the island are far less
up-to-date and satisfactory than the auto lines, but the character of the country
prevents the extensive use of steam roads, save in certain sections and near the
coasts, and under the circumstances the railway accommodations are as good as
could be expected.376
This was a time of transition. The railway service was as “good as could be expected” but it
was “limited” due to the varying conditions of the terrain. The ARRC continued developing the
beltway railroad route from San Juan to Ponce but since it was still under construction, passengers
relied on automobiles as a means of transportation between the two main cities of the country.
Towns without railway service benefited from the service provided by private automobiles or
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buses. The advent of domestic corporations to provide transportation, repairs, or towing services
increased since 1910. The Secretary of Puerto Rico reported the registration of two transportation
companies during the fiscal year 1910-1911, the Atlas Line in Ponce and the Aguadilla
Transportation Co.377 During fiscal year 1911-1912 two more companies registered, The Central
Auto Co. in San Juan and the Ponce Auto Transportation Co,378 and during fiscal year 1912-1913
two more companies registered, the Compañía de Transporte de Maricao and The Porto Rico
Transportation Co. in San Juan.379 In 1914 the main transportation company on the island was the
Porto Rico Transportation Company with three diferent departures and many destinations (Table
3.2)
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Table 3.2. Timetable of the Porto Rico Transportation Company, 1914
SAN JUAN-PONCE
South-Bound
Run No.
1
San Juan……….Lv. 8:00
Río Piedras…….Arr. 8:40
Caguas………..….”
9:45
Cayey…………….” 11:05
Cayey…………...Lv. 11:35
Aibonito………..Arr. 12:35
Coamo………..….”
1:30
Juana Díaz…....….”
2:25
Ponce………....….”

3
4:30
5:10
6:30
8:15

5

6:00
7:00
8:00
9:00

3:00

9:45

North-Bound
Run No.
2
Ponce……….….Lv. 8:00
Juana Díaz…….Arr. 8:30
Coamo………..….”
9:25
Aibonito………….” 10:25
Cayey…………….” 11:30
Cayey…………..Lv. 12:10
Caguas…….…...Arr. 1:15
Río
2:20
Piedras……..….”
San
3:00
Juan………..….”

4
4:30
5:15
6:20
7:30
8:45

6

6:30
7:45
10:00
11:00

CAYEY-GUAYAMA-PONCE
South and West
Run No.
7
Cayey…………...Lv. 6:00
Guayama……….Arr. 7:30
Salinas………...….” 8:45
Santa Isabel……....” 9:15
Ponce………....….”
10:30

East and North
Run No.
8
Ponce……..…….Lv. 4:30
Santa Isabel…….Arr. 5:45
Salinas………...….” 6:15
Guayama……...….” 7:30
Cayey…………….” 9:00

HUMACAO-CAGUAS
West
Run No.
9
Humacao……….Lv. 6:15
Las Piedras…….Arr. 6:35
Juncos….……..….” 7:05
Gurabo………..….” 7:25
Caguas………..….”
7:50

11
12:00
12:20
12:50
1:10
1:35

East
Run No.
10
Caguas………….Lv. 10:00
Gurabo….......….Arr. 10:20
Juncos………..….”
10:50
Las Piedras………”
11:10
Humacao………...”
11:30

12
6:35
6:55
7:25
7:55
8:15

SOURCE.- Alpheus Hyatt Verrill, Puerto Rico Past and Present, and Santo Domingo of To-day
(New York, USA: Doss, Mead and Company, 1914), 169.
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This schedule indicates that there were routes from San Juan to Ponce, Cayey to Ponce, and
Humacao to Caguas. This service was not necessarily faster than railways but it had fewer stops.
For example, the trip from Guayama to Ponce could be made by train or bus, both leaving at 7:30
a.m.; the train would arrive at 10:24 a.m., and the bus at 10:30 a.m.380 In addition, both only
offered one round trip per day so neither offered a more extensive schedule.
The government reported that from June 1914 to June 1915 there were 548 automobiles
imported into the island with a value of $433,408. This figure was a significant increase from the
previous year which reported sales of 323 automobiles with a value of $406,440. These figures
clearly demonstrate the reduction in the price per unit from one year to another. Access to
automobiles had improved and so had its impact on public transportation. In October 1915 there
was a commentary on the situation in the New York Times:
The motor car is used as the chief means of passenger transportation, both private
and public, about the island. There are regular motor lines running from San Juan
to all sections of the island, and in many instances the fares charged are less than
those charged by the railroads…
Recently the jitney has made its appearance in competition with an interurban
steam railroad running five miles between the towns of Catano and Bayamon. The
railroad has carried 500,000 passengers a year, and the fare has been 10 cents until
the arrival of the jitney. Then the railroad cut the fare to 5 cents, but the jitney
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continues to get many passengers at the old fare of 10 cents.381
In 1918, the governor reported “a large increase in the number of motor vehicles” with 842
public automobiles and 125 public trucks.382 Official data demonstrates sustain increase in motor
vehicles through the war years (Figure 3.5):
Figure 3.5. Number of carts drawn by animals, automobiles, and coaches, 1914-1919.

SOURCE: Report of the Governor of Porto Rico, 1916-1920.
The carros públicos and buses were more economical than the railroad. In 1920 the ARRC
and the PRRC charged 3¢ per kilometer. The Electric Car Service from San Juan to Río Piedras or
Condado and the Línea Férrea del Oeste had a flat rate of 10 cents per trip. The distance from San
Juan to Ponce was 270 kilometers, if the fare by train was 3 cents per kilometer the cost of the trip
would be $8.10, but by motor vehicle the journey was less expensive. The Porto Rico
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382

“Porto Rico Buying many American Cars,” New York Times, 17 October 1915, XX-9.
Report of the Governor of Porto Rico, 1918, 40-41.

197

Transportation Co. and the Atlas Line offered transportation from San Juan to Ponce by
automobile or bus. Atlas Line had two routes departing from San Juan with “stops at Rio Piedras,
Caguas, Cayey, Aibonito, Coamo and Juana Díaz” or “stops at Rio Piedras, Caguas, Cayey,
Guayama, Salinas and Santa Isabel.” 383 The fare for using the automobile and bus for the same
route was $6.50 and $4.50 respectively. The Porto Rico Transportation Co. also provided service
from San Juan to Ponce via Guayama, and maintained “auto service between San Juan and
Humacao”.384 Clearly, the bus was more economical than the railroads and was even more so than
the old horse-cart fare of $10 to $20 for a journey from San Juan to Ponce in 1899.385 There were
48 stops on the railroad but only seven stops in the carro público and the bus route.386 Although
the trip by vehicle was uncomfortable because the road through the mountains was extremely
curvy and caused car sickness, it was well worth the saving in price and time.
Freight transportation was another concern for railway companies. In 1912 there were “two
or three automobile truck companies” one of them was the Atlas Transfer Company with 6 to 8
trucks used in San Juan. This year the International Motor Company selected Saurer Trucks to be
imported in Puerto Rico. For mountainous roads, the Saurer truck was superior to the Mack or
Hewitt trucks because it had a light weight chassis and motor air brakes. Furthermore, the Saurer
could transport five tons of freight and “the maximum limit guaranteed by the government for the
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bridges on the roads” was 8 tons for one vehicle.387 With 45 trucks circulating in 1912, the goal
was to substitute the bull carts and to corner freight transportation between the interior and the
coast.
On April 3, 1918 railway corporations went to the Public Service Commission demanding
regulation of the service provided by all motor vehicles.388 From the perspective of the public
agency this was a “natural” reaction to jitney competition. A year later the Public Service
Commission prescribed the regulations for “all motor vehicles regularly operating as common
carriers between fixed points and over determined routes.” 389 The agency mandated to “all persons
operating or desiring to operate such a service required to take out a certificate of necessity and
convenience.”390 This decision was advantageous to railway companies because it would reduce
competition by making the process of certification a burden for transportation companies.
The pressures of the railroad companies initially would reduce competition but eventually
would be detrimental to their interest because if regulation was effective the service provided by
automobiles, buses and trucks would improve. Railroads were regulated but they were not
fulfilling the desired efficiency in transportation, as the buses were. Railroads had to provide great
service to compete and to avoid the erosion of the idea that railroads were necessary in a modern
economy and a country of progress.

“Bull Carts Yield to Trucks,” The Daily Missoulian, 21 April 1912, 9.
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CHAPTER IV: TIME OF CHALLENGES

The interwar years were moments of great challenges for railway companies. The largest
company, the ARRC confronted unexpected expenditures a month previous to the armistice when
the island suffered a 7.3 magnitude earthquake in the Richter scale and a Tsunami hard hit mostly
the northwestern part of the island. The earthquake occurred at 10:14 a.m. on October 11, 1918
followed by aftershocks for the next two days. Official reports established that 116 people died and
material losses rose to $4 million.391 In relation to the infrastructure the report noted that “Railroad
tracks were bent and thrown out of alignment in some places by the slumping of alluvial soil.”392
The damages suffered in the rail infrastructure of the ARRC forced the company to halt operations
until October 15, 1918 when the company resume its service.393
The PRRC also had unexpected expenditures in 1918. The PRRC operated electric
tramways in San Juan and Caguas and provided electric power to several municipalities from
hydroelectric plants but a drought forced the company to use a steam plant for several weeks
during the summer of 1918. The next year, in 1919, the drought once again forced the company to
use the steam plant in the months of March, April, and again in November. The drought
augmented operation costs by $60,000 in 1918 and $30,000 in 1919.
Railroad companies would benefit from the rise in exports occurring after 1919 because of
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price increases on international markets. Exports in 1919 increased dramatically in value compared
with the previous year. Sugar exports were $98,923,750; coffee exports reached $9,034,028;
tobacco leaf and scrap exports were valued at $12,416,388 and cigars $1,613,997. Other products
including coconut, citrus fruits, pineapples, cotton, alcohol, and straw hats also increased its value
over previous year.394 For Governor Arthur Yager another indicator of economic prosperity was
the increment in the banking offerings with 17 banks in operations, five more than in 1917 the year
the U.S. enter the war. This increase in banking institutions demonstrated the “large growth in
commerce and business.”395 Governor Arthur Yager finished his report stating that it was “a real
pleasure” to inform that fiscal year 1919 “has been one of great progress and prosperity for Porto
Rico.”396
The prosperity of the nation should have benefitted railroad companies and their workers.
The Department of Labor in a report about the major industries in Puerto Rico found a thriving
atmosphere at the American Railroad Company:
The American Railroad Co. employs about 1,200 workers of various classes. The
general manager of the road stated that he experiences no difficulty in securing
labor and has no trouble with his employees. Some of the records of the road
examined at San Juan prove that about 50 per cent of the machinists, blacksmiths,
and other operatives have been with the company 14 to 16 years. Most of the
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skilled workers were trained by the company, in view of the fact that there are no
other large places where workmen could acquire the skill requisite on the road.
Boys taken in as apprentices are paid 10 cents an hour to start with. Wages on the
whole are better than in most of the other industries of the island, and the men
appeared to be better fed, clad, and housed. 397 (Emphasis added)
Although this report clearly portrayed satisfied laborers, those workers affiliated with the
Federación Libre de Trabajadores (FLT) surely had different sentiments, because the lodges of
machinists and mechanics declared a strike on December 3, 1919. The reason for the shutdown
was a request for a wage increase. The leaders of the strike were Enrique Albizu, Monserrate
Gonzalez, Clemente Claudio, Domingo Estepa, Juan B. Torres, Pablo Cintrón, Felipo Robles and
Rafael Blanchs.398 In a press statement, the manager of the ARRC, Monsieur Villard, declared that
he could not understand the root of workers’ unrest because the company granted an 18 percent
salary increase on December 1918.399 The leaders of the strike designated Santiago Iglesias Pantín
to be the mediator between the lodge and the railroad company. Iglesias Pantín was one of the
founders of the FLT and the Socialist Party as the political arm of the union and had been elected
to the Puerto Rican Senate.400 Some workers questioned Iglesias Pantín’s loyalties as a member of
the Senate. Villard also rejected the intervention of Iglesias Pantín because he was a governmental
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official and the government should not intervene in the negotiations with a private company.401
During the bargaining talks, the trains halted operations and the owner of sugar mills were
preoccupied because harvest time was close since the cane harvest began in January and ended in
June. To pressure the workers, the District Attorney filed a restraining order against 42 laborers of
the ARRC as well as Santiago Iglesias Pantín as the leader of the FLT. On December 12, Federal
District Judge Hamilton issued an injunction to halt the strike, because it was in violation of the
Food Control Act:
to limit facilities for transporting, producing, harvesting, and manufacturing sugar in Porto
Rico and to restrict distribution of sugar and other foodstuff and to prevent, limit, and
lessen the manufacture of sugar, well knowing that the said conspiracy would enhance the
price thereof and that sugar is a necessary product both in this island and in the United
States.402
In the Federal Court, Henry G. Molina, Iglesias’ lawyer alleged that the objective of the
workers was not to disturb food transportation particularly the transportation of sugar. The goal of
the strike was purely to pressure the railroad company to negotiate a wage increase. Mr. Molina
expressed the desire of the union to negotiate in good faith with the administration of the company
but representing the ARRC Mr. Villard denied any possible wage increase in view of the
precarious economic situation of the company.403 After days without railroad service the
government achieved a settlement between the workers and the ARRC, in which the company
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granted a 25 percent wage increase and a reduction to eight hours of labor per day. On December
25th the strike was over and the railroad resumed operations.
Governor Yager claimed that “the widespread increase in wages enabled the laboring
classes generally to share in the prosperity.”404 However, railroad workers had another perspective
as demonstrated in their activism of demanding higher wages. Historian James Dietz claimed that
from 1913 to 1932 “wages were nearly insensitive to changes in profits or prices.”405 Dietz
provided three factors to explain this phenomenon: “a surplus of labor in rural areas; a near
absence of effective labor organizing; and the insignificance of the local market.” In 1920 the
population increased 16.3 percent from 1910 in a decade reaching 1,299,809 inhabitants. The
demographic density per square mile was 378.4 inhabitants, more than ten times as great as the
average for the United States.406 The “extraordinary prosperity and peaceful progress” celebrated
by Governor Yager in his annual report would be enjoyed by some people in Puerto Rico but was
not appreciated by railroad workers and many more.407
In the 1920 convention of the International Association of Machinists, Louis I. Obergh,
translator and delegate from the lodges in Puerto Rico declared:
How outrageous it is in the progressive days of 1920 to pay to the head of a family
the miserable sum of $2.50 or $3.00 per day. They work 10 and 12 hours a day.
With that scale of wages, can it be possible that one man can feed his wife and his
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children and give them a regular education? No. It is quite impossible… If we are
helping Europe to stand on its feet, if we are helping financially the poor children
of Armenia and saving them from starvation, why can we not help our own
American citizens who are facing starvation in our very doors?
We must inform the American Congress that machinists of Porto Rico and their
children are in a very deplorable condition.408
In Obergh’s words, railroad workers and their families lived in a hopeless situation on the
island. Poverty, not prosperity, was a more accurate description of their reality. Obergh questioned
why the United States provided economic support to Armenian Christian victims of a genocide in
Turkey, and overlooked the victims of poverty residing in Puerto Rico. Workers on the island
desperately needed economic support from the U.S. government. However, the U.S. Congress
would not give economic relief to the island as long as the governor depicted Puerto Rico’s
economy as prosperous.
Statistically the government validated that the economic situation indeed had improved
since 1919 because of increased prices for commercial crops on international markets. Humberto
García Muñíz claimed that the 1919-20 sugar crop season showed a 80,000 tons increase over the
previous years, even when the mosaic disease affected the output of several centrales, among them
the Guanica Central.409 The government collected more revenue but the economic situation did not
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necessarily improve for the general population.
After the war the main economic problem, in the eyes of the government, continued to be
an insufficient production of foodstuff in Puerto Rico. High prices promoted the harvest of export
commercial crops and limited the desire for crop diversification. The insular Department of
Agriculture and Labor started a program to organize farmers in leagues to receive education about
scientific methods of farming and to start up cooperatives. Engineer Ramón Gandía Córdoba,
Deputy Commissioner of the insular Department of Agriculture and Labor, considered the leagues
a great step forward in the progress of the island and its economic independence.410
The first leagues organized farmers in rural areas like Adjuntas, Coamo, Jayuya, and
Utuado, and after a few months 37 leagues reported more than 4,000 members.411 Governor Arthur
Yager reported in 1920 that “a large number of leagues have already been organized, and the Porto
Rican farmers seem to get the idea very quickly.”412 The Department of Agriculture and Labor
pursued the diversification of agricultural crops for the consumption of the Puerto Ricans to reduce
food imports. The goal pursued by the Department of Agriculture was the empowerment of small
farmers through Agricultural Leagues for the formation of strong internal markets. Food scarcity
during the war verified the dependency of the island on food imports. After twenty years
facilitating the production of four export products (cane, tobacco, coffee, and fruits like oranges
and pineapples) the government changed its focus.
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Ramon Gandía Córdoba identified some obstacles for the transformation of the farmer into
producers for the markets. Gandía Córdoba identified as the main problem the access to land.
Historians Cesar J. Ayala and Laird W. Bergad demonstrated that in the first decade of the
twentieth century small farmers acquired land titles and participated from the sugar and tobacco
business, which contradicts the traditional theory of land concentration. U.S. owned sugar and
tobacco trusts established in Puerto Rico but the supply of sugar and tobacco came mostly from
smallholdings owned by Puerto Rican farmers.413 However, the Commissioner of Agriculture had
a different assessment. Gandía Córdoba analyzed the 1920 census and claimed that 17,000 land
owners lost their farms in a decade. Perhaps these farms were acquired by big corporations, even
though in 1900 the Organic Act prohibited individuals or corporations to owned more than 500
acres. The enforcement of the 500 acres prohibition would be one way to ensure that land seizures
ended up in the hands of small farmers. Other problems exposed by Gandía Córdoba were high
property taxes and uneven land valuations. The appraisals for cane growing lands were in average
$172 per acre; in contrast, the appraisals for coffee growing lands were $93 per acre. A clear
difference between cane and coffee land values was their accessibility because cane growing was
possible in lowlands near towns and roads they were valued more than coffee, which was planted
in the highlands distant from towns and with scarce roads. With this in mind the next obvious
obstacle to discuss was the transportation problem. Gandía Córdoba proposed the construction of
more local roads to access farms and a reduction in railroad shipping costs. Railroads had different
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shipping rates but if railroads charged for freight cars a flat rate the small farmer would benefit.
The last obstacle was the lack of local markets to sell locally produced goods.414
An important step to overcome these impediments was the submission of a bill in the
insular legislature to produce the legal platform to launch the diversification of agricultural
production. On March 23, 1921 Senator Francisco M. Zeno from Cidra presented the bill. Ramón
Gandía Córdoba as the Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Agriculture and Labor called
for a meeting on May 5, 1922 with the Puerto Rico Chamber of Commerce to request their support
for the bill. The meeting had representatives of the Federation of Agricultural Leagues, the
Treasurer of Puerto Rico, and the Secretary of the Interior. Among the topics in the agenda were
the scarce access to credit for the small farmer, lack of efficient road infrastructure, high railroad
rates, a study about second-class railroads, the need for local roads, lack of organization in the
town markets, and lack of data and statistics.415 However, the meeting only addressed the
inaccessibility of loans for farmers and the shortage of local markets.
The bill was not approved and ultimately the push for the formation of cooperatives was
lost. Nevertheless, Ramón Gandía Córdoba’s assessment showed the need for more railroads and
roads in areas of food production and the need for lower freight rates in areas with access to
railway stations. Indeed, after the war resurrected the plan to finish the beltway railroad and freight
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rates were under revision although these initiatives were encouraged by the production of sugar not
food.
Revival of the beltway railroad
In 1918 the government received a petition from the ARRC for a permit to finish the
beltway railroad. The island had 547.5 kilometers of railroad tracks for public service, and 34.3
kilometers of street-railways tracks.416 The ARRC operated 276 kilometers with 50 stops from San
Juan to Ponce. It was the biggest company on the island, but wanted an even larger presence with
more stations (Map 4.1). The corporation sought to extend the route from Ponce to the east with a
final stop in Carolina. To achieve this, the ARRC had to purchase the public service railways
operated by sugar corporations in the east and invest in the connection of the three railroad routes.
This idea was attractive to the ARRC which would monopolize the railroad offerings in the coastal
area. This project would be beneficial to the government because it would only have to deal with
one corporation. However, for sugar companies the monopoly of one railroad company could be
problematic because the ARRC would control the prices for sugar freight. The ARRC in 1919
already almost had monopolistic control of the railroads with an operation of 359 kilometers,
nearly twice the distance owned by the other seven public-service railroads together, which merely
controlled 198.5 kilometers. Railroads in the eastern area did not want to surrender their franchises,
because these companies also wanted to expand their businesses. For example, the Yabucoa Sugar
Company submitted a petition for a franchise to develop rail lines from Yabucoa to the port in
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Map 4.1. Western segment of the ARRC, 1919.
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Guayanés.417 The sugar centrales had their interests in the railway business and opposed
monopolizing the industry. However, “the public-service commission with many public hearings
and much public discussion” granted the franchise to the ARRC on April 20, 1920.418
In the railway industry the ARRC was colossal, but the company had some issues to
resolve; one of them was the limited schedule of one train departing in the morning and one in the
afternoon from each end of the line. This schedule could have been comprehensible at the
beginning of the century, but not in the 1920s (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1. Timetable of the ARRC

Station
San Juan
Miramar
Talleres
Santurce
Martín Peña
San Patricio
Bayamón
Palo Seco
Ingenio
Toa Baja
Dorado
San Vicente
Vega Baja
Algarrobo
Campo Alegre
Manatí
Barceloneta
Cummings
Santana
Cambalache
Arecibo City

417
418

1
7:20 am
7:25 am
7:31 am
7:34 am
7:41 am
7:46 am
8:01 am
8:09 am
8:17 am
8:24 am
8:28 am
8:46 am
8:52 am
8:58 am
9:07 am
9:15 am
9:27 am
9:41 am
9:47 am
9:56 am
10:17 am

SAN JUAN-PONCE
3
Station
8:45 pm
Ponce
8:50 pm
Tallaboa
--Guayanilla
9:02 pm
Lluveras
9:10 pm
Yauco
9:15 pm
Santa Rita
9:31 pm
Limón
9:40 pm
La Plata
9:49 pm
Lajas Arriba
9:55 pm
Lajas Estación
10:00 pm Lajas City
10:18 pm San Germán
10:26 pm Filial Amor
10:32 pm Río Rosario
10:42 pm Hormigueros
10:50 pm Mayagüez City
11:04 pm Mayagüez Playa
11:18 pm Añasco
11:25 pm Tres Hermanos
11:46 pm Córcega
12:01 pm Rincón

2
7:20 am
7:44 am
7:58 am
8:07 am
8:21 am
8:31 am
8:43 am
8:50 am
8:57 am
9:08 am
9:13 am
9:30 am
9:43 am
9:46 am
9:54 am
10:15 am
10:28 am
10:45 am
10:54 am
11:07 am
11:13 am
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4
9:00 pm
9:24 pm
9:38 pm
--10:02 pm
10:12 pm
10:23 pm
10:32 pm
10:39 pm
10:50 pm
10:56 pm
11:13 pm
11:24 pm
11:27 pm
11:35 pm
11:57 pm
12:17 am
12:36 am
12:45 am
12:58 am
1:04 am

Hatillo
Camuy
Quebradillas
Isabela
Aguadilla City
Coloso
Aguada
Santoni
Rincón
Córcega
Tres Hermanos
Añasco
Mayagüez Playa
Mayagüez City
Hormigueros
Río Rosario
Filial Amor
San Germán
Lajas City
Lajas Estación
Lajas Arriba
La Plata
Limón
Santa Rita
Yauco
Lluveras
Guayanilla
Tallaboa
Ponce

10:40 am
10:44 am
11:04 am
11:29 am
12:30 pm
12:41 pm
12:48 pm
--1:09 pm
1:14 pm
1:25 pm
1:35 pm
2:00 pm
2:06 pm
2:28 pm
2:30 pm
2:35 pm
2:45 pm
3:00 pm
3:07 pm
3:15 pm
3:22 pm
3:31 pm
3:44 pm
3:54 pm
4:06 pm
4:15 pm
4:29 pm
4:50 pm

12:26 pm
12:31 pm
12:51 pm
1:18 am
2:06 am
2:17 am
2:24 am
2:35 am
2:45 am
2:50 am
3:02 am
3:12 am
3:44 am
3:53 am
4:10 am
4:17 am
4:22 am
4:38 am
4:48 am
4:55 am
5:04 am
5:11 am
5:20 am
5:38 am
5:54 am
--6:04 am
6:18 am
6:41 am

Santoni
Aguada
Coloso
Aguadilla City
Isabela
Quebradillas
Camuy
Hatillo
Arecibo City
Cambalache
Santana
Cummings
Barceloneta
Manatí
Campo Alegre
Algarrobo
Vega Baja
San Vicente
Dorado
Toa Baja
Ingenio
Palo Seco
Bayamón
San Patricio
Martín Peña
Santurce
Talleres
Miramar
San Juan

--11:34 am
11:42 am
12:18 pm
12:53 pm
1:19 pm
1:40 pm
1:44 pm
2:20 pm
2:29 pm
2:38 pm
2:44 pm
2:59 pm
3:12 pm
3:18 pm
3:26 pm
3:35 pm
3:41 pm
3:59 pm
4:03 pm
4:08 pm
4:16 pm
4:27 pm
4:40 pm
4:48 pm
4:54 pm
4:58 pm
5:03 pm
5:08 pm

1:16 am
1:26 am
1:34 am
2:00 am
2:34 am
3:01 am
3:22 am
3:27 am
4:06 am
4:16 am
4:25 am
4:32 am
4:48 am
5:03 am
5:09 am
5:18 am
5:27 am
5:33 am
5:51 am
5:56 am
6:02 am
6:10 am
6:21 am
6:35 am
6:43 am
6:49 am
6:53 am
6:59 am
7:08 am

SOURCE. - “American Railroad Company of Porto Rico,” El Mundo, 19 December 1919, 4.

In 1919 a claim that had been submitted by two railroad companies for a rate increase was
resolved by the Public Service Commission. The ARRC demanded an increase of “20 percent in
freight rates for sugar cane and its product.” 419 It was approved for a period of six months,
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concurrent with the months of the sugar harvest. The PRRC demanded a 25 percent increase “over
the existing rates on sugar cane and its products, coal, lumber, stone, sand and gravel including
joint through rates” for the route from Río Piedras to Caguas420 The Public Service Commission
approved the petition but dismissed an application to reduce the train service for passengers from
San Juan to Caguas, and a 100 percent increase in passenger rates for the “trolley” in the San JuanRio Piedras route. These petitions from the two main railroad companies indicated that after the
war these companies encountered economic difficulties. The major challenge facing the railways
was to maintain profitability.
Compañía Ferroviaria de Circunvalación
A new company, the Compañía Ferroviaria de Circunvalación (CFC) was incorporated on
July 9, 1921. The amount of its capital stock was worth $10 million dollars and the members of the
board of directors were Don Manuel González, president, Rafael Fabián, Luis Rubert, Dionisio
Trigo, Antonio M. Somoza, and Francis H. Dexter.421 All the members of the board lived in Puerto
Rico and some of them related to the sugar industry, as was the case of Manuel González owner of
sugar estates and dairy farms in Salinas, Rafael Fabián owner of an estate in Yabucoa, and Luis
Rubert owner of a estate in San Patricio, Río Piedras.
The CFC included local investors as well as European investors from the Companía de los
Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico, and ARRC’s investors from the United States. The CFC was a
holding company, which planned to merge the Companía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico, and
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the ARRC. For this process, the CFC had to pay three mortgages owed in France and Belgium by
the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico. For the people, the press, and even in official
documents the railroad continued to be the “American Railroad Company,” because until the CFC
acquired all the shares, the ARRC would continue operating the railroad. From this point on,
references to the CFC or ARRC would be one and the same.
The first serious issue faced by the CFC originated in the economic contraction of 1921.
Governor Emmet Montgomery Reily informed Warren G. Harding, President of the United States,
that in 1921 the total value of exports decreased by $29,441,705 because the prices for all
agricultural products dropped. Governor Reily stated: “The general financial crisis which occurred
last year in the United States, as well as in all parts of the world, was particular acute in Porto Rico.
Its principal agricultural product –sugar– suddenly dropped in price from 23 cents to about 4 cents
per pound and has fluctuated between 4 and 5 cents ever since.”422 Historian Humberto García
Muñiz wrote about this crisis: “in January 1921, sugar producers in Puerto Rico were saying that a
basis of 5 cents c.i.f. would severely injure the industry and that considerable acreage in cane
would disappear, mainly those areas recently been brought to cane culture. Sugar prices reached
the lowest point on 29 December 1921 when the cost in New York was 1.81 cents c.i.f.”423 In
consequence, the Central Coloso in Aguada, the Central Puerto Real in Vieques, and the Central
Juanita in Bayamón struggled to avoid bankruptcy.424 The finances of those sugar factories

422

Report of the Governor of Porto Rico, 1921, 7.
Humberto García Muñíz, Sugar and Power in the Caribbean, 384-385.
424
“Ecos de la crisis económica,” El águila de Puerto Rico, 11 July 1921, 1; “De la crisis económica,” El águila de
Puerto Rico, 19 July 1921, 1.
423

214

required court-appointed receivers to avoid seizure from creditors. The slow down of sugar
production also resulted in workers layoff. In response the Bureau of Labor facilitated the
migration of unemployed workers to plantations in Hawaii, Cuba, and New York.425
The decline in sugar prices directly affected the railroad revenues on the island. The CFC
decided to reduce workers salaries almost 50 percent. On November of 1921, machinists from the
lodges of Ponce, Arecibo, San Juan, and Mayagüez declared a strike “and the trains were running
intermittently” in reaction to the pay cut.426 The strike was unsuccessful, because employees could
not deal with the economic consequences of not receiving salary and abandoned the strike. The
International Association of Machinists with headquarters in Washington D.C., aided the lodges in
Puerto Rico, even when they were against the “precipitated” decision of declaring a strike without
exhausting alternatives at the bargaining table.427
The Porto Rico Railways Company also correlated their financial problems with the
economic situation on the island: “As in other countries, the year 1921 in Porto Rico was a year of
considerable financial depression. This was aggravated by the heavy fall in the price of sugar and
the demoralization of the tobacco business.” The report pointed to the importance of sugar as “the
chief industry of the Island” while tobacco was “one of the other main industries.”428 In 1922
production grew but prices continued falling (Table 4.2). Sugar exports in 1921 were 409,407 short
tons valued at $72,440,924 but in 1922 sugar exported increase its tons to 469,889 and its value
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decreased to $40,820,333.429 The export of tobacco leaf and scrap exhibited an analogous situation
with 14,667,932 pounds exported at a value of $13,568,249 in 1921, but after a significant increase
of 22,452,588 pounds in 1922 the value was merely $9,002,767.430 On March 1922, the sugar
crisis pushed the ARRC to file a petition with the Public Service Commission to increase rates for
cane transportation. The petition “was attacked by the Sugar Growers Association.”431
Table 4.2. Sugar exports, 1919-29.
FISCAL YEAR
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929

SHORT TONS
351,90
419,388
409,407
469,889
355,423
372,041
571,559
578,811
574,869
605,620
471,244

VALUE
$48,132,419
98,923,750
72,440,924
40,820,333
46,207,276
47,838,687
53,261,895
48,223,258
54,756,984
54,579,020
35,222,162

AVERAGE PRICE PER TON
$136.77
235.88
176.94
86.86
130.01
128.58
93.20
83.30
95.25
90.12
74.74

SOURCE. - Annual Report of the Governor of Porto Rico, 1929, 22.

In 1922 the prices started a recovery but never recuperate from the 1921 collapse. In 1925
once again the prices of sugar fell, this time to 4.6 cents per pound, a drop from 6.4 cents in 1924
and 6.5 in 1923, but not as low as it was in 1922 when prices fell to 4.3 cents per pound.432
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Tobacco leaf and scrap prices also fell in 1925. Coffee exports were the exception with increasing
values for three consecutive years (1923-25) but in 1926 the trend ended and prices started to
drop.433 The historiography of the economic situation after the Great War is almost non existent as
historians focused on the political clashes between the political parties Coalición and Alianza.
However, the official data showed that agricultural products had problems maintaining constant
revenues. Tobacco, coffee and fruits values fluctuated in the 1920s and sugar values recover
slowly. The low prices for sugar was the main concern of the government because more than half
of the state total revenues (a median of 55 percent) came from this product.
Figure 4.1. Value of Exports, 1921-1928.
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SOURCE. - Annual Report of the Governor of Porto Rico, 1929, 24, 27.

Railways also suffered from these fluctuations since sugar cane generated the main income
for the public service railroads. In the 1923 annual report of the Compañía Ferroviaria de
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Circunvalación the company reported higher incomes from freight than from passenger.
Competition with trucks for freight transportation was less intense than competition with públicos
(taxis) and buses. The company requested that the Public Service Commission establish parameters
to reach fair competition, but for the interim the railroad company had a plan: “adquirir
automotores de vapor…para competir con los automóviles públicos de carretera.”434 That is to say,
the railroad company aquired two steam powered passenger cars for the San Juan-Arecibo route
and planned to purchase three more for the southern route to increase the offerings for passenger
service. Initially it appeared as a solution to taxi competition but only time would decide who the
winner would be in the competition for passengers.
In 1924 the project to conclude the beltway railroad was resurrected. The railroad boom of
the first fifteen years of civil government provided new lines but the companies were not required
to follow the plan that had been developed in the nineteenth century. Interestingly enough, the U.S.
government did not dismiss the Spanish plan, and recognized the value of a beltway railroad.
However, no measure was adopted to drive railway companies towards resuming the conclusion of
the unfinished beltway. After the war the CFC returned to the plans to build the beltway railroad.
In 1921, the insular legislature approved Act no. 89 to sell three million dollars in bonds for the
acquisition of the land needed to complete the eastern section of the route. Another bill authorized
the Commissioner of the Interior to look into the construction of four railroad sections: (1) from
Carolina to Mameyes in Río Grande, (2) from Naguabo to Humacao, (3) from Humacao to San

Translation: “to purchase steam powered passenger cars suitable for your line to compete with taxis.”
Compañía Ferrovaria de Circunvalación de Puerto Rico, Informe del Presidente don Genaro Cautiño a la Junta
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Lorenzo, and (4) from Humacao to Guayama via Yabucoa, Maunabo, and Patillas.435 Railroad
companies made inquiries about the acquisition of franchises, but the projects never materialized.
On November 1924 the White Star Bus Line Incorporated a new bus company and was
registered with a capital stock of $500,000 distributed in 5,000 shares of $100 each. The members
of the board of directors were Adolfo Valdés Ordoñez, Luis C. Cuyar, Salvador García, and Rafael
Arcelay.436 The White Star Bus Line Inc. became a new competitor for the street tramways since
both companies provided transportation service in San Juan. In contrast, there was a decline in
transportation options after the Mayaguez Tramway Company, a domestic railroad company,
closed operations on January 1927.437 In both cases, a new bus company in San Juan and the
termination of a tramway service in Mayagüez, indicated that the economic viability of electricurban-tramways was in danger. To maintain competitiveness, electric-urban-tramways had to
invest in the modernization and maintenance of their facilities. In San Juan, the PRRC purchased
“six modern type passenger cars,” to improve the facilities and to attract passengers in view of the
increasing competition from the carros públicos and the White Star Bus Line.438 This capital
investment was necessary if the company wanted to survive in a new competitive environment.
The signs of railroad displacement by trucks also appeared in the internal railroad systems
used in the sugar industry. As previously described, the island had public service railroads (all
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privately owned) subjected to state regulation, and sugar mills owned railroads for the exclusive
transportation of cane from neighboring estates to the mill. These sugar plantation cargo railroads
were taxed but not regulated by the state. Railroads were efficient for the transportation of cane but
expensive due to taxes, repairs, fuel, and maintenance. Trucks would be less expensive, more
versatile, and tax free. For example, Hacienda Monserrate in the town of Manatí used railroads and
trucks to transport cane from estates to the mill. For the harvest of 1923 the cost of transporting
cane in rails was $17,935.25; in addition to $16,373.53 for maintenance of the tracks. In contrast,
the cane transported in trucks only cost $10,145.45.439 Sugar corporations estimated transportation
costs and would only continue relying on railroads if it was economically beneficial. In 1923
Hacienda Monserrate manufactured 6,597.5 tons of sugar 1,245.25 tons less than the previous
year’s harvest. The situation was similar on the entire island with a drop in the national sugar
production in 1923 to 373,477 tons from 396,100 tons the previous year, a difference of 5.71
percent.440 Within this framework the railroads had to demonstrate efficiency in transportation
costs and if not the corporation could use trucks to replace the iron roads. The Hacienda
Monserrate was an example of the issues confronted by most sugar mills and not an exception.
Risks
When choosing a mode of transportation, passengers had to consider value, time, and
safety. Commuting by railroads or tramways was not always secure and accidents occurred. The
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Public Service Commission was the agency that enforced safety procedures to reduce the risks of
accidents. However, railroad companies did not demonstrate a serious commitment to the security
of passengers, workers, or bystanders, nor did the Public Service Commission demonstrate a
rigorous enforcement of the regulations. As a result, newspapers would often publish articles about
railroad accidents, as was the case on September 5, 1921 when the press reported a derailment in
the area of Guajataca in Quebradillas that caused the death of two workers and the injury of several
passengers.441 In his annual report, Governor E. Mont. Reily informed that “two of the most
serious railroad accidents recorded since the organization of the [Public Service] Commission
occurred, both upon the lines of the American Railroad Co.”442 In 1928 out of a total of 503,539
customers transported the railroad companies reported 153 accidents suffered by passengers. No
passengers perished inside the wagons, although eighteen bystanders did “due to trespassing on the
companies’ right of way.”443 The individuals implicated in railway accidents were not statistically
significant, although injuries could potentially be life-changing for any victim.
The courts became the place to litigate the degree of responsibility of railroad companies in
accidents. Clearly, the legal representation of railroad companies fought vigorously to avoid any
reparation or responsibilities. For example, when in 1928 a truck collided in Guayanilla with a
passenger wagon operated by the ARRC. Angel Mattei, the owner of the truck, accused the
company of “(1) Failure to blow the whistle or ring the bell upon approaching the crossing as
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required by statute; (2) excessive speed of the train; (3) failure to provide chains or gate at the
crossing; and (4) failure to keep the crossing in a safe and proper condition for traffic.”444 Mattei
sued the railroad company demanding compensation of $3,595. The verdict favored Mattei,
although he did not receive the entire restitution he demanded.
Railroad companies had to improve safety or passengers would select another means of
transportation. The New York Times published a report titled “Porto Rico from a Guagua,” in
which the columnist mentioned that bus accidents did occurr but none were “serious”:
The writer saw two of them in head-on collision one day. As usual, no one was
hurt. Another guagua broke the rail of a small bridge and hung over the water, its
rear wheels caught on the foundation, but the passengers climbed out safely.445
In this report the author evidently wanted to promote the use of buses and downplayed the
risk associated with bus transportation. Railroad companies had to offer a reliable service and
avoid accidents in order to preserve their passenger’ service.
On May 1927 the insular legislature approved a joint resolution to exempt the Compañía de
los Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico from the payment of insular, municipal, and local taxes. For its
part the Compañía de los Ferrocarriles had to transport free of charge any officer wearing a police
or army uniform, prisoners and insane patients under the supervision of the state, and cattle or
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other goods related to the promotion of industry.446 In other words, if the company needed support
from the state it had to provide benefits for the public interest. The approval of the tax exemptions
revealed that the government appreciated the impact railroads had on the economic infrastructure
of the island. Hurricane San Felipe struck the island on September 13, 1928 at 150 miles per hour.
The island suffered heavy rains for 48 hours with internse precipitation in the mountainous coffee
districts, which recorded 29.6 inches. The staff of the insular experimental station estimated coffee
losses in about 80 to 90 percent, which amounted to $9,465,225. The loss in sugar was estimated at
32.6 percent of the crop, which was a loss of $17,337,180. Tobacco farmers did not lose the leaves
but did lose all the seed beds that amounted $11,979,114. Finally, in the citrus-fruit industry the
loss of trees was estimated in 32.8 percent equivalent to $1,650,829. The final estimates of losses
for all the agricultural crops cultivated in the island amounted to $54,462,945 and the damages to
farm-related structures amounted to $7,969,131.447 The immediate relief for farmers came from the
American Red Cross, then from a Huricane Relief Commission, and the U.S. Congress approved
an act to allow “the Federal Land Bank of Baltimore to extend the limit on farm loans to
$25,000.”448
The hurricane also caused significant damage to the railway infrastructure. The CFC closed
operations for five days and then resumed partial operations until September 24 when the company
reestablished complete service. For security reasons, the night train, which had sleeping carts, did
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not resume its operations from San Juan to Ponce until October 10. The CFC estimated that the
damages amounted to $200,000. The “trolley” in San Juan, operated by the PRRC, resumed partial
operations on September 22 but it took until November 9th to restore full service. The PRRC
estimated their losses to be $40,000. Other public service companies also suffered damages: the
Ponce and Guayama Railroad Company estimated its losses to be $38,000; the Northern Porto
Rico Railroad Company $12,000; and the Fajardo Railroad Company $17,000.449 Although the rail
infrastructure suffered substantial damages it was important in the reconstruction of the island after
the hurricane. The government acknowledged the contribution of Emilio S. Jiménez, manager of
the American Railroad Company for providing a prompt response in the aftermath of the hurricane.
The company “transported free of charge for the American Red Cross all the supplies and materials
to be utilized for the relief of hurricane sufferers, and also their Pier No. 5 was placed at the
disposal of this organization for the docking and discharging of steamers bringing materials and
supplies.”450 These initiatives gave the ARRC an image of a private corporation with a serious
commitment to the well-being of the country. Hurricane San Felipe not only impacted the railroad
industry, the hurricane exacerbated the economic weakness of the 1920s.
During the autumn of 1928 the Brookings Institution conducted a study about the
“problems” of Puerto Rico. In Porto Rico and its problems the economist Victor Clark concluded
that rapid population growth in Puerto Rico lead to “low wages, unemployment, and inadequate
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subsistence.”451 To solve the root of the “problem” it was necessary to efficiently use the island’s
resources for the diversification of the economy and especially the promotion of manufacture and
industry. The report included a chapter on Public Works, which stated that the island could rely on
its highways and roads for the improvement of the national economy because the country had
“more good roads in proportion to its size than any states except Connecticut, Rhode Island and
Vermont.”452 In view of the excellent road infrastructure there were no drastic recommendations
other than suggesting the creation of a plan for road maintenance and the construction of more
roads, not because this was necessary, “but in order to reduce unemployment.”453
The chapter on Public Works included a subtopic about the railroad situation with a succint
description of the area covered by railways. The report highlighted the competition between
railways and automobiles to corner the passenger market. In relation to freight service it noted the
importance of the sugar industry for freight revenues. The only recommendation was the
integration of refrigerated cars “when fruit and vegetable growing have extended to sections of the
island distant from capital.”454 The Brookings Report applauded the Department of the Interior for
the development of highways and roads, but showed less enthusiasm with the progress of railways
in the country.
In October 1929 Thedore Roosevelt Jr. arrived in Puerto Rico to occupy the seat of
governor and held this office when the New York Stock Market crashed, and the world capitalist
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system showed signs it would fall into a deep crisis. The economic crisis in the United States
inevitably impacted the island’s economy, however, Governor Roosevelt did not consider the
economic problems of the island as related to the U.S. crisis. At his arrival, before the crash,
Roosevel found the island in desperate fiscal and social conditions. The insular budget was
unbalance because revenues were insufficient to meet the obligations. In December 1929 the
government owed more than 6,500 vouchers and governmental employees received their salaries
after a loan of $200,000. Social problems also were challenging. People in Puerto Rico died in
alarming numbers from tuberculosis, malaria, and parasites, more than 60 percent of the population
able to work were unemployed or only seasonally employed, and “the average yearly income of
the working man or woman ranges between $150 and $200.”455 Agriculture was slowly recovering
from the hurricane of 1928 but the programs to promote the economy were difficult to implement
with the limited budget of the insular government. In his first annual report Governor Roosevelt
required economic support from the federal government for different areas, among them for health
improvement, agricultural incentives for the small farm holder, and increasing funding for
infrastructure.456
In 1929 the U.S. Congress at the suggestion of President Herbert Hoover allocated one
million dollars for road asphalt. These funds approved for asphalt roads directly benefited the
island finances because this type of road was cheaper to maintain than macadam roads. One
kilometer of macadam road had an approximately cost of $800 a year to maintain while a
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kilometer of asphalted road costed $300.457 Furthermore, the use of federal funding for road
construction allowed the local government to allocate more funds for health programs, education,
and agricultural and industrial development. The Brookings Report recommended that the
government had to invest in road building to generate jobs and had to promote food crops over
sugar to diversify the economy, and Governor Roosevelt followed the formula. The federal
government allocated the funds for road building, created jobs and benefited families that “would
therefore be starving.”458 The official policy for agriculture focused in the diversification of crops
with special attention to vegetable farming and the formation of farmer cooperatives.459 In his
second annual report Governor Roosevelt recognized that the economic situation continued to be
difficult but he offered an optimistic outlook by accentuating the favorable balance of trade with
$98,400,927 exports and $76,437,410 imports. The report celebrated the reduction of imports as an
unquestionable consequence of the policy to encourage foodstuff cultivation for local consumption
and applauded the increase in the volume of exports although the value fell behind the previous
year.460
On October 17, 1931 the largest local bank on the island, Banco Comercial de Puerto Rico,
went into receivership. After that five more banks went into receivership: the Banco Industrial de
Puerto Rico, the Banco de Yabucoa, the Rivas Commercial Bank, The Banco de Economías del
Pueblo, and Crédito y Ahorro Popular. On September 28, 1932 the Banco Territorial y Agricola,
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the largest local bank after the Banco Comercial de Puerto Rico closed its doors. The collapse of
local banks represented a serious impediment in the efforts to support the small farmer, which
suffered from a new setback in 1932 after Hurricane San Ciprián devastated the island. The
government estimated in 35 million dollars the material losses. The Commisioner of Agriculture
and Commerce estimated damages to crops in approximately 20 million dollars and banks lost
liquidity after depositors withdraw their money to pay for the reconstruction after the hurricane.
The banking situation forced the government “to make deposits in several local banks in order to
strenghten their cash position.”461
The governmental course of action in response to crop lossess by storms and lack of
financing was the persistent encouragement of farmer cooperatives. However, maintaining
production was a challenge when crop prices declined in the United States. Puerto Rican exports
dependended on the U.S. markets and the prices and the demand for sugar, tobacco and coffee in
the United States plunged. Governor James R. Beverly reported in 1932 that coffee prices dropped
to $14 a hundredweight, tobacco crop from 1931 remained in the warehouses without being sold,
and sugar prices went down to $2.58 per short ton, the lowest price ever paid since 1898.462 From
1930 to 1933 total net income decrease from 189 millions to 140 millions of dollars and per capita
income from $122 to $86, the lowest in a decade.463
The crisis impacted every sector of the economy including transportation. Railway
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companies made different adjustments to survive the crisis but it was difficult to maintain
profitable operations. In the case of the electric tramway between Santurce and Río Piedras the
company had to temporarily cease operations and the decision received the endorsement of the
Public Service Commission.464
In response to the economic crisis the CFC decreed a dramatic reduction in passenger fares
(Table 4.3):
Table 4.3. Passenger Rates of the CFC, 1933.
ARRIVAL STATION
Vega Baja
Manatí
Arecibo
Aguadilla
Mayagüez
San Germán
Yauco
Ponce
Guayama

FIRST CLASS
$0.35
0.40
0.50
1.00
1.25
1.35
1.75
1.75
2.15

SECOND CLASS
$0.20
0.25
0.30
0.55
0.75
0.85
0.85
0.85
1.10

NOTE. - Rates based on a departure from San Juan or Martín Peña Station
SOURCE. - El Mundo, 7 January 1933, 1.

Fare reductions had a positive impact due to the accessibility of the railroad to more people
with limited economic resources. In 1932 the CFC reported transporting 203,000 passengers and
by 1941 this figure increased to 689,000; “an increase of 239%.”465 However, more passengers did
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not equate more revenue for the company because of the extremely low fares. The CFC gambled
on reducing the fare during increasing operational costs, to rise in the volume of commuters, and
thus, obtain long-term gains. The company did not immediately produce significant revenues;
nevertheless the people used the railroad because it was a cost-effective alternative. The company
preserved a “railway culture” on the island thanks to its adaptability to the economic challenges of
the time. The following table shows how the company maintained consistent sales after 1932, but
the revenues were lower than in the nineteenth-twenties (Table 4.4).
Table 4.4. Passengers carried and average revenue for the CFC, 1921-1941.
TOTAL
Year

Passenger
Revenue

1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941

$459,617.00
418,874.00
404,233.00
402,293.00
311,169.00
243,935.00
302,601.00
276,297.00
245,265.00
193,655.00
150,824.00
110,759.00
132,565.00
144,904.00
145,389.00
147,580.00
143,748.00
158,744.00
150,623.00
158,912.00
208,547.00

AVERAGE REVENUE
Passengers
Carried
(in thousands)
437
384
390
367
285
220
531
503
439
767
281
203
423
486
494
482
468
574
555
575
689

Per Passenger

Per passenger
kilometer

Percent of
1932

$1.0462
1.0844
1.0302
1.0904
1.0849
1.0992
0.5674
0.5481
0.5566
0.5376
0.5362
0.5358
0.3110
0.2977
0.2944
0.3063
0.3073
0.2763
0.2713
0.2765
0.3026

$0.0208
0.0210
0.0206
0.0207
0.0202
0.0192
0.0103
0.0102
0.0102
0.0101
0.0097
0.0096
0.0055
0.0053
0.0052
0.0051
0.0050
0.0050
0.0049
0.0049
0.0052

216.66
218.75
214.58
215.62
210.41
200.00
107.29
106.25
106.25
105.20
101.04
100.00
57.29
55.21
54.17
53.12
52.08
52.08
51.04
51.04
54.17
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SOURCE. - The American Railroad and its place in the transportation system of Puerto Rico,
1944, 38.

The fluctuation in the number of passengers using the train previous to 1932 stabilized;
although revenues fell because of the lower fares when operational costs did not. The CFC also
made important changes in freight rates. The reduction was dramatic (Table 4.5):
Table 4.5. Comparison of Freight Rates for sugar cane, CFC 1923-1933.
KILOMETERS
10
30
50
80
100
150
200
260
300

1923
$1.01
1.895
2.305
2.88
3.31
4.32
4.81
5.33
5.76

1933
$0.60
1.20
1.44
1.8
1.92
2.00
2.20
2.50
2.60

NOTE. - Per ton of 2,000 lbs. Minimum carload 15 tons.
SOURCE. - The American Railroad and its place in the transportation system of Puerto Rico,
1944, 36.

The New Deal
Franklin D. Roosevelt in his campaign for the presidency stated: “I pledge you, I pledge
myself, to a new deal for the American people,” however, the people in Puerto Rico were unsure if
President Roosevelt would extend his “deal” to the island.466 Francisco Pons, Commissioner of the
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1938), 647.
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Interior, wrote to Santiago Iglesias Pantín, Resident Commissioner in Washington, to lobby in the
U.S. Congress for the participation of Puerto Rico in the distribution of funds for new roads. In his
letter, Pons remarked that only automobiles made in the United States ran on Puerto Rican roads:
“que por nuestras carreteras sólo corren automóviles fabricados en los Estados Unidos.”467
Allocation of funds for new roads would help the insular economy with jobs and needed roads.
President Franklin Roosevelt extended the New Deal Program to the island providing
federal funding from 1933 to 1939. The New Deal agency on the island was the Puerto Rico
Emergency Relief Administration (P.R.E.R.A.). The PRERA allocated its road-building budget
primarily for rural areas.468 The plans for Puerto Rico consisted of “rural rehabilitation” through
the establishment of cooperatives, subsistence farms, electrification, soil conservation programs,
community centers, new roads, among other programs.469 Tobacco and coffee farms received
beneficial incentives; however, the sugar sector was not included for any recovery funds. Railways
received nothing from the PRERA.
The 1930s was a decade for the small farmer not the large plantation and it was the time for
small business initiatives. The government promoted internal trade through the establishment of
market facilities in the principal urban centers: San Juan, Ponce, and Mayagüez. Prices were still
unaffordable for the poor “due to monopolies, local combinations, and lack of transportation

Translation: “In our roads only ran automobiles manufactured in the United States”
“Sobre la extensión a Pto. Rico de la ayuda federal para carreteras,” El Mundo, 9 June 1933, 1, 14.
468
“La asignación de millón y medio de dólares para carreteras,” El Mundo, 29 September 1933, 1.
469
D. L. Kreeger, Acting General Counsel to Carlos Chardón, Acting Administrator PRRA, Memorandum, 22
January 1936, NARA, RG 323: Records of the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration, Box 3 Entry 38: Records
relating to construction projects directed by the engineering division, 1935-1953, File: Construction Porjects – Road
Construction (General).
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facilities.”470 The federal government built new roads in rural areas, but at the end of the program
in 1938 farmers in the highlands indicated the need for even more roads. An example is provided
by the many small farmers in Barrio Cacao, Orocovis. These farmers needed 6 kilometers of road
to connect with the nearest road. They claimed: “Por estos motivos de la falta de comunicación,
nuestra situación económica es sumamente difícil, pues nos es muy costoso el conducir nuestros
productos al mercado.”471 Roads in rural areas were the keys to access the island’s markets to
increase domestic food production.
The development of new roads and road maintenance had an immediate economic impact
because it fueled the construction industry and generated jobs, and in the long term it provided the
infrastructure to shorten the distance between producing areas and markets. The following table
illustrates the quantity of kilometers constructed and maintained during the New Deal:
Table 4.6. Roads Construction and Maintenance (in Kilometers).
FISCAL YEAR
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
TOTAL

INSULAR ROADS
14.60
3.00
32.25
4.40
3.50
15.69
18.01
91.45

470

MUNICIPAL ROADS
48.12
43.81
69.81
25.38
82.98
28.07
35.15
333.32

KMS. MAINTAINED
1,880.46
1,945.69
2,072.00
2,109.60
2,154.10
2,251.21
2,316.90
14,729.96

Ibid, 17.
Translation: “lack of communications caused our extremely difficult economic situation, because is very
expensive to transport our products to the market.”
Ángel Ortiz Rosario, President-Granjeros del Barrio Cacao, to Honorable Harold Ikes, Secretary of the United
States, Orocovis, Puerto Rico, 21 February 1939. NARA, RG 126, Box No. 866, File 9-8-69: Puerto Rico,
Highways, Federal Highway Act.
471
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SOURCE.- Annual Report of the Commissiones of the Interior for 1939-40.472
The data show the privilege given to the local municipal roads over the insular roads.
Historian Alan Brinkley argued that in the origin of the New Deal program there were “important
voices advocating a decentralization of economic power, “anti-monopolists” who envisioned a
frontal assault on “bigness” and concentration in the corporate world.”473 Since the arrival of U.S.
owned sugar and tobacco corporations to Puerto Rico local entrepreneurs, workers, and politicians,
blamed the government for facilitating absentee capitalists the exploitation of local resources, but
the New Deal program in Puerto Rico provided direct relief for the local farmer and rural
communities impacting the local economy and improving the popular perception of the
government.
The Department of Agriculture and Commerce divided agro-industries into three groups:
(1) Big industries (required a large amount of capital to produce export products); (2) Small
industries (required moderate capital to produce products for local consumption to substitute some
imports); and (3) Domestic industries (required the work of the family to produce food for their
own consumption or to bring to the local market). The Department of Agriculture and Commerce
decided to stimulate the second and third types of activities: “las del segundo y tercer grupo las que
con más facilidad y provecho podrían impulsarse en los momentos actuales.”474 If the official
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policy was the promotion of small and domestic agriculture the question was what type of
transportation would be ideal to stimulate these businesses. The answer was without a doubt: the
development of an internal road system.
In November 1935 the Department of the Interior sent a memorandum to Governor Blanton
Winship to inform him about the possible extension of the Federal Highway Act (H.R. 1392) to the
territories if the act was finally approved.475 The act was approved in 1921 but it was only in 1935
that Puerto Rico could partake in its benefits. It took until 1937 for the insular legislature which
“passed legislation enabling Puerto Rico to qualify for Federal Highway Aid for the first time in
the history of the Island.”476 Before the bill was approved the insular legislature prepared the
terrain with the approval on May 15, 1937 of the Gasoline Act no. 143, which created a special
fund from a tax imposed on gasoline sales. The local government matched dollar for dollar the
federal funds assigned to build new roads. More roads allowed the use of more automobiles and
trucks, which in turn would use more gasoline, which translated into increasing the income to the
special fund to be used in the construction of more new roads.
Within a few months of its approval, mayors and municipal legislatures sent letters to
Governor Blanton Winship requesting that the road construction projects move more rapidly. In
reality what was behind this campaign for building new roads was the need to create new jobs to

F. A. López Domínguez to the Comissioner of Agriculture and Commerce, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 13 march 1933,
AGPR, Fondo Oficina del Gobernador, Tarea 96-20, Caja 259.
475
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help alleviate unemployment.477 The Puerto Rican Reconstruction Administration (PRRA), which
was established in 1935 by presidential executive order, employed 25 percent of the labors on the
island, but to really reduce unemployment many more jobs were needed.478 After two years the
Economy Commission of the Legislature of Puerto Rico submitted a proposal to develop 53.9
kilometers of new roads at a cost of $716,750 from a surplus in the gasoline tax fund.479 Once
again, the municipalities demanded to be integrated into the plan for new roads to provide jobs to
the unemployed.480 In conclusion, the desire for new roads was not only a solution to the lack of
shipping alternatives, or a need to develop new internal markets, but also a palliative to the
problem of unemployment.
In a message to the legislature, Governor Blanton Winship proposed an increase to the
budget for road maintenance to compensate for a reduction in the federal budget assigned to road
construction. The reduction came after President Rossevelt decided in 1937 to reduce spending in
view of improving economic indices. However, the country was not ready for this federal
retrenchment. In response, Governor Winship recommended “to authorize the Commissioner of
the Interior to spend the $1,250,000 annually in the maintenance of roads and bridges.”481 In fact,
by 1939 the federal government had invested substantial sums of money for road construction, as
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reported to Mr. Miles H. Fairbank, administrator of the PRRA. Fairbank reported that road
construction and maintenance was possible with the funds from three sources: the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration (FERA)-Work relief built 170 miles, Rural Rehabilitation
(RRRA) built 90 miles, and the PRRA 30 miles for a total 290 miles built by federal agencies.482
The New Deal program also allocated funds to build and acquire hydroelectric plants to
generate electricity. In the United States there was a program for electrification and this priority
was extended to Puerto Rico. The electrification program decisively impacted the second largest
railroad company in the island, the Porto Rico Railway, Light and Power Company because this
company operated a steam railroad, an electric tramway, and also provided power in the
metropolitan area and other towns.483 Ernest Gruening, administrator of the PRRA from 1935 to
1937, pursued the acquisition of all privately owned hydroelectric plants. Scholars César J. Ayala
and Rafael Bernabe described Ernest Gruening as a critic of U.S. interventionism in the Caribbean,
a campaigner against private power interests in New England, and a defender of public utilities.484
Gruening used the Utilization of the Water Resources (an agency created in 1927 with the purpose
of building hydroelectric plants to generate energy) to launch his project for the state acquisition of
power plants. In March 1935 the legislature of Puerto Rico approved a joint resolution to extend
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transmission and distribution lines to the area of San Juan which was exclusively supplied by the
Porto Rico Railway, Light and Power Company. The legislature claimed that power bills from
governmental buildings and street lighting in the metropolitan area was too costly and it was
necessary to install distribution lines for the capital city to reduce costs. The PRRC went to the
courts claiming that since 1909 the government granted them “the right to maintain and operate an
electric power plant for the furnishing of electric power light and heat to the public for profit, and
to extend poles, wires, and transmission lines for that purpose.”485 The PRRC considered this
initiative a governmental attack to their economic interests. To stop Gruening the PRRC went to
the courts alleging that the PRRC already had the franchise to provide electricity in San Juan. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ratified the decision of the District Court dismissing the
claim of the railroad company. The PRRC had the franchise to operate in San Juan, but those rights
were not exclusive. Ernest Gruening with the funds from the Public Works Administration moved
towards the acquisition of all privately owned electric companies: the Ponce Electric Company, the
Mayagüez Light and Ice Company Incorporated, and lastly the Puerto Rico Railway, Light and
Power Company. The PRRC sued the government to paralyze the seizure of their hydroelectric
plants in Comerio and Naguabo. The steam railway between Río Piedras and Caguas, and the
electric “trolley” in San Juan were not a central part of this effort probably because at the time they
were a burden to the company. In the 1936 annual report the directors informed:
For some years past the Steam Railroad of your subsidiary has been operating at a
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loss. In common with other short haul railway operations the business had
diminished to a point where it was considered advisable to write off the property.
The Electric Tramway, which also has been unprofitable in recent years, was
materially written down. As a result of the foregoing and other property
retirements, there was written of Property Account the sum of $2,625,242.82.486
Ernest Gruening moved forward with his plans to create a state monopoly over electric
power production and consequently a future appropriation of railway operations became a real
possibility. Without doubt, his accomplishments on the island provided Gruening with the
credentials to become a member of the Alaska International Highway Commission in 1938 and a
year later to be appointed governor of Alaska by President Roosevelt. Before leaving, Gruening
achieved the approval of a bill in the insular legislature authorizing a one million-bond issue to
purchase the Río Blanco Hydroelectric Plant from the Porto Rico Railway, Light and Power
Company.487 In 1938 the company suffered an important setback with the loss of the hydroelectric
plant, and the company also discontinued the steam railroad service between between Caguas and
Río Piedras “because of continued losses for a long a period.”488 Previously, in 1936, the PRRC
tried to close its Río Piedras–Caguas railroad but the Public Service Commission denied the
petition.
Under the auspices of the federal program for reconstruction Carlos E. Chardón, chancellor
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of the University of Puerto Rico, made an assessment of the Puerto Rican economy. The Report of
the Puerto Rico Policy Commission, known commonly as the “Chardón Report”, provided
concrete recommendations for possible industrial development in Puerto Rico. César Ayala and
Rafael Bernabe claimed that the Chardón Report was “one of the key documents of the decade.”489
This report became Puerto Rico’s economic blueprint in the 1940s under the governorship of Luis
Muñoz Marín, who was the first Puerto Rican elected governor in 1948. In his report Carlos
Chardón proposed the acquisition of hydroelectric plants to achieve lower power costs for the
general population as well as corporations. The report had a section titled Transportation, but it
only discussed the problem of maritime shipping rates between the island and ports in the United
States. Chardón did not mention railways or roads in his report. In the discussion of tourism, he
pointed out that “fine motor-roads” were attractive to Americans, but he also identified three
obstacles for the development of the tourist industry: “inadequate and expensive transportation,
lack of publicity, and inferior hotel accommodations.”490 Once again, the “problem” was maritime
transportation. Of significance in the Chardón Report is the silence in reference to the role of
railroads in the industrialization of Puerto Rico. Chardón did not envision railroads in the Puerto
Rico of the future.
A central aspect of the Chardón Report laid in the suggestions related to the sugar industry.
During the depression, a quota system in the United States impacted the production of sugar in
Puerto Rico. The Jones-Costigan Sugar Act was approved on May 9, 1934 by the U.S. Congress
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for the stabilization of sugar prices with quotas for sugar imports. The Congress calculated the
quota for sugar produced in Puerto Rico with the average of the sugar imported to the United
States from 1925 to 1933.491 The Sugar Act imposed limits in sugar production and as a result
impacted railroad profits from sugar freight. For example, in 1933 (before the act) the CFC
transported 1,651,239 tons of sugar cane, the next year it increased to 1,941,125 tons, but in 1935
(after the act) the number of tons dropped to 1,458,663, and dropped again in 1936 to 1,438,803.
Freight income in 1936 decreased by $32,000 in comparison to the previous year.492 Although this
quantity may not be impressive it shows the relationship between sugar production and railroad
revenues. The sugar quotas established a limit to sugar corporations to avoid overproduction but
indirectly limited railroad companies because they had less sugar in way to the ports.
An important concern was whether the railroad would remain profitable if the passenger
service thrived in light of declining freight revenues. The company’s financial statistics
demonstrated that operating costs were too high and the income from passenger transportation was
insufficient to maintain profitability. Looking at the numbers, it is evident that freight
transportation was crucial for sustainability (Figure 4.2). Income from passenger service was only
a fraction of the total revenues. This importance of freight income may explain the emergence of
the idea that the survival of the railroads depended on sugar.
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Figure 4.2. Revenues from freight and passenger transportation (CFC), 1928-1938.

Source. - Record Group 126: Records of the Office of Territories, 1881 – 1976, Box 1027, File:
9-8-93: Puerto Rico-Transportation-Railroad- Wage and Hours - 1939 – 1949, National Archives
at College Park, College Park, MD.

In a report about the sugar industry, Esteban A. Bird, Chief Economic Research Section of
the PRRA, portrayed the common view of his time about the railroads and the role it had on the
Puerto Rican economy. Bird linked the development of railroads with the success of the sugar
business:
Out of an estimated total mileage of 1,485 kilometers for all the railway systems
of Puerto Rico, 924 kilometers, or 62 percent of the total, is mileage controlled by
sugar enterprises. Not less than 90 percent of the total tonnage handled through
these systems is sugar tonnage. Of the mileage not directly controlled by sugar
interests, 361 kilometers belong to the American Railroad Company of Puerto
Rico. Although this is the only independent system of any importance, 85 per cent
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of their freight revenue is derived from sugar tonnage. There is no question that
the transportation of sugar is the life and soul of the railway system of Puerto
Rico.” 493 (Emphasis added)
Bird’s analysis was not a great revelation. He critiqued the monoculture economy as
follows: “The Island depends on the sugar industry to an alarming degree.”494 With this panorama,
if the country moved away from the sugar monoculture model, then the country would have no
need for railroads. Although sugar was not the sole product transported by the CFC, Bird did not
project the potential of the railways with respect to other industries. Appendices 2 and 3 have
copies of the statement of cargo carried by the ARRC and the revenues it obtained from
transporting those other products. The income from sugar and molasses surpassed by far the
income from all other products. If the idea was to promote new industries, the railroad should have
been a cheap transportation alternative for those industries but for Bird and other policy makers,
railroads were inoperative economically outside the sugar business.
Gruening and other “New Dealers” demonstrated the state’s commitment to improve the
island’s economic situation through the creation of new jobs in new industries. Historian Manuel
Rodríguez argued that “Most of the leadership of the PRERA was constituted by Americans that
perceived the New Deal as a golden opportunity to revive their old progressive ideals and put them
into practice in a colonial possession ravished by poverty and neglect.”495 The government did not
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give incentives to the sugar business, because more than half of the jobs on the island already came
from this sector. The goal was to promote jobs in the production of other crops besides sugar that
could empower native farmers to build wealth by themselves. However, to make this shift was not
easy as an observer published: “particularly foods grown for local consumption, suffer badly from
an almost complete lack of credit and distribution facilities. Farmers generally have no financial
reserve, nor access to storage or processing facilities. It is no uncommon sight in the island where
malnutrition is the rule, to see piles of fresh vegetables rotting only a few miles from markets, for
lack of distribution facilities. Cooperative action, as in all branches of Puerto Rican economy, is in
its infancy, largely unsuccessful, and beset by almost overwhelming difficulties.”496 This author
mentioned two challenges: credit and distribution. The federal government directed thousands of
dollars administered by the P.R.R.A. to the acquisition of land for the establishment of
cooperatives, and the distribution of food crops to the markets would be resolved by constructing
new roads. In the 1930s railroad companies were not included as a solution to the distribution of
food crops to markets; furthermore, railroad business started to experience a new relation with
governmental politics. The government was no longer the facilitator of the past but a rigorous
regulator.
For the CFC, the Federal Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) spawned a crisis that in the
long run was impossible to overcome. The FLSA granted a five cents hourly wage increase for
workers in the railroad industry and 15 cents for workers on express railroads. That is to say,
effective on August 1938 the minimum salary for railroad workers increased from 20 to 25 cents
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an hour, and in express railroads from 20 to 35 cents an hour. The CFC claimed that if the act was
applied it “would cause an immediate collapse of its service and the bankruptcy and dissolution of
the company.”497 Although the CFC protested the federal decision, the wages were far less
burdensome than the 40 cents per hour approved for the railroad industry in the continental United
States. The CFC still ignored the mandates of the FLSA.
From 1935 to 1938 the CFC and the PRRC struggled to maintain profitable operations. The
PRRC reduced operating costs but the CFC was less successful in this endeavor. The companies
were open to any governmental assistance because they were confronting serious economic
problems during the depression as their reports demonstrated (see Table 4.7):
Table 4.7. Incomes and Expenses of the PRRC and the ARRC (1935-1938).

PRRC Incomes

1935
$81,114.64

1936
$80,229.88

1937
$84,971.43

1938
$82,242.29

PRRC Expenses

$83,660.47

$81,611.88

$78,351.66

$79,711.76

-$2,545.83

-$1,382.00

$6,619.77

$2,530.53

ARRC Incomes

$1,680,119.02

$1,650,438.14

$1,775,647.36

$1,688,611.95

ARRC Expenses

$1,817,028.06

$1,847,226.86

$1,915,840.12

$1,767,799.24

-$136,909.04

-$196,788.72

-$140,192.76

-$79,187.29

Total

Total

SOURCE.- National Archives of the United States (NARA), RG 126: Records of the Office of
Territories, 1881 – 1976, Box 1027, File: 9-8-93: Puerto Rico-Transportation-Railroad- Wage
and Hours – 1939, and Box 1036, File: 9-8-97: Puerto Rico-Public Utilities, Puerto Rico
Railway.
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Public service railroad companies provided passenger service but the volume was
insignificant in contrast to the CFC. From 1936-37 the CFC transported 481,883 passengers, the
Ponce & Guayama Railroad transported 12,621 passengers, the Fajardo Development Company
transported 495 passengers, and the Ferrocarriles del Este transported 163 passengers. To
summarize, 97 percent of passengers used the CFC.498 Railroad companies competed with carros
públicos and buses for passengers. People relied on the públicos and buses, not only because they
were cheaper, but because they could travel between towns to which there was no railroad service.
However, carros públicos and buses had their own issues. The drivers of the carros públicos
complained about the unfairness of competition with the buses because the bus tariff was lower
and they could transport more passengers. The operators of carros públicos demanded an increase
in the bus fare in order to have fair competition.499 However, the bus owners had their own issues
of unfair competition to contend with because due to the economic crisis many people with cars
were jobless and decided to use their private automobiles as an immediate source of income. The
bus owners complained that private automobiles without permits from the Public Service
Commission were tough competitors. The main problem of these illegal taxis was that they
charged lower fares, took more passengers than allowed by law, and worked only during peak
hours.500 Without a doubt, the Public Service Commission was not enforcing the regulations. Bus
owners demanded more surveillance to prevent competition of illegal taxis and rejected an increase
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in fares as carros públicos had desired alleging they operated at a loss.
Sugar producers provided their particular concerns on the development of new highways
and railways. In a study entrusted to Mr. Dudley Smith, Assistant Director of the Association of
Sugar Producers of Puerto Rico, the economic progress of Puerto Rico was palpable since the
occupation of the island by the United States. However, if there was a comparison of the economic
progress of Puerto Rico with that of continental United States the island appeared “in most
respects, to be a backward, poverty-stricken area, though one of rapidly improving conditions.”501
If Puerto Rico was compared with other countries in the Caribbean and Latin America the
economic situation clearly demonstrated improvement. However, when Smith compared the island
with some states of the Union he found that the number of railroads and highway miles in
Arkansas, Mississippi, Ohio, and Iowa were at least triple the number of those in Puerto Rico. The
contrast with Caribbean and Latin American countries provided a perspective on the increased
presence of automobiles, buses, and trucks in the Latin American landscape. From the data
provided, Puerto Rico had more railroad miles than the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and
Venezuela; but, less than Colombia and Cuba. In highway miles, the relation was similar with the
exception of Venezuela with twice the miles of Puerto Rico. The increasing construction of roads
in Puerto Rico was not unique as the data of the report showed a world trend towards investing in
highways and leaving behind the construction of new expensive railroad tracks.
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Figure 4.3. Railway and highway miles in selected Caribbean countries, 1936

SOURCE. - Dudley Smith, Some standards for measuring Puerto Rico's economic and social
progress (Washington: Association of Sugar Producers of Puerto Rico, 1937), 38.

248

Figure 4.4. Registered trucks, buses and cars in selected Caribbean countries, 1934.
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SOURCE. - Dudley Smith, Some standards for measuring Puerto Rico's economic and social
progress (Washington: Association of Sugar Producers of Puerto Rico, 1937), 39.

Smith concluded that the transportation infrastructure on the island was appropriate for the
geographic extension of Puerto Rico. Countries with greater infrastructure such as Colombia,
Venezuela, and to a lesser extent Cuba also surpassed Puerto Rico in land extension. Cuba had ten
ports and the distances to those export hubs were accessible via highways and railroads. In Puerto
Rico access to the ports was also essential for the economic progress, particularly in view of the
mineral resources and an extremely dense population that drove the island to focus on production
for external markets. Puerto Ricans and their Caribbean neighbors were different in relation to how
they traded, because Puerto Rico consumed products mainly from the United States, “whereas the
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manufactures of other Caribbean areas” were “primarily for home consumption.”502 This rational
was important. The federal government in Puerto Rico was promoting an increase in food
production for internal consumption instead of supporting export crops like sugar with incentives
or higher quotas.503 Mr. Smith concluded that sugar exports allowed Puerto Ricans to achieve a
higher purchase power of food crops from the United States. Conversely, more sugar production
equaled greater profits for the U.S. economy. Mr. Smith did not criticize the federal policy in his
writing, even though, his conclusions deviated from the policy of the New Deal.
In a survey on the benefits of the New Deal in Puerto Rico between 1933 and 1938 Eugene
G. Ashe, Project Auditor of the Public Works Administration (PWA), concluded that 85 percent of
the insular economy depended on sugar. The profits from the sugar industry translated into
dividends to foreign stockholders, and the capital that remained on the island would eventually find
its way to the United States since consumer-goods were imported. The promotion of local
production was necessary to improve the island’s economy but domestic capital was insufficient.
Ashe’s report did not assess the program in Puerto Rico as a failure, but his words suggested that
the New Deal could not help the country to move away from the monocultural economy, which
was one of the desired outcomes of the program. This shortcoming demanded an immediate
change in the economy which was only possible after the construction of a plan to diversify the
economy. With the emergence of native businesses, in Ashe’s words:
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The mental, moral, physical and patriotic attitude of Puerto Ricans will undergo a
complete change, and the United States will have paid its debt to civilization and
incidentally cemented the bonds of its good-neighbor policy with the Latin
American Republics, all of whom now point to Puerto Rico as a horrible example
of Yankee Imperialism.504
This sentence closed Ashe’s report by stating that Puerto Rican economic backwardness
was more than a domestic problem; it was a problem of foreign policy. The Good-Neighbor Policy
of President Roosevelt wanted to improve economic exchange with Latin America, and Puerto
Rico could be the showcase of the great improvement achieved with the close economic relation
with the United States.
In tune with the efforts to portray Puerto Rico as a modern and civilized country, in 1939
Governor General Blanton Winship published a collage of photographs commissioned as
“intellectual propaganda.” Photographs with landscape views taken of several roads and highways
filled fifteen pages of the album. One page titled American Railroad Company illustrated the
headquarters in San Juan, the terminal station, the yard, and a map with the route of the public
service railways. The description of the American Railroad Company included the
acknowledgement of the “efficient cooperation to trade, agriculture and industry.” 505 This

504

Eugene G. Ashe to Miles H. Fairbank, Memorandum, 23 december 1938, NARA, RG 323: Records of the Puerto
Rico Reconstruction Administration, Box No. 3, Entry 13, File: Survey of benefit to Puerto Rico from emergency
funds allocated to and disbursed in P.R. -1933 to 1939.
505
Antonio M. Monteagudo and Antonio Escamez, editors, Album de oro de Puerto Rico. Golden album of Puerto
Rico. Obra de divulgación cultural en pro de la fraternidad americana. A work of intellectual propaganda for
American fraternity (La Habana, Cuba: Artes gráficas, s. a., 1939.)
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government publication was one of the last portraits found of railways. In the editor’s words, this
was a project born from the “ideal of American brotherhood” in times of “new trials of ancient and
modern doctrines which” shook “the foundations of a legendary civilization.”506 The Golden
Album of Puerto Rico followed a previous publication titled The Golden Album of the Dominican
Republic, which served as “vehicle […] of American cordiality.”507 In reality, this was propaganda
for the Good-Neighbor Policy, which used the island as an example of economic stability and
success. The images in the album depicted railroads as a valid icon of modernity to a foreign
audience, for which the album was published. This portarayal of the railways was the end of an
epoch of government support for railroads.
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CHAPTER V: RAILWAYS UNDER ATTACK

The railroad industry had a new opportunity to reorganize during the slow recovery of the
economy that justified dismantling the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration (PRRA). In
1939 the census reported 2,952 workers in the railway business, an increase of 14 percent in
comparison with the report published a decade earlier.508 Railroads were in demand by passengers,
businesses, and in the 1940s a new customer appeared on the scene: the military. The rise of
fascism in Europe indirectly helped the railway industry on the island because railways were
considered to be an integral part of defense infrastructure. Since the “railroad boom” during the
first decades of the twentieth century, in which railways had an important role in the modernization
of the country, this moment was a new experience for the importance of railways but for a different
reason: national security.
The intensive use of railroads by the U.S. military during war was not new. During the First
World War the ARRC transported troops free of charge, “spent close to $40,000.00 in building a
spur from the main road to Camp Las Casas;” and the company took “active part in the war
activities in Porto Rico.”509 Now again, particularly in 1942, the ARRC transported approximately
9,000 troops free of charge.510 The War Department developed different plans for the protection of
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Puerto Rico and relied on the tracks of the ARRC to use two 8-inch railroad cannons and three 155
mm GPF canons in the event of a coastal attack.511 In addition, the geo-strategic position of the
island justified the establishment of multiple military bases to defend the Atlantic. The U.S.
government put together a defense grid of 25 military bases linked by roads and rail tracks. Only
four bases lacked direct access to railroad lines: a small military base in Aguadilla, another in
Cayey, two in the area of Cangrejos in Carolina, and the naval base in eastern Vieques (Map 5.1).
In 1941, President Roosevelt appointed Rexford Guy Tugwell as Governor of Puerto Rico.
Tugwell was deeply familiar with the economic challenges of a territory reliant on agricultural
production because he was Secretary of Agriculture in the 1930s. Tugwell was part of the so called
“Brain Trusts” of the Roosevelt administration, a selected group of academics that adviced the
president. His trajectory in agriculture and his planning approach would mark his plans for Puerto
Rico in the particular context of a World War.
In December 1941 Tugwell informed the Secretary of the Interior of his plans for the
economic reorganization of the island. In the plan the monocultural economy controlled by
absentee corporations was an impediment to economic progress. The solution would be to
diversify the economy through the promotion of cooperatives for independent farmers. The
enforcement of the 500-acre restriction of land ownership approved under the Foraker Act was the
solution to end monopolistic practices and the source of land to be redistributed to small farmers.
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Map 5.1. Military Bases and Railroads.
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The Land Authority was the governmental agency responsible for establishing new farms and
promoting “new hill crops.”512 If the land reform was successful, the role played by the railroads
would have to be reassessed in light of a decrease in the demand for sugar cane transportation,
which was the main source of income for the railroad industry.
In 1941 the American Railroad Company reported the transportation of 121,959 tons of
sugar, 1,222,668 tons of sugar cane, and 244,545 tons of other merchandize. The Fajardo
Development Company reported the transportation of 23,246 tons of sugar, 529,878 tons of sugar
cane, and 17,853 tons of other merchandize followed by the Ponce & Guayama Railroad Company
with 1,446 tons of sugar, 677,093 tons of sugar cane, and 1,715 tons of other merchandize.513
Although the American Railroad Company transported more freight than the other two companies
together returns were insufficient. The ARRC increased freight rates by 10 percent starting on
March 1942 and scheduled another 15 percent increase on March 1943. This increase in freight
rates would help the company to recuperate from the depression years. In the following table there
is a breakdown of freight costs by years (Table 5.1):
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Table 5.1. Comparison of Freight Rates for sugar cane, ARRC.
KILOMETERS
10
30
50
80
100
150
200
260
300

1907
$0.88
1.68
2.40
3.10
3.60
4.65
5.40
5.70
5.90

1917
$0.84
1.58
1.92
2.40
2.76
3.60
4.01
4.44
4.80

1923
$1.01
1.895
2.305
2.88
3.31
4.32
4.81
5.33
5.76

1933
$0.60
1.20
1.44
1.8
1.92
2.00
2.20
2.50
2.60

1942
$0.66
1.32
1.58
2.02
2.11
2.20
2.42
2.75
2.86

1943
$0.76
1.52
1.82
2.32
2.43
2.53
2.78
3.16
3.29

NOTE.- Per ton of 2,000 lbs. Minimum carload 15 tons.
SOURCE.- The American Railroad and its place in the transportation system of Puerto Rico,
1944, 36.

This table shows that even after two rate increases in the 1940s, the ARRC did not reach
the rates it had before 1933. Consequently, the company had to assure great freight volume in order
to maintain profitable operations. However, local production was under threat after the German
submarine warfare became more effective interfering with the Caribbean maritime trade. The
German blockade affected food and general merchandize imports and produced a considerable
increase in the prices of commodities. In 1942 sugar producer were unsure if the sugar they
produced would find its way out of the island and this concern was shared by railroad
companies.514 Ironically, the German blockade would benefit railroad companies. The imports of
motor vehicles, the tires, and gasoline were very limited. Rairoads would be the best transportation
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alternative for freight and also for passengers. In 1941 The ARRC reported the transportation of
574,640 passengers and the PRRC reported 1,570,970 passengers. The lack of motor vehicles had
to be the reason for a significan increase in passengers transported by the ARRC, which in the last
half of 1939 transported 261,000 passengers, “whereas for the similar period in 1942, 854,000
passengers were transported.”515
Governor Tugwell discouraged the use of railroads or tramways by people in need of
transportation. In his words: the situation in San Juan was “complicated by the existence of an old
fashion trolley line which belongs to the Puerto Rico Railway and Power Company.”516 The
alternative to the “old fashion trolley” were the buses. The White Star Bus Line was the only bus
company in the metropolitan area providing service on four routes: the Río Piedras route (7.5
miles), the Villa Palmeras route (5.5 miles), the Loiza route (5 miles), and the Fernández Juncos
route (5 miles).517 This company opened its bus service in 1927 with efficiency until the buses
started to encounter mechanical problems. Tires and replacement parts were difficult to obtain and
maintenance was inadequate. Bankruptcy was inevitable when the company failed to invest
enough capital to maintain its competitiveness.
The PRRC also operated in San Juan and Río Piedras but the route did not converge with
the route of the White Star Bus Line. The “trolley” had serious challenges to maintain profitable
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operations to the point that in 1941 the company halted service between Río Piedras and Condado
for two weeks due to power shortages. Under these circumstances, the White Star Bus Line
received a permit from the state to provide “special services in the Condado residential section.”518
In sum, the business of passenger transportation in San Juan was not profitable in the early 1940s
and would need support from the state to continue operations.
Rexford Tugwell as head of the insular government had the opportunity to improve the
transportation system through the institutionalization of the bus company. Economist Francisco A.
Catalá identified Tugwell as a follower of the “institutional” economic model learned during his
years of student at the University of Pennsylvania.519 In Tugwell’s doctoral dissertation The
Economic Basis of Public Interest he defended the regulation of business for the protection of the
public interest. Following this perspective Tugwell augmented the public sector pursuing the
rationalization and planning of the local economy. In 1941 the insular legislature approved the
creation of various executive agencies and among them was the Puerto Rico Transportation
Agency (PRTA). The first significant action of the PRTA occurred in 1942 when the White Star
Bus Line filed for bankruptcy in the federal court. Governor Tugwell with the approval of the
Attorney General petitioned in the federal court the transfer of the White Star Bus Line property
(worth in $559,501.32) to the PRTA. After negotiations the government acquired 229 buses but
only 34 were in operational conditions. The PRTA received the cooperation of the Office of
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Defense Transportation (ODT), an agency established by executive order of President Roosevelt to
assure “the maximum utilization of the domestic transport facilities of the nation for the successful
prosecution of the war.”520 The Puerto Rican Transport Division of the ODT bought 496 new tires
in an effort to increase the number of buses to 65. Moreover, the ODT commissioned a survey to
offer solutions to the problem of transportation.521 The members of the commission were Manuel
García de Quevedo, a Puerto Rican attorney and former member of the Interstate Commerce
Commission; M. E. Nuttila, Conservation Engineer of the New York City Service Oil Company;
William Addams, Atlanta District Director of motor carriers in the Interstate Commerce
Commission; and Ralph A. I. Bogan V.P. of Greyhound Lines. Although the commission had to
study traffic problems to provide solutions for buses and railways, all members were only
associated with the bus industry.522 In response to gasoline shortages the Public Service
Commission relied on the ARRC to provide emergency service for the metropolitan area.
“Emergency trains” scheduled 5 trips departing from San Juan or Río Piedras with stops in Parada
36½, Parada 31, Martín Peña, Parada 20, Parada 15, and Parada 10.523 In the final report submitted
to ODT by the transportation committee the transit problem was not properly discussed and in its
place the transportation committee incorporated a survey of maritime transportation.524
The next step was the seizure of the Porto Rico Railway Light and Power Company a
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corporation with three hydroelectric power plants and one steam plant with transmition and
distribution lines in thirty-five municipalities. The justification to seize the PRRC and other power
companies was on the grounds of the war emergency, because there was scarcity of fuel oil and the
government considered the unification of all power sources to be necessary. Under the War Powers
Act the government planned to acquire Mayaguez Light Power and Ice Company and the Porto
Rico Railway Light and Power Company, which also operated the trolley in San Juan. The Court
ordered the Federal Works Administration to acquire on and after July 20,1942 all the property
owned by the PRRC after a compensation of $6,250,000 and then the Water Resources Authority
would operate the facilities. The Puerto Rico Water Resources Authority was created by the
legislature in 1941 for the control of water and power resources.
The PRRC went to the Federal Court in Puerto Rico to stop the confiscation “alleging that
the taking of the property was not for war purposes, but ‘a conspiracy between the Governor of
Puerto Rico, R.G. Tugwell, his agent, Antonio Luchetti’ and an unnamed person in the Federal
Department of the Interior.”525 After some months the judge “validated the seizure of all the
company’s properties by the United States under the Lanham Act.”526 The Lanham Act of
October 14, 1940 declared that “"public works" may be acquired, maintained, and operated in
areas or localities found by the President to be suffering an acute shortage of public works or
equipment for public works necessary to the health, safety or welfare of persons engaged in
national-defense activities,” and the President of the United States declared on June 8, 1942 that an
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acute shortage of public works did existed or impeded national defense activities in the locality of
Puerto Rico.527 The Porto Rico Railway Light & Power Company went to the Circuit Court of
Appeals alleging that the declaration of the president did not specifically mentioned the
condemnation of all the property of the PRRC, for example the trolley had no relation with the
power needs however “all of the road bed and rolling stock, including tramway cars, rails and ties,
wires and equipment, of the tramway system operated in and between San Juan and Santurce; and
all easements, rights-of-way and other rights and interests owned or enjoyed by the Porto Rico
Railway Light and Power Company” would be seized. Judge Calvert Magruder decided on
November 27, 1942 in favor of the PRRC because it was not sufficiently evident “that the
President approved the taking” and it was not obvious that the appropriation of all the property
owned by the PRRC “would contribute to the relief of a shortage in electrical transmission and
distribution facilities.”528 For these two reasons the government had to restore full possession of all
the property held from the PRRC.
The efforts of Ernest Gruening in the 1930s to control all sources of power became a reality
on January 1944. Mr. Benjamin W. Thoron, Director of Territories in the Department of the
Interior, approved the purchase of the PRRC by the Federal Works Administration. The “old
fashion trolley” with all the hydroelectric plants controlled by the PRRC would be transferred to
the Water Resources Authority. The Federal Works Administration paid $11,218,416.66 to acquire
the only privately-owned power company in operation “to assist in the movement to industrialize
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the island.”529 In the transaction, the PRRC’s trolley was not crucial and eventually the government
would dismantle it. At first sight, the actions of the government may have appeared as a movement
towards the nationalization of vital infrastructure for the public well-being. This was not the case,
as Emilio Pantojas García suggested in his study Puerto Rican Populism Revisited: “These
expropriations were in no way 'nationalizations'; rather they were 'state takeovers' of public
services for strategic reasons.”530 The government made these ‘takeovers’ in the exceptional
context of the war to pave the path for economic development during peacetime.
After oil scarcity, food supply was another government concern because Puerto Rico did
not produce enough food crops to supply internal demand, and many food products in the United
States were under ration. In this context, the Agricultural Adjustment Agency (AAA) conditioned
the economic assistance offered to farmers with a new requirement to have them plant a minimum
of 7 percent food crops out of the total land planted with sugar cane. The justification was simple:
in war time everyone had to do their part even if it was not economically reasonable. For J.
Adalberto Roig, V.P. of Roig Refinery and Ferrocarriles del Este this experience provided
empirical evidence that demonstrated the error of promoting food-crop production on soil ideal for
cane planting. His data came from experience in Humacao and Yabucoa, places in which most of
the crops did not produce profits. For example, 374.21 acres of cowpeas produced a $6,439.23
loss; 137.32 acres of beans produced a loss of $2,877.33; 56.15 acres of corn lost $1,246.77; and
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only sweet potatoes produced $722.27 profits on 40.27 acres of land.531 In words of Mr. Roig: “we
recognize the fact that food crops should be grown to meet as best as possible shortages of food
which may arise due to lack of shipping space, but it also seems impractical that these low yield
crops be produced at high losses.” 532 J. Adalberto Roig proposed the maintenance of sugar
production as the “economic backbone of the island.”533 From his perspective the sugar industry
benefited the country as a whole, as well as related industries such as the railroads. There were two
discourses that clashed. For sugar centrales the answer to the economic problems lied in
increasing exports; but, for the local and federal government the answer was in the decrease of
imports. Local production of food had important detractors and the government had problems
shipping foodstuffs to the Caribbean even before the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Caribbean
Emergency Program Division reported:
the disruption of ocean shipping and congested continental railroad facilities,
coupled with advancing costs and the growing difficulties in obtaining from the
mainland, supplies which were in great demand for the armed forces and for the
Lend-Lease operation, proved beyond the ability of the insular private trades to
properly plan, finance and perform the tremendous task of providing, within a
reasonable time, the essentials of life for the people of Puerto Rico and the Virgin
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Islands.534
At this juncture, the Food Distribution Administration (FDA), a federal-funded agency,
allocated warehousing and distribution services for foodstuff to needy civilians when the shipments
arrived on the island. Most of the merchandise was unloaded in the San Juan Area (81 percent)
with a fraction arriving in Ponce (15 percent), and Mayagüez (4 percent). The FDA used trucks to
transport the merchandise from the ports to the warehouses; “by truck and railroad to other
distribution centers”, and they included the use of a “small sailing craft to the Islands of Vieques,
Culebra, Saint Thomas and Saint Croix.”535 For the intra-island transportation of foodstuffs the
FDA relied more on railroads than on trucks (Figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.1. Intra-island freight transportation, 1942-1943.

SOURCE.- Caribbean Emergency Program Division, Program Liason (FDA), Report of operations
of the Caribbean Emergency Program, 20 January 1944, 10.

The Caribbean Emergency Program validated the effectiveness of railroads in the
distribution of foodstuff. However, the local government did not appear to value the benefits of the
railroads due to the fact that it imposed an increase in taxes on land with rails and buildings by 62
percent (Figure 5.2).536 This tax impacted the finances of railroad companies and sugar centrales
alike. In response, railroad companies lobbied to persuade policy makers to revoke the new tax.
Sugar centrales had an easier way to evade the taxes: dismantle the internal railroad infrastructure
and purchase trucks to transfer raw cane to the mill and sugar to ports and markets.

“Tabulation of Assessed Value of Real Property by Municipalities and Classes,” Annual Report of the Treasurer
of Puerto Rico, 1933-1945.
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Figure 5.2. Assessed Value Property.
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SOURCE.- “Tabulation of Assessed Value of Real Property by Municipalities and Classes,”
Annual Report of the Treasurer of Puerto Rico, 1933-1945.

The rise in property taxes coincided with the expiration of the tax exemption enjoyed by
the ARRC because of the war. A panel from the National War Labor Board also made several
recommendations in order to maintain the ARRC in operations including the continuation of the
tax exemption “in view of the large role the railroads” played during “the war effort.”537 The sugar
centrales also needed a strategy to avoid taxes, but for these companies the only solution was to
adopt an alternative system of transportation. Most sugar mills had important investments in rail
infrastructure and were not pleased with the idea of abandoning their railroads just to avoid the
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payment of land taxes (Table 5.2).
Table 5.2. Railroads operated by centrales, 1942-1943.
CENTRAL
Cambalache
Canóvanas
Carmen
Cayey
Coloso
Constancia
Constancia
Cortada
Eureka
Fajardo
Guánica
Juanita
Juncos
Lafayette
Los Caños
Machete
Mercedita
Monserrate
Plazuela
Rochelaise
Roig
Rufina
San Francisco
San José
San Vicente
Santa Juana
Victoria

TOWN

MILES/ GAUGE
61 km/ 30-inch & 13 km/ 1 meter
50 km/ 30-inch
19.5 km/ 19-inch & 34.5 km/ 1 meter
24 km/ 30-inch
24 km/ 20-inch & 417 m/ 1 meter
53.3 km/ 30-inch
4.5 km/ 24-inch
22.5 km/ 24-inch
40 km/ 24-inch
132 km/ 1 meter
60 km/ 1 meter
22 km/ 24-inch & 2 km/ 1 meter
200 km/ 30-inch & 1 meter
10.5 km/ 24-inch & 25 km/ 30-inch
17 km/ 26-inch & 25 km/ 1 meter
22.5 km/ 1 meter
62 km/ 26-inch & 4 km/ 1 meter
10 km/ 24-inch & 3.5 km/ 1 meter
22.9 km/ 26-inch & 63.8 km/ 1 meter
7 km/ 24-inch
47.8 km/ 1 meter
700 m/ 1 meter
1.6 km/ 1 meter
28 km/ 1 meter
43 km/ 30-inch
200 km/ 30-inch & 1 meter
30 km/ 30-inch & & 1 meter

Arecibo
Canóvanas
Vega Alta
Cayey
Aguada
Toa Baja
Ponce
Santa Isabel
Mayagüez
Fajardo
Ensenada
Bayamón
Juncos
Arroyo
Arecibo
Guayama
Ponce
Manatí
Barceloneta
Mayagüez
Yabucoa
Guayanilla
Yauco
Río Piedras
Vega Baja
Caguas
Carolina

SOURCE. - The Gilmore Puerto Rico Sugar Manual, 1942-43.
As Table 5.2 illustrates, the majority of sugar corporations owned railroads, but these
corporations also relied on other means of transportation such as trucks and even ox-carts. The
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trend was to introduce more and more trucks for the transportation of cane. The Gilmore’s Puerto
Rico Sugar Manual exemplified this shift by citing the case of the South Porto Rico Sugar
Company, commonly known as Central Guánica. The Fortuna Railroad, owned by Central
Guánica, had hundreds of wagons for the transportation of cane “however starting with the 1941
crop the mill began to receive cane in trucks; establishing special handling arrangement for the
feeding of truck-delivered cane to one of the mill tandems which” was “handling truck cane to the
extent of twelve hours per day.”538 Central Guánica was not a common central, as it was the largest
sugar manufacturer on the island with a production of 79,877.47 tons in 1941.539 The growing use
of trucks for freight transportation in lieu of railroads, and a higher property tax for railroad-related
property were not the only two challenges faced by railroad companies in the 1940s. The
reorganization and activism of railroad workers further added economic stress to the administration
of railroad corporations.
A new worker’s organization
On February 22, 1942 the Obreros Unidos de la Ferrovías de Puerto Rico (Obreros
Unidos), a new union organized in 1941, held their first congress in Ponce. At the congress José A.
Lanauze Rolón, leader of the insular communist movement made a call to railroad workers in the
syndicate to help the nation in the struggle against “the enemies of democracy and social
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justice.”540 He understood that he enemy of democracy was Fascism not the railroad companies.
The ‘state’ was leading the struggle to destroy fascism abroad and for this reason the workers made
a truce with the government. Furthermore, in the program distributed in their congress Obreros
Unidos demonstrated their allegiance to governor Tugwell by printing fragments of his speeches to
the legislature. Raúl Guadalupe de Jesús explained in Sindicalismo y lucha política that in 1941 the
Communist Party in Puerto Rico decided to establish alliances in a Popular Front as this was the
case of the Moscow-based Comintern for parties throughout the world including Latin America.
Communist workers offered governor Tugwell their help in the struggle against fascism and his
“Plan de Siembra,” which was the name of the program for the promotion of fruit and vegetable
crop production over sugar.541 In this situation, the Obreros Unidos developed their syndicalist
agenda to achieve a “better quality of life and higher salaries.”542
Miguel Torres, president of Obreros Unidos, informed the governor of Puerto Rico that
workers in the ARRC received less that the minimum wage salary of 20 cents per hour.543 In 1938
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) had increased the minimum wage but the ARRC had ignored
this. The Obreros Unidos also went to the legislature for support from Luis Muñoz Marín,
President of the Senate. Torres tried to persuade Muñoz Marín to act in favor of the workers by
reminding him that railroad workers voted for the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD), and
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powerful corporations like the ARRC only desired the electoral defeat of the PPD.544 Sociologist
César J. Ayala stated that “the Great Depression led to the formation of the Popular Democratic
Party in 1938 on a program based on the redistribution of the sugar latifundia and to the search for
alternatives to sugar monoculture.”545 Railroad workers assumed the PPD would be commited to
the claims of low paid railroad worker as the party also supported did with the jíbaro (subsistence
farmer). Luis Muñoz Marín, the founder of the PPD, avoided playing a leading role in the conflict
by choosing Ernesto Ramos Antonini, PPD legislator in the House of Representatives, to propose
the creation of a commission to study salaries in the railroad industry.546
The last move of Obreros Unidos was to request the support of the military. From the
worker’s perspective the ARRC had the best financial condition in years, because the war had
increased the demand for railroad services:
Las bases militares, representan un buen negocio para la empresa a tal extremo
que su material rodante no da abasto para cubrir la demanda del servicio, tanto de
pasajeros como del comercio y carga en general de toda la isla.547
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In view of this situation, the workers threated the corporation with a strike and requested
the support of the local government and the U.S. military. Obreros Unidos claimed that a prompt
resolution of the conflict was in the nation’s best interest to uphold the “lucha heroica contra las
fuerzas del mal representadas por las naciones agresoras nacifascistas.”548
The administrators of the ARRC claimed that the serious financial difficulties the company
was confronting impeded them from granting higher wages to the workers. Profits declined since
the volume of business had considerably decreased “as the result of unfair competition by the
different trucking companies and individual truck and automobile owners,” who were not being
subjected “to any rate regulation, control, or inspection by the Public Service Commission.”549
From the workers perspective, the company was justifying their evasion of compliance with the
federal law. The local government had not enforced the law since 1938, and as a result the workers
undertook the task of pushing the company to yield to their claims through a strike. In the conflict,
the government of Puerto Rico served as mediator between the railroad union and the ARRC
administration. Obreros Unidos demanded a 12.5 percent increase in wages but the company only
accepted a 5 percent increase.550 Initially, the arbitration was unsuccessful and the ARRC proceed
to lay off workers who had been affiliated with the union during the negotiations. After four
months of talks with Charles A. Goldsmith as arbitrator the union and the ARRC signed a
collective agreement for one year. For the company, this concession increased the payroll by
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$96,000 per year. Obreros Unidos achieved a 10 percent increase in conventional wages for
approximately 1,500 permanent workers and 400 temporary labors. Another achievement for the
workers was the double payment for overtime and holidays.551
The takeover by the federal government
Since the collective agreement was for only one year, tensions soon resurfaced and
negotiations resumed. The workers paralyzed the railroad system with a strike on May 12, 1943.
The day before the leadership of the union sent a telegram to governor Tugwell to notify him of the
imminent cessation of the railroad service, although the workers made a commitment to offer
special service if the Armed Forces required it for the war effort.552 On the first day the insular
police reported: “at Ponce the number of strikers estimated at six-hundred. At San Juan and Río
Piedras districts the number [was] greater.”553 That same day Governor Tugwell decreed a
mobilization of the National Guard and Insular Police to “preserve order, to protect workers and
other citizens in their legitimate discussions and to provide against injury to property during the
period of the immobilization.”554 During 48 hours the government forced the suspension of the rail
service to avoid confrontation between those in conflict.555 In essence, the impact of this decision
only negatively affected the railroad company since there was no service and the company could
not blame the workers. The workers would continue their protest without the fear of being
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dispersed by security forces.
The union won the battle or that was the appearance after President Franklin D. Roosevelt
issued an Executive Order to “take immediate possession” of the ARRC to secure “the movement
of supplies and food for the armed forces and the civilian population.” 556 President Roosevelt also
pointed out that railroads were “essential to the effective prosecution of the war.”557 On May 15,
the Office of Defense Transportation (ODT) started to operate the ARRC, and appointed Mr. O.
Arthur Kirkman as operations manager. The federal government required the return of the workers
to resume railroad operations and the union responded affirmatively. For the union, the Executive
Order was beneficial because it directed the National War Labor Board (NWLB) to study the
disagreements between the workers and the ARRC, and thus settled the major disputes. The
NWLB created a committee with three members: Cecil Snyder, Supreme Court Judge; Frank
Dorathy, Manager of Bacardí representing “the employer”; and Jaime Benítez, Chancellor of the
University of Puerto Rico representing “the employees.” The committee report recommended the
distribution of $100,000 among the workers. Finally, on November 16, 1943 the Obreros Unidos
signed the collective-bargaining agreement.
Under the ODT there was an effort to modernize the railroads though the purchase of
twelve diesel locomotives to reduce operating expenses. The machinery arrived on February 1944
at a cost of $635,000 with tax exemptions.558 At the time, railroad wagons and machinery seemed
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obsolete but it was necessary to maintain the railroads in operation for the sake of national defense.
Unaware of it the strike by the workers opened the door for the advance of Tugwell’s plans
for the railroads. In the context of the war a strike was an act of disloyalty or even sedition, but
Governor Tugwell and Conger Pratt, Commanding General of the Puerto Rican and Antilles
Department of the U.S. Air Force, preferred to avoid violent repression and to make the conflict
strictly between the workers and the company. For Tugwell this was the opportunity to take over
railroad corporations:
We had been suspecting for some time that the railroad's owners were trying to
unload it on the Government. They said it was unprofitable in spite of the fact that
it paid no taxes (under an old exemption just running out), that its wages were
about one tenth of railway workers' wages in the States, and that for years
maintenance and replacements had been at so low a level as to all but cause a
One-Hoss Shay collapse. To arrive at the conclusion of unprofitability allowance
had to be made for the fact that there were three separate companies each with
high-salaried officials and expensive counsel. It had obviously been a bonanza in
the good old Coalición days when taxes need not be paid, when bad services were
condoned by a tame Public Service Commission and when demands for higher
wages were considered subversive; but anyone could see that things were going to
be different now. And since a vast increase in temporary military haulage had
raised operating revenues above those of any past period, it was a good time to
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capitalize them, establish a whacking value, and sell out to the Government.559
Tugwell’s desire was supported by General Pratt because he considered the railroads
dispensable for military infrastructure: “"That railroad," he said solemnly, "has no military
importance. We don't need it. There is nothing we can't move by truck."”560 Indeed, since the
beginning of the Second World War the War Department made significant investments in military
infrastructure. In a letter from James L. Collins, Commanding General of the U.S. Army in Puerto
Rico, to governor Tugwell, road construction had to be a priority:
The construction of the Insular Government Highway from San Juan, Puerto Rico
to Punta Borinquen, Puerto Rico is a project vitally necessary to the proper
defense of the Island. This project should be given all possible priority ratings in
order to accelerate its completion. Also the construction of the highway between
San Juan and Cayey is of great importance to national defense and should be
entitled to a priority rating.561
The insular government had plans for the economic development of Puerto Rico during the
war as well as for its aftermath. In 1944 the Puerto Rico Planning, Urbanizing, and Zoning Board
published a technical paper explaining the economic benefits of the war. Military construction of
naval bases, air fields, hospital facilities, water and power plants, and highways translated in an
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important monetary income for the island’s economy. At the end of the war the government had to
modify the economic structure to make up for the reduction in military investments. Highways
were built for military ends but they brought civilian benefits because it would be the infrastructure
for the transportation of commercial goods and facilitated the mobility of workers. Not everything
was positive because the report identified an undesirable effect of military expansion: “military
requirements have taken about 25,000 acres of agricultural land out of production in Puerto Rico
for military bases, airfields and road construction. This is a serious problem in a land-hungry
country, for alternative employment cannot easily be found for the families thus dispossessed.”562
This illustrates the main concern of the Planning Board baptized as the “Problem of Puerto Rico.”
The “Problem” consisted of three elements: high population density, poverty, and low productivity.
The island needed a study of basic needs among them an assessment of the transportation
infrastructure. New highways built with federal funds provided the backbone for the peace-time
transportation infrastructure. The study could enlighten the need for new roads to connect foodproducing areas to local markets. In this report, the authors conceived the railroads as a
“supplement” to the highways. There were no suggestions to improve the railway system or to
extend the railways to new areas such as the eastern section between Guayama and Humacao were
this was needed. The authors of the report only gave importance to the transportation of raw cane
and sugar. Although sugar production was not under attack per se, the group advocated a change in
the priorities and the promotion of food crops. Only the encouragement of food crops did not
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included railroads as a means of transportation for products to the local markets. After the war the
future of railways was certainly opaque in view of new priorities:
After the war there will be an expansion of intra-island air transportation in Puerto
Rico as well as of highway travel by buses and other common and private carriers,
so that the use of the island’s railroad system for passenger transportation will
probably be greatly reduced. Indeed, the proposed circumferential modern
highway will almost parallel the railroad around the Island. Nevertheless, with the
contemplated expansion of Puerto Rico’s industries, the railways will remain
important for heavy freight and should in any case be maintained for
emergencies.563
An important factor constributing toward the disappearance of railways occurred after the
state acquisition of the PRRC on July 1942. The Autoridad de Fuentes Fluviales (Power and Water
Resources Authority), a public corporation created by Act No. 83, on May 2, 1941 to generate and
distribute power, acquired the PRRC. The popular presumption was that the street electric tramway
in San Juan, known as the “trolley,” was going to be enhanced. However, the Water Resources
Authority used the shortage of supplies to justify a delay in improvements to the tramway. Two
years later, Antonio Luchetti, Director of the Water Resources Authority, dismissed temporary
trolley workers, and granted paid vacation to permanent workers, prior to permanently shuting
down operations on March 30, 1944.
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No more trolleys
On April 3, 1944 the insular House of Representatives approved a resolution to create a
committee to study the reasons behind the shutdown of trolley service. The committee had 10 days
to submit their final report.564 An editorial in El Mundo criticized the decision of the Water
Resources Authority to discontinue the trolley service in San Juan and Santurce. The gasoline
crisis and tire scarcity were the reasons given by the newspaper which argued for the continuation
of the trolley service as an effective means of transportation. On the other hand, El Mundo depicted
the trolley as obsolete: “el tranvía anticuado de San Juan era prácticamente un estorbo público y no
había razón alguna para mantenerlo operando con perjuicio del tránsito expedito y de la propia
comodidad de los pasajeros que bien podían y debían viajar con mayor confort en vehículos
modernos y rápidos.”565 However, the editorial claimed that it was a mistake to reduce trolley
service during war time, since it was crucial: “el tranvía por obra de emergencia, se convirtió en un
medio utilísimo de servicio público.”566 In a second editorial the newspaper questioned the rights
of the Water Resources Authority to make decisions over the trolley without the Public Service
Commission. By law, the Water Resources Authority was not subject to any regulatory agency.
After the acquisition of the PRRC by the Water Resources Authority, the Public Service
Commission had no legal power to hold back the decision to close the trolley. The editorial
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questioned this authority because without any regulatory agency the Water Resources Authority
could make arbitrary decisions.
To substitute the trolley, Roberto Sánchez Vilella, director of the Autoridad de Transporte,
announced the use of six buses in the Condado area. El Mundo argued that Sánchez Vilella’s
solution was inadequate, because thousands of passengers confronted serious problems reaching
their destinations.567 The Liga de Proprietarios de Fincas Urbanas (Urban Property-Owners
League) also criticized Luchetti’s decision to cease trolley service and were skeptical about the
capability of the Autoridad de Transporte to substitute the trolley:
El servicio de carros eléctricos es absolutamente necesario, y aún más en los
actuales momentos, para resolver nuestro complicado problema de tránsito. El
servicio que presta la Autoridad de Transporte es inadecuado, y tardará mucho
tiempo en ponerse en condiciones de servir al público como es debido.568
Rexford Tugwell, as president of the Water Resources Authority board and not as
governor indicated that a drought was the reason behind the “temporary” shut down of the trolley.
Tugwell demonstrated his political skills in the manner he addressed the transportation problem in
the press. The lack of electric power forced the Water Resources Authority to make the decision to
end trolley service until enough rain allowed hydroelectric plants to generate sufficient power.
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Consequently, the shutdown of the trolley was a pragmatic decision in reaction to the forces of
nature. The necessity to rely on bus service was “temporary,” he explained. Tugwell and Luchetti
should have announced the problem caused by the drought prior to closing the trolley, not two
weeks after the crisis. Tugwell commissioned Mr. Cyrus G. Hill to conduct a study to determine if
the tramway was in acceptable conditions to resume operations in view of the deterioration of the
infrastructure. In reality Governor Tugwell had no plans to resume operations because the tramway
had been under the control of the Water Resources Authority for two years without making any
major investments to improve it. The Federación Libre de Trabajadores raised the question of the
need to stop the trolley since the corporation had healthy finances and the juncture of the war
demanded transportation alternatives for the people.569
Tugwell had two subordinates with the mission to deal with the crisis while his public
image was safely guarded. One of his subordinates was Antonio Luchetti, who declared in the
press that he did not consider the situation critical but was committed to resume the trolley service
if the situation was merited. The other figure was Roberto Sánchez Vilella who was responsible for
the improvement of bus service in order to make the electric tramway unnecesary. Sánchez Vilella
refuted the idea that thousands were left without any transportation alternative arguing that only 5
percent of the passengers who could actually use the electric tramway did.570 In an editorial, El
Mundo determined that the destruction of the trolley was related to Tugwell’s political motivations.
El Mundo further added that the study commissioned to Hill was merely a means to validate the
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decision of the Water Resources Authority in response to the popular rejection of the
discontinuation of trolley service. In this scenario, the only possibility of resurrecting the trolley
service lied with two federal agencies: The Office of Price Administration (OPA) and the Office of
Defense Transportation (ODT).571 Neither of these agencies received notification from the Water
Resources Authority regarding the decision to halt the tramway service.572
Political adversaries of the PPD in the House capitalized on the trolley crisis by approving
a resolution passed by 19 votes in favor out of 37 demanding an immediate restarting of the trolley
service.573 Senator Luis Muñoz Marín supported the role of the Public Service Commission to
oversee the decision of the Water Resources Authority. With this, Muñoz Marín moved away from
the spotlight and left the controversy in the hands of the regulatory agency. Benjamín Ortiz,
President of the Public Service Commission, had publicized days before a new interpretation of the
law by the agency’s attorneys in which the trolley continued under the legal control of the PRRC,
although the shares and the operation of the company were in effect under the control of the Water
Resources Authority. In this scenario, the Public Service Commission could oversee decisions
related to the trolley. The Public Service Commission postponed a public hearing until the
submission of Cyrus Hill’s report. In the meantime the Autoridad de Transporte committed itself
to provide 10 buses to alleviate transportation demand.
The issue of the trolley service divided federal and insular agencies. The Water Resources
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Authority and the Autoridad de Transporte promoted the use of buses in place of the trolley, but
the Office of Price Administration and the Office of Defense Transportation considered the trolley
a vital element in defense infrastructure, even if the buses were operating efficiently.574 All of the
agencies were resolved to wait for Cyrus Hill, an independent consultant commissioned to make an
informed decision about the suitability of the trolley service. On April 28 Hill’s report became
public, and concluded that tracks and wagons needed repairs; however, the electric tramway was
functional:
No obstante gran parte del material rodante, las vías y el sistema eléctrico es viejo,
y que reparaciones substanciales son deseables, un mantenimiento adecuado y un
funcionamiento cuidadoso a una velocidad moderada podría habilitar el sistema
para funcionar con un riesgo no mayor del promedio, por muchos años.”
(Emphasis added)575
Cyrus Hill’s assessment was most certainly a bombshell for the local government. Now
Governor Tugwell needed to find a new tactic to discreetly get rid of the trolley. Paul H. Quinn,
insular director of the ODT, received orders from Washington to request in the public hearings a
speedy reopening of the trolley operations to ameliorate the transportation crisis.576 Tugwell, as
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president of the Water Resources Authority board, agreed to any proposal made by the ODT and
recommended the acquisition of the trolley by the Autoridad de Transporte.577 With this move
Tugwell distanced himself from the conflict. This is illustrated in an editorial in El Mundo:
El gobernador Tugwell, que indudablemente no quería suspender por mero
capricho un servicio público que la ODT y la OAP consideran indispensable
durante la emergencia, ha resuelto recomendar que la AF se guíe por las
indicaciones de la OTD, lo cual equivale a decir que los tranvías comiencen a
funcionar a la mayor brevedad posible.578
It appears that Tugwell was the mastermind behind the eradication of the railways, but the
press blamed Luchetti. The editorial stated that Luchetti, not Tugwell, was responsible for the
decision to get rid of the trolley because it operated unprofitably.579 After the hearings called for by
the Public Service Commission, the agency endorsed the decision of the Water Resources
Authority to halt trolley service in view of the decline in power production. Once the drought
ended there was no reason to not resume the trolley service.580 On the morning of May 4, 1944,
after 35 days without running the trolley service resumed on the streets of San Juan. The press
chronicled the reopening of the trolley service saying:
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Cuando el tranvía llegó a la parada 23 ya se encontraba prácticamente lleno por
viejos clientes que montaban en el mismo, con caras risueñas. Al pasar frente a la
Escuela Superior Central un crecido número de estudiantes que había en las
afueras del plantel, comenzó aplaudir. De muchas casas junto a la avenida sus
residentes salían a los balcones y ventanas a ver pasar el carro eléctrico como si
fuera cosa completamente nueva en la ciudad.581
El Mundo portrayed a popular joy on behalf of the trolley. However, the trolley was not a
new answer to the problem of transportation but a need related to the scarcity caused by the war
against fascism. The question was whether the trolley would be justified when the war ended and
scarcity vanished.

Translation: “When the trolley arrived at stop 23 it was already almost full with old customers who rode in it with
smiling faces. As they passed the Central High School a growing number of students who were outside the
institution began clapping. Residents of many houses along the avenue went out their balconies and windows to
watch the electric trolley as if it was something completely new in town.”
“Ayer se reanudó el servicio de carros electricos en San Juan,” El Mundo, 4 May 1944, 5.
581
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CHAPTER VI: THE COLLAPSE

The aspiration of policy makers in the 1940s revolved around the desirability for a new
economic model to improve the lives of the Puerto Ricans. Possible strategies arose from ideas
developed during the experiences of the Great Depression. Insular economic challenges continued
during the war. The main difference lay on in the shift of the role played by the federal government
from funding relief and economic rehabilitation during the 1930s. In 1943 Life magazine reported:
Since the start of the war, Puerto Rico’s perpetual crisis has deepened. Its
economy has been based on exporting sugar, rum, coffee, tobacco, and
needlework; importing food, clothing, machinery and many raw materials. The
need for cargo ships elsewhere, plus, Nazi U-boat campaign, have cut Puerto
Rico’s imports 75 percent. The people are starving. Inflation is having a field day.
The price of rice has risen from 4¢ to 11¢ a pound, codfish from 9¢ to 40¢ a
pound.582
With this scenario the railways faced major financial challenges. They gambled on an
economic recovery but local policy makers had the promotion of new industries, highways, and
airports in mind. Politicians did not include the railroads in the future blueprints for the
industrialization of Puerto Rico and blamed the railroads’ disappearance on their inability to sustain
profitable operations.
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State owned railroad?
In the fourth congress of the Obreros Unidos railroad workers approved a resolution to
promote the acquisition of the franchise and properties of the Compañía Ferroviaria de
Circunvalación (CFC) by the Autoridad de Transporte. The workers believed that under public
ownership the employees would receive better treatment because service was a priority over profit.
This proposal should not have been problematic because in 1942 the government took land from
the sugar centrales at the discretion of the Autoridad de Tierras (Land Authority).583 If the
government had no issues with the expropriation of big sugar industries then it was plausible that
the same could be done to the railroads. The workers had little understanding concerning the
federal and insular governments’ plans. Railways would have a different role in the country after
the war as exemplified by the seizure of the PRRC by the state in order to acquire the hydroelectric
plants, not the electric tramways.
The insular government had no interest in the confiscation of the CFC. Harold Ickes,
Secretary of the Interior, sent a memorandum to the president of the United States on June 1944 to
inform him that Governor Tugwell agreed “that possession and operation by the government of the
properties of the American Railroad Company of Porto Rico” were “no longer required for the
successful prosecution of the war and that they may now be turned back to the owners.”584 At the
end of the fiscal year (June 30, 1944), the federal government returned the railroads to their
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owners, the CFC.585 The return of the ARRC to civilian control could have signified a rebirth for
the CFC but this was not the case. A year later, the administration of the CFC sent governor
Tugwell a letter requesting his cooperation to maintain the railroad company in operation. Fragile
finances pushed the company to ask for tax exemptions, rate adjustments, and enforcement of the
regulations for fair competition. The Public Service Commission responded to the call of the CFC
by assigning James E. Curry to audit the company in order to provide solutions.586
Ironically, as an omen of the railroads’ collapse, some months after the return of the
railroad to CFC the first president of the company, Don Manuel González, died of heart problems.
At the time of his death González was the richest man in Puerto Rico, with major investments in
railroads and sugar businesses.587 A month later more people related to the CFC died. On Monday
night the CFC’s 9:00 p.m. train departed from San Juan to Ponce. The train derailed near Aguadilla
casuing 11 deaths and 41 injured passengers because it was traveling at excesive speed. This was
the worst railroad accident in the island’s history.588
Union workers did not consider accidents to be a superficial issue. In an assembly of the
FLT, railroad workers from the Union de Ferrovías demanded that the Public Service Commission
force the CFC to use two drivers for all diesel locomotives.589 For the union, the only way to assure
the safety of the workers and passengers was through the adoption of these measures. For the CFC,
more safety meant onerous economic requirements.
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The collective agreement with the Obreros Unidos de la Ferrovías de Puerto Rico expired
on August 1945. The workers demanded an increase in wages but they recognized the company’s
financial problems. If economic projections were similar to those of 1939 (prior to the war) the
income would be approximately 1.8 million dollars. From the company’s income 1.3 million
dollars would go for salaries that would leave only $500,000 for operational costs. From the figure
budgeted for operational costs one would have to deduct $205,000 for taxes, and the reminder for
fuel, lubricants, maintenance, and repairs of tracks and buildings. In this alarming scenario, Miguel
Torres, the president of Obreros Unidos, requested state aid from Governor Tugwell for the
workers, because the company was not only unable to grant higher wages but in all probability
would reduce their salaries. If the government did not act, the company would file for
bankruptcy.590 The workers also went to the President of the Senate, Luis Muñoz Marín, with a
document detailing the needs of the workers and the CFC.591 The approval of tax exemptions and
other economic measures to maintain the railroad in operation was in the hands of the legislature.
The company failed to pay their taxes for three years which amounted to a debt of $450,000.592
With the company’s records in hand the union appealed to the governor and the legislature for a
debt amnesty and tax exemption for future years. The company would only then agree to sit down
and negotiate workers’ wages.
The conflict went to arbitration and the federal government once again appointed Charles
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A. Goldsmith as mediator.593 The union and the company signed the collective bargaining
agreement on November 16, 1945, but the issue of salaries was put on hold until the committee
completed the study. The Committee of Arbitration required financial reports from the company to
confirm their alleged inability to increase salaries. The company would grant higher salaries if their
finances allowed, but a dramatic increase in payroll would leave the company with insufficient
funds for operating expenses. In only a decade the company had substantially raised the salaries by
187 percent, from $783,711.59 in 1935 to $1,470,751.48 in 1944.594 The impasse between the
company and the union continued until the Committee of Arbitration submitted a final report. On
October 10, the Obreros Unidos de la Ferrovías publicly requested governmental seizure of the
railroad because the committee submitted recommendations that were unacceptable to the
workers.595 The call made by Obreros Unidos would not be heard because the federal government
did acquire the railroad company in 1943 because it was times of war, but on September 2, 1945
the war was over and there was no justification for a seizure.
Post-war transformations
The economy of Puerto Rico underwent a dramatic transformation in the post-war years.
Agriculture would be planned by the Agricultural Company, an agency created by the legislature in
1945, to organize production and markets. This agency had to encourage the commercial
development of agricultural resources after the Land Act of 1941 enforced the 500-Acre law. The
Foraker Act of 1900 included a clause prohibiting the ownership of more than 500 acres of land by
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an individual or corporation, but the law was never enforced until the Land Authority, created in
1941, received the power to expropiate the land in excess. This initiative of the government
affected the sugar industry after a decade of harsh governmental control of the production through
the imposition of quotas. The land obtained by the government after the seizure of the excess in the
500 acres would be transferred to farmers or cooperatives for the promotion of different crops
including foodcrops for local consumption.
The aim of Tugwell was the transformation of the economy by diversifying agriculture and
promoting industrialization. The point of depature was the creation various agencies by the
legislature. In 1942 the majority in the legislature were members of the Partido Popular
Democrático including Luis Muñoz Marín president of the party and the Senate. With the votes of
the PPD the legislature approved the creation of the Planning Board, to make studies about land
use, to establish zoning codes for urban development, and to create a six-year economic plan. The
planning of the insular economy was a new approach after decades of pure laissez-faire. The
legislature also created the Puerto Rico Development Company with the purpose of promoting the
creation of new industries, commercial enterprises, mining projects, and cooperatives. The
Development Company also had the responsibility of conducting “research and experimentation in
the marketing, distributing, advertising and exporting of all products of Puerto Rico.”596 The final
task was the establishment of new enterprises on account of the Puerto Rico Development
Company for the exploitation of local raw materials. To finance these projects the legislature
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created the Development Bank of Puerto Rico. Rafael Buscaglia, Treasurer of Puerto Rico and
president of the bank, was responsible for the approval of loans for new or existing enterprises
being previously rejected by commercial banks. However, the annual budget assigned to the Bank,
the Development Company, and the Planning Board was insufficient to achieve the goals.
In 1942 the government of Puerto Rico had the platform to lauch an industrial project in
times of shortages resulting from the diminution in commercial shippings. The decline in trade
justified the need of produce what the island needed domestically. The shortages of raw materials
and rising prices discouraged private investors from establishing companies in times of war and
trade uncertainty. The Puerto Rico Development Company undertook the creation of factories in
the absence of private initiatives. The agency acquired a cement plant from the PRRA and named it
the Puerto Rico Cement Corporation, in 1943 it created the Puerto Rico Glass Corporation to
produce bottles for the rum industry, and the Puerto Rico Pulp and Paper Corporation for the
production of paperboard to export rum and other products. The next subsidiaries of the Puerto
Rico Development Company would be the Puerto Rico Shoe & Leather Corporation, and the
Puerto Rico Clay Products Corporation.
The subsidiaries of the Puerto Rico Development Company were the pillars of this first
stage of industrialization (1942-1950). Historian James L. Dietz characterized this stage as an
intermediate Import Substitution Industrialization based on the production of intermediate imputs
for the rum and the construction industry (bottles, cardboard, cement, tiles) and consumer goods
for local consumption (shoes, textile merchandises). In this stage of industrial development the
government-owned factories stimulated local production showing local investors the economic
292

posibilites of these businesses.
During the war an important flow of capital entered to the island channeled by the military
due to the construction of bases and other infrastructure. An example was the “military road” built
to shorten the distance between Fort Buchanan and Punta Borinquen Air Base at a cost of 5 million
dollars. This project injected money into the local economy, gave continuity to the road building
started by the Department of the Interior since the U.S. occupation (Appendix 4), and in the long
term provided road infrastructure needed for the success of the industrialization plan. José Bolivar
Fresneda recommended that a closer look be given to the military’s role in the policies of
infrastructure, and claimed that the military build-up paved the path for the 1940s economic
development in Puerto Rico.597
In the first annual report after the end of the war Governor Rexford Tugwell presented the
status of his plan for economic development:
The year 1945-46 saw a marked advance in the industrialization program which
was initiated in 1942 with the establishment of the Puerto Rico Industrial
Development Company, in the hope of rectifying the discrepancy between
population and resources. Among other accomplishments, The Company began
operation of a paper board and a glass container factory, started the construction
of a heavy ceramics plant and a shoe factory, and completed plans for the
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establishment of a cotton textile mill. All this was an integral and essential part of
the Island’s post-war development program.598
After World War II the United States had an unprecedented economic expansion and
Puerto Rico would be impacted in various ways. Harvey S. Perloff, director of the Economic
Division of the Puerto Rico Planning Board considered this moment beneficial for the island
economy because the “continental market for the major Puerto Rican products” sustained “the
relatively high postwar farm income.”599 Agriculture benefited with the reopening of the U.S.
market and the expansion of U.S. production would alleviate the island’s “population problem.”
Policy makers considered the population density in Puerto Rico problematic, but out-migration to
the United States would alleviate the problem of unemployment. However, Perloff recognized that
migration also affected the productive capacity of the island. Historian James Dietz offered a
diferent argument, less optimistic. Dietz considered the post-war expansion of the U.S. economy a
problem for the state-owned factories in Puerto Rico because imports from the United States
resumed and the companies were not able to compete. After two years, in 1947, the efforts to
promote industries to substitute imports came to an end without acquiring the benefits of this initial
stage of industrialization, which included the “development of a larger entrepreneurial class,
technological learning, improving industrial efficiency, [and] a more skilled work force.”600 The
aborted import substitution process altered the industrial development stategy. State-owned
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companies had to be sold and the government would attract industries from the United States. The
new strategy consisted in attracting investors from the United States though tax abatements and
exemptions.601 The legislature approved a “Tax Holiday Act” exempting new industries from
municipal, property and income taxes and from excise taxes on machinery and raw materials after
July 1, 1947. In addition, companies in Puerto Rico did not pay federal taxes since the approval of
the Foraker Act in 1900. The “holiday” would expire on June 30, 1959 but followed with three
years of graduated low rates.602
One of the tasks of the Planning Board was the preparation of a Master Plan of Rural
Transportation Facilities. The Mapping Division of the Planning Board had to prepare an inventory
of the roads suited for motor vehicle traffic. The work of the Planning Board would be useful for
the Transportation Authority, another agency created in 1942. People would rely once again on
their automobiles or acquire new ones and commerce would again count on trucks as a means of
transportation. The railroad companies experienced the reappearance of motor vehicles with
distress because the end of the war resulted in a renewed competition and the end of the tax
exemptions. During the war, railroad companies benefited from these exemptions because they
were part of the defense apparatus. But during peace time they returned to providing a civil
service; and consequently, their tax exemption status also changed. However, the absence of an
effort to extend tax exemptions to railroad companies occurred in times of governmental policies
for economic development grounded in tax cuts.
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In 1946 President Harry S. Truman appointed Jesús T. Piñero as the first Puerto Rican
governor. During Piñero’s governorship the Transportation Authority developed the transportation
platform of the future. The law allowed the agency to “dispose of any and all equipment, supplies,
services, goods, and such other property real and personal as the Authority” deemed necessary.603
The priority was the establishment of an efficient bus service in the metropolitan area in lieu of
establishing an integrated tramway and bus system. The new interest of policy makers was in
transportation, and “considerable attention was given to future developments in air travel in the
Caribbean area.”604 The promotion of the island as a tourist destination for U.S. citizens was not a
new idea and since the U.S. occupation the island was portrayed as the Switzerland of the
Caribbean. During the first decades of U.S. control, the infrastructure in Puerto Rico was not in a
position to exploit an industry of tourism. In 1936, the Department of Agriculture and Commerce
put forward their efforts in making Puerto Rico a place that would be highly attractive to tourists.
Since one of the greatest concerns was the lack of suitable accommodation for the tourists, the
Department of Agriculture and Commerce tried “to induce someone to build and operate a first
class hotel,” and would provide him with “free land and exemption of taxes.”605 With these
incentives the Industrial Development Company signed an agreement in 1947 with the Hilton
Hotels Corporation for the construction of a 300-room hotel at a cost of 5 million dollars.606
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Another initiative for the promotion of the tourist industry was the approval of a bill in the
legislature for the creation of the Institute of Tourism with an initial budget of $300,000. Using the
New York office of the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, the Institute of Tourism
conducted an aggressive advertising campaign with “thousands of pamphlets, descriptive literature
and views of the Island and a set of five posters in colors were distributed to tourist agencies
throughout the United States and Canada.”607 The campaign also included exhibitions and
participation in festivals and pageantry contests. From 1937 to 1938 twenty tourist ocean liners
arrived in Puerto Rico. However, from 1946 on tourists arrived on planes. As a result, the country
needed a new international airport and the insular government relied on the Transportation
Authority for its development. The efforts to build an international airport became a priority for the
promotion of the tourist industry. Visitors would rely on taxis or buses and railroads were not
considered a transportation alternative or a tourist attraction in itself.
Last Stop: Parque Borinquen
Tramway workers in the San Juan trolley also were in a situation of job insecurity. On
September 19, 1945 Governor Tugwell announced the prompt cessation of service provided by the
electric tramway operated by the Administración de Fuentes Fluviales (AFF).608 In order to cut
their losses the board decided to close down the trolley service and the chairman “stated that he
had been assured that other means of transportation would be available by November 30, 1945 and
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he recommended that operation of the street railway system be discontinued as of that date.”609 The
board voted to lay off 63 workers with a two months severance pay package.
The Water Resources Authority’s board ended the railway operation in recognition that
competition from cars, buses, and trucks would make the tramway economically unsustainable.
Apparently, the governor did not meet with the chiefs of other agencies to inform them of his
plans. Antonio R. Barceló, president of the Public Service Commission, and José G. Bloise,
director of the Transportation Authority, declared they were unfamiliar with the plans of the Water
Resources Authority.610 The Department of the Interior was widening the Ponce de León Avenue
and the project included the leveling of tramway tracks in concrete, but the agency did not receive
any official communication from the Water Resources Authority. It was cheaper to remove the
tracks and simply asphalt the entire avenue but the status of the trolley was unknown. The
editorials of El Mundo criticized the decision of the Water Resources Authority and denounced the
lack of coordination between governmental agencies. It also asked that those passengers who may
have preferred the use of the trolley over the publicos be considered.
Rafael Picó, head of the Planning Board, backed the Water Resources Authority’s decision.
In his words: “La Junta recomendó hace meses que el tranvía fuera eliminado.”611 If the Planning
Board had already eliminated the trolley from the San Juan development plans it was just a matter
of time before the tramway met its end. This plan to close the trolley clearly explained the lack of
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interest from the Water Resources Authority in investing in the maintenance of tracks and repairs
for the wagons. In order to demonstrate that the trolley was indeed obsolete the agency abandoned
maintenance.
The press condemned the imminent cessation of the trolley service. El Mundo, the principal
newspaper on the island, published various editorial columns questioning the reasons behind the
dissolution of the trolley. The main hesitation was the lack of alternatives left to the people without
private automobiles.
In mid-November, José G. Bloise, director of the Autoridad de Transporte, recognized the
impossibility of the agency to provide adequate bus service by month’s end. The Agency ordered
80 buses from a factory in the United States but the automobile industry and dockworkers were on
strike.612 For this reason, the board of the Water Resources Authority met and agreed to maintain
the trolley in service until the Autoridad de Transporte received the units needed from the United
States to provide efficient service.613
In a report prepared under the auspices of the Division of Economic Research of the Puerto
Rico Industrial Development Company the difference between income from the railways and
gasoline vehicles was evident. Income from the railways was dramaticaly lower (Table 6.1):
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Table 6.1. Purchased local transportation: Gross Income (in thousands of dollars), 1944-46.
TRANSPORTATION
Bus & Ferry transportation (s)
Públicos & Taxis (s)
San Juan trolley (s)
Steam railway (s)

1944
4,264
26,160
120
607

1945
6,282
33,582
131
547

1946
6,496
30,714
119
362

SOURCE. - Gross Product of Puerto Rico, 1944-1946 (Río Piedras, Puerto Rico: Editorial
Universitaria, 1949), 9.
The government could justify closing down the trolley but the lack of coordination between
agencies helped to create an atmosphere of uncertainty about transportation in San Juan. Almost a
year later, in August 1946, the Public Service Commission endorsed the end of the trolley
operation, because the Autoridad de Transporte finally received new buses to replace the trolley.614
On September 30, 1946 the San Juan trolley journeyed for the last time. El Mundo published a
romantic review of the last trip, although, La Democracia reported how people vandalized the
trolley:
La despedida al vehículo anticuado y ensordecedor para darle paso al ómnibus
modernista y con el necesario confort, fue bellísima oportunidad para que
centenares de jóvenes de todas las estratas de nuestra sociedad se dedicaran al
saqueo y a la destrucción de una propiedad que por ser pública pertenece a todo el
pueblo… El vehículo tuvo que suspender su marcha incontables veces porque los
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diversionistas no desperdiciaban oportunidad para detenerlo.615
The Imparcial did not explain why people reacted this way, if it was a band of criminals or
thieves, or a violent reaction of commuters because of the closing of the trolley. The following
morning the Department of the Interior started the removal of the tracks on the Ponce de León
Avenue. The agency continued the widening if the road in order to increase the flow of vehicles.
With wider roads to accommodate more automobiles and the hasty removal of the tramway tracks
the city welcomed a new modern era founded on individual transportation.
ARRC files bankruptcy
On November 1946, the workers of the ARRC celebrated the Boston Court of Appeals’
decision ruling that a railroad company must meet “full wage claims of its employees, even though
it was contended this might force the company out of business.”616 The Obreros Unidos de las
Ferrovías de Puerto Rico immediately resumed their demands for retroactive wages that the
company had failed to pay since 1938. The ARRC consistently stated their disposition to increase
worker’s wages, although, they were financially incapable of granting them. Unionized workers
did not agree with the company’s claims, and condemned the practice of maintaining low wages to
increase company’s earnings. The union pointed out that workers from the ARRC received the
lowest salaries in the transportation industry. For example, a fireman in the Ponce & Guayama
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Railroad earned 45 cents per hour in contrast to 26 cents per hour earned in the ARRC.617
Although the union was demanding higher wages the administration of the ARRC was proposing a
$200,000 payroll reduction. The impasse between the workers and the company would be solved
after the report of the Insular Board of Minimum Wages. In the meantime the company decided to
postpone the discussion of the clauses relating to salary increases.
The Mandatory Decree No. 12 approved by the Minimum Wage Board prescribed wages
of 40 cents per hour for skilled workers, 30 cents per hour for semi-skilled workers, and 25 cents
per hour for un-skilled workers in the railroad industry, but in all other transportation branches it
was 50, 40 and 30 cents per hour for the same group of workers. The Decree also established the 8hour day and 48-hour week for all transportation workers. Overtime had to be compensated with
double pay.618 For the union the Decree No. 12 was setback for railroad workers, so they filed a
petition for review. 619 In order to pressure the company, the Obreros Unidos de las Ferrovías de
Puerto Rico threatened the ARRC’s administration and the government with a railroad strike that
would affect the 1947 cane harvest which was about to begin.
After multiple meetings the president of Obreros Unidos, Primitivo Meléndez, alerted the
General Director of the ARRC, Etienne Totti, of their decision to declare a strike in two days.
Meléndez informed Totti that he had the power to halt the strike if there was a commitment to raise

617

Unión Obreros Unidos de las Ferrovías de Puerto Rico, Manifiesto, AGPR, Fondo Oficina del Gobernador, Tarea
96-20, Caja 408.
618
Forty-seventh Annual Report of the Governor of Puerto Rico, 1947, 105.
619
Primitivo Meléndez and Mariano Ducrett to Cándido Oliveras, Santurce, Puerto Rico, 13 January 1947, AGPR,
Fondo Oficina del Gobernador, Tarea 96-20, Caja 457.

302

workers’ salaries.620 However, the strike began on February 26, 1947 at 6:00 p.m. The local
government did not get involved in the conflict and the federal government demonstrated its
apathy to intervene after a decision was made to have the Army distribute the mail on the island.621
The disruption of the mail service was a serious infringement in the federal sphere and the striking
workers could be subject to imprisonment for disrupting the mail service caused by the railroad
strike.
The strike ended on March 31. A week later, on April 8, Secundino Lozada informed
Governor Jesús T. Piñero about the precarious economic situation of the company and urged the
governor to offer some economic assistance to maintain the company in operation. Piñero had
several alternatives that could assist the ARRC. In 1945 the government created a rental subsidy
program known as Aid to Industrial Development (AID) to promote the relocation of U.S.
companies on the island. Economic historian James Dietz found that after 726 inquiries from
different U.S. companies, only three benefited from AID. Those three companies already
conducted business in Puerto Rico thus defeating the raison d'être of the program. The ARRC
operated on the island and was a U.S. company but did not obtain the subsidy. Evidently, AID was
not attractive enough to persuade U.S. corporations to transfer their operations to Puerto Rico.
However, the government was eager to attract capital from abroad and decided to create even more
incentives. Consequently, on “May 1947 the legislature passed the Industrial Incentives Act, which
not only exempted qualifying firms from property, excise, and municipal taxes and license fees, as
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earlier laws had done, but also provided complete exemption from insular income taxes until 1959
and partial exemption until 1962.”622 Similar legislation was submitted by the legislature in 1944
but Tugwell vetoed it. It was no surprise, that that same year the ARRC submitted a petition for tax
exemption. The governor now signed the bill but made no effort to extend it to the ARRC.
Evidently, Piñero had no interest in making it easier for the company, not because he rejected
public funding or assistance to private companies in principle, but because he desired to eliminate
the railways.
In September the ARRC would have to cease operations unless the government bailed
them out or granted some kind of financial assistance.623 Before making any decisions, Governor
Piñero provided a copy of the communications between him and the ARRC to the Department of
the Interior in Washington in order to receive advice from the head of the Division of Territories
and Island Possessions. A study of the Antilles Department determined that military cargo, which
was being handled by the railroad, would “be moved by water and highway.”624 Wm. W. Bessell,
Brigadier General, requested advance notice from the governor for any decision relating to the
railroads in order to make any necessary adjustment in the army schedules.625
On July 23, 1947 the governor appointed a special committee to study the finances of the
ARRC but before the committee submitted its final report the ARRC filed bankruptcy in the
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Federal Court.626 Historian Aurelio Tió claimed that the bankruptcy of the company was the result
of workers’ wage demands.627 In fact, the company stated in its annual report that competition and
labor relations were the principal causes for the bankruptcy.628 The acquisition of private
automobiles and trucks had increased steadily in a decade (Figures 6.1 and 6.2). However, private
ownership of automobiles and trucks did not guarantee a reduction in the impact the closure of the
railroad would have on those who had no transportation alternatives. An example of the
inconvenience of over dependency on taxis would be the traffic jams in rush hours, the fluctuation
in gasoline prices, and the interruption of the service in the case of a strike.
Figure 6.1. Automobiles registered for 1940 and 1950.
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Puerto Rico.
Figure 6.2. Trucks registered for 1940 and 1950.
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Collective taxis (carros públicos) started a strike in February 1947.629 They protested a
decision of the Autoridad de Transporte Público to establish fixed routes and protested high
gasoline prices. In March of that same year, trucks used in the transportation of cane to Central
Lafayette in Arroyo also declared a strike demanding a 75 cents increase per tons transported.630 In
both cases, railroads were an alternative to the shortage in transportation created by the strikes. The
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government provided collective transportation for the metropolitan area through buses operated by
the Puerto Rico Transportation Authority, but this service was not extended to the rest of the
island. Although, this public corporation only operated in the metropolitan area it still did not
function as expected because already in 1947 its financial situation was critical. During the fiscal
year 1945-46 the corporation “showed a loss of $22,687” and for the next fiscal year the loss
increased dramatically to $222,476. In a report published in January 1948 a consultant firm
concluded: “to all intents and purposes the Bus Division is literally bankrupt.”631 The Puerto Rico
Transportation Authority adopted economic adjustments including the end of many benefits that
had been granted for years, such as free transportation to detectives and police officers in
uniform.632 Both, buses and railways operated at a loss, but the government only subsidized the
buses, and turned their back on the railroads.
The federal court selected Don Fernando E. Zegrí, manager of the Banco de Ponce, to
supervise the operation of the ARRC. José G. González from the law firm Fidler, González &
Nido submitted a plan to reorganize the ARRC. The plan proposed the establishment of a new
company with a capital of $5 millions distributed in shares of $100. This action would imply the
dissolution of the Companía de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico and the ARRC. The new
company would get a loan for 1.5 million dollars for repairs, purchase of equipment including four
diesel locomotives, and workers’ salaries. The company owed more than 3 million dollars in
wages, but the proposal included a court settlement to reduce the quantity to $889,000 including
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lawyers’ fees.633 The union reluctantly supported the plan, probably because the alternative was
the end of the company and complete end of employment. However, this proposal never
materialized.634
In an official letter directed to Ellmer Elsworth, coordinator of insular affairs, the ARRC
questioned the unwritten policy of railway exclusion from the new infrastructure plan. Fernando E.
Zegri, trustee of the ARRC, was particularly concerned about the lack of tracks in the plans for the
development of a bulkhead in Ponce. Without railroad tracks it would be impossible to participate
in the transportation of cargo to and from the port. Zegri claimed that in Cataño another bulkhead
was under construction near an army base, where railroad tracks were also not included in the
blueprints. The trend was clear Zegri concluded in a letter: “At times, I cannot understand the
antipathy of the Government officials in general, barring your goodself, towards giving the railroad
any opportunity.”635 In conclusion, the ARRC declared bankruptcy and the government was not
willing to extend any economic aid to the corporation.
It was evident that the direction was to abandon the railroads for the development of
another type of infrastructure. Railroads were a thing of the past, and highways and airports were
the future of a new, dynamic, and modern economy. In 1948, the island had 3,500 kilometers of
roads as well as a master plan developed by the Puerto Rico Transportation Authority for a new
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international airport in Isla Verde, Carolina.636 Airplanes, trucks, buses, and carros públicos,
became the best choice for cargo and passenger transportation because the service was faster,
cheaper, and more convenient.
In a booklet published by the Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company in 1948 titled:
Puerto Rico, U.S.A.: Moving Forward the government circulated several statistics to illustrate the
economic progress of the island after 50 years of being part of the United States. The booklet
included data for demographic density, per capita income, literacy, trade per capita, and
transportation. Puerto Rico was compared to other Latin American countries and a selection of
states in the U.S. The graphs and figures illustrated that Puerto Rico was doing better than all Latin
American countries but still fell behind all of the states in the union. Moving Forward meant
becoming more like those developed states in the U.S. In the case of transportation, railroads were
never mentioned. Instead, Moving Forward indicated that an increase in road building was a
“significant aspect of the multilateral program of economic and social expansion now under
way.”637 That is to say, that there was a new plan of economic development and that only
automobiles and trucks were in the plan. The government did not have to articulate the railway’s
demise because the silence concerning the future of railways was thunderous.
The message was clear: Puerto Rico was moving forward. In a report titled “El
financiamiento del desarrollo económico en Puerto Rico” the island occupied third place in
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automobiles per 100 inhabitants after Panama and Argentina, but Puerto Rico had more roads per
100 square miles than all the countries in the study.638 In contrast with other Latin American
countries as the report established, Puerto Rico exhibited more economic progress than its
neighbors. The government increased expenditures by 83 percent for road construction and
maintenance from 1941 to 1948. Without a doubt, the government developed an active campaign
to portray the island as one in the process of rapid transformation and one measure of this
transformation was the purchase of automobiles and the advancement of new road infrastructure.
The shift in the economic model was directly related to the neglect of the railways. The
official policy was the promotion of manufacturing industries in place of agricultural production,
because after 50 years of exporting sugar, tobacco, coffee, and citrus fruits the change was
necessary to move ahead. The government claimed that they pursued “a better balance between
industry and agriculture”.639 In reality, the government promoted the industrialization of the island
at the expense of agriculture and there was no “balance.” This model was catastrophic for the sugar
industry, as it was for agricultural production in general. It was also the final blow for the railroads.
The first elected governor of Puerto Rico, Luis Muñoz Marín, followed the plans of
industrialization for the island. He embraced those ideas that have been developed by Chardón in
his “Plan” and continued the work started by Tugwell and Piñero for the transformation of the
insular economy. As governor, Muñoz Marín appointed Santiago Díaz Pacheco, Ángel Silva, Jose
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Trías Monge, Frank T. Martocci, and José M. Feliciano to study the role of the government in the
reorganization of the CFC. There was no serious attempt by the committee to intervene in the
bankruptcy proceedings. Instead the committee focused on reasons why the purchase of the
railroad by the government would be economically unwise. In the first paragraph of the
preliminary report the committee made their point clear:
It is generally believe that a railroad in Puerto Rico is not economically justified.
If the island were without railroad today, no informed group would be willing to
construct one. Its operations would never yield a reasonable return over the big
investment required for such a project.640
The report further went on to say that there were only four benefits from the service
provided by the CFC. First, it was a source of income for 1,179 families; second, competition
between railroads and trucks kept down freight costs; third, highway maintenance costs were kept
down; and fourth, it was useful in time of war. The CFC had operated with losses for years and
these four reasons were not enough to justify the purchase of an insolvent railroad. The loss of the
benefits caused by the closure of the CFC could easily be overcome. First, the laborers of the CFC
could find new jobs as truck drivers; second, the Public Service Commission could regulate the
trucks and the prices; third, it was difficult to calculate the savings of highway maintenance if the
railroad continued to operate; and fourth, in case of another war, the military could use trucks for
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transport. The conclusion was evident: trucks made the railroad unnecessary. This study was
obviously a pro forma document to excuse the government for not rescuing the CFC from
bankruptcy.
Without the aid of the government the CFC shutdown passenger service in 1953. The most
widely circulated newspaper on the island, El Mundo, published under the title “A city without
rails” in September 1953:
Con el progreso urbano y los adelantos en la transportación la entrada del
ferrocarril a San Juan se ha considerado desde hace algún tiempo un estorbo y una
amenaza para la seguridad de los habitantes de las barriadas por donde cruza la
vía férrea.641
The newspaper depicted the railroads as “obstacles” and a “menace” for the urban
population. Deceptively there was no more space in the city for the railroad. In the press there was
a change in the perception of the railways and their relevance.
Policy makers were building an industrial Puerto Rico and the transformation included the
disappearance of the railroads because railroads seemed obsolete, slow, and unsustainable. In order
to give meaning to the island’s economic reality Puerto Rico used the U.S. as well as Latin
American countries as a gauge. That is to say, the island would overcome the poverty characteristic
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of agrarian countries by attracting factories from the United States, and motor vehicles would be
indispensable for the transportation of manufacture goods.
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CONCLUSION

During the mid-nineteenth century the establishment of railways was essential in order to
promote economic modernization and progress in Puerto Rico. This desire for economic progress
flourished among creole intellectuals, planters, and merchants. However, Spain lacked a serious
commitment to invest capital for the establishment of railways. The state assumed a passive role
and looked to private capital for the financing and development of railways. Consequently, the first
railroads in Puerto Rico were urban tramways financed by local entrepreneurs. Tramways offered
passenger service in the main urban centers but did not impact the transportation of export
products.
Sugar planters were particularly interested in the establishment of railroads to stimulate
their businesses. Cane fields located in coastal valleys were suitable for rail lines so the proposals
for railroad franchises originated mostly in sugar-producing areas. The government approved all
the petitions for feasibility studies but the projects were expensive and the lack of capital impeded
the realization of the projects.
In 1877 the insular government assumed an active role in the development of railroad
infrastructure. Leonardo de Tejada, Chief Public Works’ engineer, designed a state supported
railroad project to be financed with private capital. The beltway railroad was conceived by state
officials after an analysis of the island’s economic and geographic realities. It was the only instance
in the period under study when the state developed a coherent plan for the establishment of
railways. A steam railroad built from private capital would circle the island enjoying state support.
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However, it was difficult to find investors for the construction and operation of a railroad in Puerto
Rico. Eventually, a Spaniard with Spanish and French capital acquired the project.
The opening of the first railroad lines on the northern coast produced great jubilance, even
though development was extremely slow. The corporation confronted internal problems, did not
meet their deadlines, and started to file petitions for extensions of previously agreed contracts and
timetables for development.
The acquisition of the island by the United States marked a new era for railway expansion
because of greater investment capital availability. The new century brought with it a renaissance of
the sugar industry which used the railroads extensively. Sugar centrales built their own internal rail
lines to transport cane among neighboring plantations and farms to mills and the beltway railroad
was the trunk line that moved the sugar to the ports.
The latest studies on railroads in Latin America stress the essential role of railways in the
strengthening of internal economic exchanges along with the importance of railways in integration
with the world markets. However, this did not apply to Puerto Rico. The documentary evidence
suggest that railroads were not significant in the development of the internal markets than they
were for the transportation of goods to export outlets. The reason for this was the unique relation
Puerto Rico had with the United States after the approval of the Foraker Act. The Puerto Rican
economy was integrated with the United States. The island imported a broad variety of consumer
goods from the United States, including food; and exported sugar, tobacco, coffee, and citrus fruits
to U.S. markets without restrictions. Railways were part of the infrastructure that had been
developed for the export of goods to the United States primarily sugar. Internal exchange of goods
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was enhanced with the construction of roads particularly in mountainous rural areas. With the U.S.
occupation of the island road construction became a priority. Railroads were too expensive to
construct in the highlands because of the steep nature of the mountainous interior, and for this
reason railways operated only on the coast. To fill the demand for internal transportation the
Department of the Interior consistently funded the construction and maintenance of roads. Year
after year, the governors included a summary in their annual reports of the advances made in the
construction of new roads as a commitment toward the modernization of the island’s infrastructure.
Up to the First World War the state actively promoted the construction of railways and
roads to make Puerto Rico a territory with a modern infrastructure. After the war a final attempt to
complete the last portion of the beltway railroad did not materialize and effectively ended the era
of the railroad “boom.” In the 1920s railway companies started to deal with competition, not
between different railroad companies, but with trucks, buses, and automobiles. Initially,
unrestricted competition had an impact on the passenger service, but not on freight. Railroad
companies required from the Public Service Commission a more vigorous overview of the
transportation industry. It was also in the 1920s when railroad companies confronted the first
financial problems when freight service contracted as a result of fluctuations in sugar prices.
A critical period began after a devastating hurricane that struck the island in 1928.
Hurricane San Felipe caused a great deal of economic destruction and the next year the stock
market crash. With the establishment of the New Deal Program, as a response the crisis caused by
the Great Depression, the construction of more rural roads made the interior of the island more
accessible. Large corporations did not benefit from the relief measures as a result of a shift in
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government priorities from focusing on production to consumption. From this point onward the
promotion of automobile and truck sales for individual transportation was more desirable than the
encouragement of collective transportation.
With the onset of the Second World War railroad companies were once again important to
the government as railways were vital for the defense infrastructure. As a result, railroad
companies improved their incomes and had less competition from automobile and buses; although,
their financial situation continued to be delicate. During the war, politicians on the island planned
economic projects that would take place in the country once the war came to an end. But, railroads
were not included in the island imagined by policymakers. Moreover, the country had a brand new
web of roads to aid in the development of a future industrial economy. Soon after the war, the
biggest railroad companies went out of business. In the case of the PRRC, the state seized the
power plants and closed the tramway, and in the case of the ARRC the company simply filed for a
bankruptcy. The other two public service railroads (Fajardo Development Company and
Ferrocarriles del Este) survived longer, because they were an integral part of the sugar business.
The “meaning” of the railroads
The original need to establish railways on the island came from the premise that the
inclusion of railroads in a country’s infrastructure was essential for a modern and growing
economy. The island had a backward economy that required substantial investment in the
construction of new infrastructure to promote exports. The prescription “railroads equal modern
economy” was clear through the second half of the nineteenth-century.
The occupation of the island by the United States at the end of the century was significant
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for the development of railroad lines because U.S. investors built steam railroads and urban electric
tramways. The railroad boom had a powerful message for the people in Puerto Rico. The U.S.
government demonstrated their interest in stimulating the Puerto Rican economy through the
development of a modern railroad infrastructure supplemented with new road construction. The
advance of the railroad project originated by the Spanish government was slow; in contrast, the
U.S. occupation honeycombed the island with kilometers of rail tracks and roads.
The First World War marked the end of the railroad boom. Railroads assumed a new role
because they became part of the defense infrastructure but when the war ended the railway industry
underway important defies. After 1921 sugar prices dropped producing unexpected losses after an
economic bonanza just after the war, coupled with the approval of the Federal Highway Act by the
United States Congress. Although the economy recovered after the crisis and the Federal Highway
Act was not immediately applied to the island, both events were significant. The 1920s were tough
years for the insular economy because the prices of the main export products fluctuated, railways
confronted problems to maintain their financial stability, and the federal government committed
with the development of the infrastructure needed by the increase circulation of motor vehicles.
The crisis of the 1930s and its long-term remedies, were critical in the demise of the
railroad system which was associated with the sugar monoculture economy that was under attack
by the New-Deal policy-makers. When the sugar production was restricted because of quotas the
profits from the railway industry declined to an unsustainable level. The attack on the sugar
industry became an indirect attack on the railroads. The federal programs for economic relief did
not benefit the railroad business.
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The demise of the railways occurred in the 1940s. Railways did not survive the shift in the
economic model promoted from the government from 1942. In this decade official reports made no
mention of railways because the industrialization of Puerto Rico was planned without them. The
government wanted to end large-scale agricultural production and sponsored the small farmers and
their organization into cooperatives and the establishment of new industries in urban areas. Sugar
centrales were under attack by the government and railroads were connected to the sugar industry.
Decreasing freight and passenger incomes and increasing operational costs forced railroad
companies to seek governmental assistance, but the aid was not granted. The exclusion from the
industrialization program sealed the ill fate of the railways in Puerto Rico not accusations of
corruption or mediocrity in the management of their finances. The closing of the “Railway Age” in
Puerto Rico paralleled the takeoff of the island’s industrialization.
Railroad workers were principal players in the transformation of the railways. Unionization
became a headache for railroad administrators. Workers believed they deserved higher wages but
this struggle was in some ways counterproductive because it raised operating costs and decreased
profits. The enemies of big corporations used the labor movement to validate the undesirability of
the railroads as businesses incapable of maintaining profitable operations. The workers appeared
directly responsible for the company failure given that the bankruptcy of the CFC occurred in the
middle of a labor dispute. The government took advantage of the strike to move forward on their
plans to withdraw all support for the railway companies and the impression was that the unions had
pressured the company to its limit.
Finally, the rejection of railways by state policy-makers in favor of motor vehicles had
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some resistance. Newspapers denounced the inconvenience of exchanging the trolley with buses.
Passengers would be better served if the trolley route was complemented with buses, but the plan
was simply the elimination of the trolley although the routes continued by transforming trolley
stations in bus stops. Each person reliant on railways had to make adjustments. The closing of the
railroad displaced those who relied on an informal economic activity around the stations as was the
case of chicharrón vendors (fried pork skin) in Bayamón, which moved away from the rail tracks
to continue their sales on the side of Road no. 2. They had to relocate to the side of roads. Railway
infrastructure became debris of an “obsolete” economic model of agricultural production and roads
and highways became the answer to the transportation needs of industrial Puerto Rico.
Epilogue
The history of railways did not end with the island’s industrialization program known as
Operation Bootstrap. A renaissance emerged in the 1990s. During this period, Governor Pedro
Rosselló developed various mega-infrastructure projects, among them an urban passenger train, a
shuttle between San Juan and Bayamón. In today’s Puerto Rico, cars outnumber inhabitants.
During rush hour, highway congestion in the metropolitan area is utterly chaotic. An efficient
system of mass transportation would have remedied or ameliorate the situation. Regrettably, the
Urban Train has not succeeded. Rails are once more part of a public debate where an efficient mass
transportation system becomes crucial to achieve the Puerto Rico of progress envisioned and
reimagined since the nineteenth century.
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APPENDIX 1

Compañía de los Ferrocarriles de Pto. Rico
Cuadro de las mermas naturales por evaporación, desecación, derrame ú otras causas de que
son susceptibles diversas mercancías en su transporte por ferrocarril, formado por la compañía á
los efectos del artículo 148 del Reglamento para la ejecución de la Ley de Policía vigente.
TANTO POR 100.

MERCANCÍAS

RECORRIENDO HASTA 100K.
2
2
1
½
½
1
1½
1½
2
1
1
1
1
½
1
2
2
1
2
1
½
½
2
1
1½
2
½
1
1
1

Abonos, en cajas, barricas ó sacos.
Aceite, en barriles, ú otros recipientes.
Aceitunas, en barril.
Acidos, en piedra ó polvo
Achicoria, en polvo.
Aglomerados (carbón mineral.)
Aguardiente, en barril.
Aguarrás, en barril.
Ajos, frescos.
id., secos.
Algodón, en faldos.
Alquitrán.
Arcillas.
Arroz, en sacos.
Azucar, centrifuga en sacos.
id., moscabado en bocoyes.
Baruices, en barriles.
Bacalao, en barriles.
Batatas.
Brea.
Cacao, en sacos.
Café, en sacos.
Cal apagada, á granel.
Cal ó cemento, en sacos o barriles.
Cañamo.
Cañas de azucar.
Carbón vegetal, en sacos.
id. id. á granel.
Caruaza.
Carue, ahumada y salada.
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Cebollas.
Cereales.
Cerveza.
Cocos, á granel.
Coke.
Colores, en cascos.
id. molidos, en sacos.
Confituras.
Cordages. (cordelería)
Cortezas tintóreas y medicinales, en fardos.
Cuernos.
Cueros, frescos.
Crin vegetal.
Drogas, en barriles.
Embutidos.
Esencias, en barriles.
Especias.
Estearina.
Féculas, en sacos.
Forrajes
Frijoles.
Frutas, frescas.
id. secas.
Gandures.
Garbanzos.
Grasas.
Habichuelas, frescas.
id. secas.
Harina, en sacos.
Hortalizas.
Huesos.
Hulla, á granel.
Jabón, en cajas.
Legumbres, frescas.
id. secas.
Lentejas.
Limones.
Maderas, tintóreas.
Manteca.
Miel de caña, en barriles.
Miel de abeja.
Minerales en bruto, á granel.

2
½
1½
2
1
1½
½
1
1½
2
2
2
1½
½
1
2
½
1
½
2
1
2
1
½
½
1
2
½
½
2
5
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
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Naranjas, dulces ó amargas.
2
Ñames.
2
Paja.
½
Pastas, alimenticias.
½
Papas ó patatas.
2
Pescados, secos.
1
id. frescos con sal.
2
Pieles, curtidas y charoladas.
1
Pieles, frescas ó saladas.
2
Pimienta molida, en cajas ó sacos.
½
Platanos.
2
Productos químicos, en barriles.
½
Quesos.
1½
Raices tintóreas ó medicinales.
2
Resinas sólidas, en barriles ó sacos.
½
Rón, en barriles.
1½
Sal común.
½
Salazones, en barriles ó en cajas.
1
Sebo.
1
Semillas, en sacos
½
Tabaco en hojas, en barriles
1½
Tierra para industria, á granel.
1
Trapos, en fardos.
1
Vinos, en barriles
1½
Vinagres, en barriles
1½
Yautias
2
Nota. A las demás mercancías que se transporte, y que no están comprendidas en este cuadro, se
les calculará la MERMA aplicando el tanto por 100 señalado á las que tengan con aquellas más
analogía.
San Juan 9 abril 1897
El Director into
Aprobado por acuerdo de la comisión provincial y asociado de quince de enero de mil
ochocientos noventa y ocho.
El Vicepresidente
Source: Diputación Provincial de Puerto Rico,“Expediente sobre tarifas e itinerarios de la
Compañía del ferrocarril de circunvalación, cuadro de mermas. 1897 – 1898,”AGPR, Fondo
Obras Públicas, Subfondo Ferrocarriles y Tranvías, Serie Expedientes y documentos relativos a
ferrocariles, Caja 34, Legajo 51, Expediente 161.
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APPENDIX 2

Statement of tonnage of traffic moved over the line during the last nine years
Sugar - Cane
Sugar - Raw
Molasses - scrap
Fertilizers
Groceries
Coal
Building materials
Fuel oil
Gasoline
Kerosene
Oil & Alcohol
Lumber
Coffee
Miscellaneous
Leaf Tobacco
Minor Native
Products
Machinery
Wood and Fuel
Hardware
Oranges & Pineapple
Cull Fruits
Woolen Fab.
Bagging
Charcoal
Seeds
Livestock
Transshipments
TOTAL

1930
1,415,65
7
131,145
35,160
42,509
20,351
13,710
6,722
31,265
2,629
891
3,005
5,811
1,147
14,182
276
3,000

1931
1,655,93
5
159,817
40,852
34,153
18,959
10,449
5,085
23,348
2,229
952
4,358
5,993
1,561
11,897
138
2,178

1932
1,575,20
9
152,918
46,885
51,967
7,795
11,032
7,509
28,571
964
1,195
1,968
11,498
548
6,373
71
2,510

1933
1,647,12
4
150,249
24,392
53,123
5,923
7,344
5,662
25,514
676
860
1,437
14,432
1,165
7,051
68
1,191

1934
1,895,07
3
151,733
27,666
39,299
5,359
7,441
7,763
27,043
509
350
1,389
6,971
405
6,972
43
2,464

1935
1,460,30
4
129,425
50,097
26,608
3,965
7,567
5,848
31,280
219
229
2,021
5,132
590
7,242
21
2,756

1936
1,442,42
3
131,940
19,131
36,370
4,156
8,653
6,713
36,167
185
255
1,122
5,065
983
7,725
26
2,333

1937
1,592,96
8
151,023
27,008
34,931
4,593
8,793
13,601
30,662
399
424
2,484
7,784
1,174
6,345
29
1,841

1938
1,426,80
1
139,804
19,255
33,158
4,475
8,249
13,845
35,938
280
444
2,921
10,224
1,254
6,470
23
1,508

2,816
553
2,107
111
1,604
1,154
1,273
77
2,895
56
1,740,10
6

2,952
666
2,095
128
1,285
1,609
1,515
65
1,186
83
1,989,48
8

1,813
152
2,530
13
691
1,189
1,557
89
1,099
48
14,600
1,930,79
4

2,059
192
2,935
2
420
1,222
1,327
180
2,887
134
13,856
1,971,42
5

2,162
179
2,936
1
987
1,249
1,502
103
595
12
13,161
2,203,36
7

3,425
124
2,758
490
1,189
779
66
68
23
15,715
1,757,94
1

3,159
959
3,341
25
125
1,373
746
143
62
4
18,726
1,731,91
0

3,103
524
3,368
36
1,310
1,182
88
256
16
27,223
1,921,16
5

3,058
234
3,116
19
1,414
1,939
98
269
4
23,397
1,738,19
7

SOURCE: American Railroad Company of Porto Rico. Traffic Department. Statement of tonnage
of traffic moved over the line during the last nine years.
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APPENDIX 3

Statement of revenue of traffic moved over the line during the last nine years.
1930

1931

1932

1933

1934

1935

1936

1937

1938

Sugar - Cane

$750,735.06

$938,731.81

$848,662.63

$921,228.55

$1,093,651.1
5

$830,852.07

$822,262.68

$922,704.13

$822,201.01

Sugar - Raw

251,193.03

225,455.49

248,403.54

152,884.64

180,892.64

152,647.41

155,539.42

176,636.52

139,432.11

Molasses - scrap

60,210.23

65,734.04

83,896.53

19,989.17

16,281.82

59,330.54

10,809.46

14,593.58

7,179.01

Fertilizers

72,354.05

65,915.78

67,565.79

75,668.30

52,358.11

26,636.28

38,484.92

34,035.13

30,686.04

Groceries

61,751.77

44,839.22

15,810.67

10,325.88

9,328.98

6,909.05

7,314.06

8,610.83

8,563.52

Coal

17,620.26

17,008.88

12,657.10

12,128.47

9,453.93

8,734.77

8,803.69

8,766.62

8,001.47

Building materials

10,250.48

8,087.90

10,301.38

7,895.89

10,101.97

8,257.69

9,435.56

17,373.67

17,768.92

Fuel oil

37,430.14

27,153.72

29,478.62

24,346.69

27,279.21

25,937.23

29,072.15

28,332.98

33,445.09

Gasoline

5,636.96

4,335.70

1,718.87

1,287.39

908.51

396.62

276.40

964.14

691.26

Kerosene

1,745.44

2,012.82

2,294.78

1,622.28

539.29

380.25

669.19

1,104.79

1,135.98

Oil & Alcohol

7,406.56

7,147.73

5,125.24

3,633.19

3,172.61

5,392.92

2,692.28

6,582.99

6,997.97

Lumber

11,638.59

11,960.15

15,850.40

19,482.10

9,377.06

10,760.98

10,009.78

14,416.23

17,442.83

Coffee

2,927.29

4,864.81

1,553.68

2,712.65

1,234.26

1,395.12

2,197.91

2,698.61

2,436.32

Miscellaneous

49,041.59

40,097.18

19,396.84

17,419.83

13,943.65

13,397.26

14,298.55

13,318.02

14,061.35

Leaf Tobacco

1,549.69

861.73

386.55

258.35

203.65

111.37

90.35

139.44

122.20

Minor Native Products

8,232.90

4,699.50

5,242.62

2,367.23

4,773.16

5,156.57

4,557.18

3,604.70

3,081.36

Machinery

8,422.86

6,533.93

4,145.74

4,634.91

4,789.31

4,383.35

6,285.74

6,422.34

7,113.08

Wood and Fuel

469.25

515.34

102.79

147.12

139.45

104.92

675.11

327.23

142.74

Hardware

8,619.05

7,474.97

7,570.80

8,261.27

8,030.57

7,855.04

9,058.63

10,301.69

9,829.81

Oranges & Pineapple

346.93

337.77

36.45

8.82

2.82

-

65.63

0.99

-

Cull Fruits

3,641.24

3,261.17

1,421.44

945.70

1,904.37

849.26

262.42

99.17

42.39

Woolen Fab.

6,052.25

7,588.62

5,318.74

5,129.63

5,116.46

5,289.04

5,614.71

5,685.42

6,121.66

Bagging

3,634.39

3,818.92

3,035.29

2,683.57

2,816.62

1,209.56

1,179.32

1,770.69

2,796.99

Charcoal

176.51

150.65

170.32

323.57

187.50

99.34

230.56

196.21

176.74

Seeds

4,915.09

1,884.07

1,255.38

2,603.53

643.94

121.11

98.49

319.64

418.88

Livestock

312.77

330.35

127.67

427.00

122.23

54.40

27.80

53.05

13.80

Transshipments

-

6,879.56

37,692.20

36,386.02

27,305.91

33,052.28

38,818.57

49,251.00

46,602.14

TOTAL

1,386,314.38

1,507,681.81

1,429,222.06

1,334,801.75

1,484,559.18

1,209,314.43

1,178,830.56

1,328,309.81

1,186,504.67

SOURCE: American Railroad Company of Porto Rico. Traffic Department. Statement of revenue
of traffic moved over the line during the last nine years.
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APPENDIX 4

Road construction in Puerto Rico, 1899-1943

SOURCE. - AGPR; Fondo Oficina del Gobernador; Caja 743.
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